We’re warmer (they’re more competent):
I-sharing and African Americans’ perceptions of the ingroup and outgroup

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Abstract

Researchers currently know very little about how African Americans regard themselves and their salient outgroup (i.e., European Americans). The current study examines how experiences with individual ingroup and outgroup members affect these evaluations on two key dimensions in intergroup research: warmth and competence. In particular, the study asks what effect I-sharing (i.e., sharing a subjective experience) with an African American or a European American has on African Americans’ perceptions of the warmth and competence of their ingroup and outgroup. Results revealed an ingroup preference on the dimension of warmth when participants had I-shared with a fellow African American but not when they had I-shared with a European American. No such ingroup preference emerged on the dimension of competence. Instead, participants exhibited an outgroup preference on this dimension after I-sharing with a European American. The discussion entertains possible explanations for these differential effects of I-sharing on judgments of the ingroup and outgroup.

The descriptors come cloaked in different garb depending on the group of interest. For women, they come in the form of “nurturant” but “naïve” (Glick & Fiske, 1996), for the elderly, “endearing” but “ailing” (Cuddy, Norton, & Fiske, 2005), and for Asians, “smart” but “untrustworthy” (Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2005). Setting aside the specific terms, one cannot help but notice that two dimensions repeatedly emerge as particularly pertinent to interpersonal judgments. According to Fiske and colleagues (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007), people want to know two critical pieces of information about those with whom they interact: information about their intentions (are they good or bad?) and information about their abilities (can they carry out those intentions?). Theorists refer to the first type of information as warmth information and to the second type as competence information (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Fiske et al., 2002; Glick & Fiske, 1996; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005; Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968; Yzerbyt, Provost, & Corneille, 2005).

This manuscript concentrates on the warmth and competence judgments that African Americans make of the ingroup (fellow African Americans) and of the outgroup (European Americans). In particular, we ask what effect I-sharing (i.e., shared subjective experience) has on judgments of the ingroup and outgroup. In so doing, we add to the literature on warmth and competence in two ways: (1) we offer insight into how African Americans...
regard European Americans, something about which we know very little; (2) we look at how personal experiences with ingroup and outgroup members affect warmth and competence judgments of the group at large. In the writing that follows, we begin with a brief review of the warmth and competence literature, following it up with a discussion of I-sharing and our predictions for how it might play a role in warmth and competence judgments.

**Warmth and Competence Research**

Across more than 20 countries, looking at over 20 different social groups, researchers interested in stereotype content have amassed evidence that social groups tend to get judged along the dimensions of warmth and competence (Glick et al., 2000; Glick et al., 2004). Moreover, analyses of stereotype content indicate that many groups receive ambivalent, seemingly contradictory, ratings on these dimensions (i.e., they are seen as high on warmth but low on competence, or low on warmth and high on competence; Judd et al., 2005), and these contradictions presumably occur in such a way that they maintain the status of the majority group (Cuddy et al., 2007; Fiske et al., 2002, Fiske et al., 2007; Yzerbyt et al., 2005).

Looking at the judgments of the specific groups focused on here - African Americans and European Americans in general - it turns out that we do not have much modern-day data on this topic. In early work on intergroup attitudes, African Americans tended to be seen as more warm than competent (Allport, 1954; Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1950) and European Americans tended to be seen as more competent than warm. More recent data on this topic yields mixed results. Perceptions of Whites, in general, tend to corroborate the results of earlier findings: Whites as a group get rated as higher in competence than in warmth (Cuddy et al. 2007). Perceptions of Blacks, in general, tend to follow a different pattern from that observed in earlier research: Blacks receive average scores on both dimensions (Fiske et al., Study 4, 2002). Of relevance here, these data come from samples characterized by a majority of White participants.

As far as we know, the little bit of data collected to date on African Americans’ perceptions of the ingroup and outgroup (i.e., European Americans) do not break these ratings down by warmth and competence. Looking at general regard for the ingroup and outgroup, these data reveal the standard ingroup preference observed across a wide range of groups (Hwang, Fitpatrick, & Helms, 1998; Livingston, 2002; Monteith & Spicer, 2000).

In short, we know very little about how African Americans view the ingroup and outgroup, and virtually nothing about these views as they pertain to warmth and competence. The ingroup preference typically observed may very well emerge as equally strong on both dimensions, or it may take on a different pattern. For instance, based on Crocker and Major’s (1989) writings on selective valuation, as well as on Major and colleagues’ (Major & Schmader, 1998; Major, Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998) work on psychological disengagement, one might predict that African Americans would show more ingroup favoritism on the dimension of warmth (i.e., the dimension on which, according to stereotypes, African Americans fare well) than on the dimension of competence (i.e., the dimension on which, according to stereotypes, African Americans fare poorly).

The research on the antecedents of stereotype content also points to differential ratings of the outgroup as a function of warmth-competence dimension. In brief, this work indicates that cooperation and competition predict warmth ratings such that people rate as warmer those against whom they do not compete (see Fiske et al., 2002). Status, on the other hand, predicts competence ratings. Groups deemed high in status receive higher competence ratings than those deemed low in status.
Considering first the dimension of warmth, one could argue that African Americans as a group perceive themselves as competing with European Americans. If so, then African Americans should rate European Americans less warmly than they would rate African Americans. In contrast, given the unfortunate reality that European Americans as a group continue to occupy a higher status than African Americans across a wide range of positions, one might predict that African Americans would rate European Americans more highly on the dimension of competence than they rate the ingroup.

In short, the data on how African Americans perceive European Americans do not look at these evaluations as a function of warmth and competence. These dimensions may operate similarly or they may operate differently; there are good reasons to predict both possibilities. In this study, we looked at this question empirically. Moreover, we examined this question in the context of a specific type of interaction between our African American participants and a member of the ingroup and outgroup. The interaction consisted of an instance of I-sharing (or not I-sharing). As we explain in the next section, I-sharing may prove particularly relevant to warmth and competence ratings insofar as it simultaneously fosters feelings of interpersonal closeness (which would implicate warmth ratings) and feelings that one’s conception of reality is on the mark (which would implicate competence ratings).

I-sharing Research and Theory

I-sharing derives its name from the distinction that James (1890/1918) and other self theorists (e.g., Mead, 1934/1963) make between the objective self (the Me) and the subjective self (the I). The objective self consists of our representation of ourselves, our self-concept. It includes anything pertaining to what we call ours, what we think of ourselves, how we feel about ourselves, what we know about our behaviors, our memories, our social identities, etc. Taking a mirror as an analogy, the reflection we see in the glass constitutes our objective self.

In contrast to the objective self, the subjective self refers to the agentic part of the self. It represents that aspect of our self that, at any given moment, perceives, reacts, interprets, and experiences. Referring back to the mirror analogy, the part of us that does the looking and reacts to what it sees constitutes the subjective self.

Whereas the objective self tends toward stability, changing only insofar as people add to their representations of self (“I’m a mother now”), the subjective self is fleeting in nature; it changes from one moment to the next - as the stimuli to which one attends change - and leaves what James (1890/1918) dubbed a “stream of consciousness” in its wake.

Keeping the distinction between the objective and subjective self in mind, I-sharing refers to the belief that one has shared an identical subjective experience with at least one other person. Importantly, I-sharing involves a form of similarity that has nothing to do with how people conceive of themselves and thus it can be distinguished from similarity of the objective self (hereafter, Me-sharing). I-sharing refers to similarity that stems from how two or more people react in a given moment to a common stimulus. It happens when a person senses that she and her partner have the same passionate response to a Mozart concerto, or when she and her partner express identical thoughts and feelings in response to their child’s theatrical debut, or when, upon describing an abstract painting, her friend uses the same exact esoteric adjectives that she had called to mind. But it can also happen with a stranger, or with someone who is drastically different from us from an objective standpoint.

We draw a clear line between I-sharing and other forms of interpersonal similarity typically studied in the literature on interpersonal and intergroup processes. Although researchers have investigated the magnetism of similarity on dimensions ranging from non-diagnostic
features of the self such as birthdays (Burger, Messian, Patel, del Prado, & Anderson, 2004) and dot estimation (e.g. Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) to seemingly defining features of the self such as core values (Rokeach, 1973) and life-altering experiences (Hodges, Klein, Veach, & Villanueva, 2004), all of these features have in common the shared umbrella of the objective self.

We believe that I-sharing fosters liking because it satisfies people’s need for existential connection. From a historical standpoint, as humans became more and more self-aware and more and more other-aware, they became increasingly more concerned about what goes on inside the minds of themselves and others (Baumeister, 1987). This inward-focus sets the stage for the recognition that we cannot know firsthand the inner-workings of other people’s minds and bodies, nor can they know the inner-workings of ours (Yalom, 1980). We are existentially isolated - alone in a phenomenological sense - and this can pose problems for our fundamental needs for belief validation (e.g., Festinger, 1954; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991; Swann, 1996) and connectedness (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Florian, Mikulincer, & Hirschberger, 2002; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). If we cannot truly know the mind of another, then we have difficulty ascertaining whether their conception of reality matches up with our own. This poses a problem for our need to have our beliefs validated. Similarly, if we cannot truly know the mind of another and if he/she cannot truly know ours, this limits the level of interpersonal closeness we can achieve and perhaps even calls the whole notion of closeness into question. How can we be close to someone who does not truly “get us?”

Research points to I-sharing as a unique contributor to interpersonal connectedness and confirms the role that existential isolation plays in this process. In study after study (Crimin, Pinel, & Long, 2008; Pinel & Long, 2008; Pinel, Long, Landau, Alexander, & Pyszczynski, 2006; Pinel, Long, Landau, & Pyszczynski, 2004), people prefer the I-sharer to the person with whom they do not I-share, even when they differ from the I-sharer on important, objective characteristics (e.g., place of origin; sexual orientation; weight class). Moreover, our data show that manipulations of existential isolation increase people’s preference for an I-sharer over a Me-sharer, suggesting the unique role that existential isolation plays in liking for an I-sharer (Pinel et al., 2006, Study 5).

Putting the Two Sets of Research Together

Previous work on warmth and competence, although admirably thorough and extensive, does not tell us specifically about how African Americans see the ingroup and outgroup on the dimensions of warmth and competence. Moreover, warmth and competence research has yet to examine how warmth and competence ratings differ as a function of one’s experience with ingroup and outgroup members. We suspect that I-sharing may represent one interpersonal experience that makes a difference when it comes to ratings of warmth and competence. I-sharing, insofar as it makes people feel connected to one another, may cause one to rate an I-sharer as warmer than a non-I-sharer. Likewise, insofar as it validates people’s conceptions of reality, I-sharing may cause one to rate an I-sharer as more competent than a non-I-sharer. We look at the effect of I-sharing on warmth and competence ratings here, as well as whether this effect varies as a function of the I-sharer’s group membership.

Method

To investigate the effects of I-sharing on group-level evaluations of warmth and competence in African Americans and European Americans, we recruited a sample of African Americans to participate in a study that involved interacting online with two separate
interaction partners. During the course of the study, participants played a modified and computerized version of the game *Imaginiff* with two (ostensible) other participants, one African American and one European American. We manipulated whether the African American partner or the European American partner I-shared with the participant during the game and we measured participants’ warmth and competence ratings of African Americans in general, and European Americans in general.1

**Participants**

Fifty-six African American undergraduate students (46 women and 10 men) participated in this study. For compensation, participants received either course credit or $8. All but one student fell in the 18 to 24 age bracket. When participants arrived at the lab, they got randomly assigned to an I-sharer condition - I-sharing with an African American (and not I-sharing with a European American) or I-sharing with a European American (and not I-sharing with an African American). We collected data from one participant at a time.

**Procedure**

When participants arrived at the lab, a female experimenter greeted them and led them to the cubicle where the experiment on “computer-based interaction” would take place. The experimenter told them that two other participants would be participating in the same experiment in nearby rooms. To bolster this cover story, in full view of the participant, the experimenter wrote down the participant’s name on a piece of paper that already listed the names of the two ostensible partners, Jamie (a unisex stereotypically European American name) and Deiondre (a unisex stereotypically African American name). She then left the room to enter these names into the “master computer,” explaining that the computer program would later refer to each of the participants by name. After a few minutes she returned to obtain participants’ informed consent and explained that all further instructions for the study would appear in written form on the computer sitting in front of them. She then left the room to allow participants privacy while they completed, as part of a separate study, a series of questionnaires on the computer (e.g., a measure of rational versus experiential mind states; a measure of empathy) as well as a writing task.2

After the writing task came the critical manipulation for the current study. First, participants met, via computer, the other two ostensible participants: Jamie and Deiondre. They exchanged demographic information with Jamie and Deiondre, including gender, age, major, ethnicity, and race. Jamie and Deiondre answered these demographic questions identically (18 years old, non-Hispanic, Psychology major, of the same gender as the participant) except for the question pertaining to race. Jamie identified as White/Caucasian, and Deiondre identified as Black/African-American.

After exchanging this demographic information, participants began the game of Imaginiff. Through this game, we manipulated I-sharing.

**I-sharing manipulation**

In the game of Imaginiff used in the present study, we asked participants to imagine celebrities (e.g., Oprah Winfrey) as some other category (e.g., a tool) and to choose what

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1 We had a secondary goal in this study, which consisted of examining whether priming social versus existential isolation would affect warmth and competence judgments of the ingroup and outgroup. Thus, participants started out the study by writing paragraphs designed to prime either social or existential isolation. At best, marginally significant effects emerged for this independent variable and at no point did it interact with the I-sharing manipulation. For this reason, we do not discuss this variable further. We would be happy to provide more information to interested parties.

2 Participants wrote a paragraph about a time when they felt either existentially or socially isolated. As noted in footnote 1, this manipulation did not interact with our I-sharing manipulation and so we will not discuss it further.
specific instantiation of that category the celebrity would be (e.g., cocktail mixer, screwdriver, sledge hammer, toenail clippers). Because most people have never considered such questions, they cannot draw upon their extant knowledge or previous thoughts (i.e., their Me) to answer them, but instead must rely only on their in-the-moment subjective experience (i.e., their I). Thus, we reasoned that when people respond the same way to such questions, they experience a moment of subjective similarity, of I-sharing. Note that we have stripped similarity with regard to Imaginiff responses from any components of the objective self insofar as we asked participants to make novel and spontaneous associations between sets of stimuli. This similarity manipulation involves a trivial response to a game that holds no importance in people’s lives; responses have meaning only insofar as they reflect a person’s in-the-moment experience of the game.

The computer presented 12 trials of the Imaginiff game; each trial included a different celebrity (half of them African American, half of them European American), a different category, and a different set of four multiple choice options. After each trial, participants learned the responses of their ostensible partners, and believed that their partners learned their response. Both partners’ responses appeared on the screen immediately after participants had provided their own response, and remained there for seven seconds. One of the partners, either the African American partner or the European American partner (depending on the I-sharing condition to which participants had been assigned) responded to these Imaginiff questions very similarly to the way the participant responded (i.e., provided the exact same response as the participant on 8 out of the 12 trials) and the other responded very differently (i.e., never provided the same response as the participant). We designated the partner who responded similarly as the I-sharer, and the partner who responded differently as the non-I-sharer. It is important to note that although in this within participants design participants simultaneously got exposed to either an ingroup I-sharer and outgroup non-I-sharer or to an outgroup I-sharer and an ingroup non-I-sharer, we have used a between participants design in other research and found the same effect of I-sharing (Crimin et al., 2008). To keep the race of the interaction partners salient, the racially stereotyped names of the partners appeared along with their responses.

Following the Imaginiff game, participants learned that they would complete a final series of questions and, importantly, that we would not share their responses to these questions with their partners. The two questions of relevance for this study consisted of warmth and competence ratings of African Americans in general and of European Americans in general. These ratings were made on 10-point scales ranging from ‘0’ (very cold or very incompetent) to ‘9’ (very warm or very competent).

At the end of the program, participants received computerized instructions to alert the experimenter that they had finished the study. Before leaving the lab, participants got probed for suspicion, fully debriefed about the methods and goals of the study, and received thanks for their participation.

Results

Did perceived warmth of African Americans and European Americans vary as a function of I-sharing? To answer this question, we submitted warmth ratings to a 2 (I-sharer: African-American, European American) X 2 (Group: African Americans, European Americans) repeated measures ANOVA. This analysis yielded an interaction between I-sharer and Group, $F(1, 54) = 4.61, p < .05$, partial eta squared = .079. As depicted in Figure 1, participants who I-shared with a fellow African American rated African Americans higher in warmth ($M = 6.00, SE = .30$) than European Americans ($M = 5.25, SE = .25$), $F(1, 54) = 6.51, p < .05$, partial eta squared = .108. In contrast, when participants I-shared with a
European American, no difference emerged between the warmth ratings of the two social groups, $F < 1$. This could mean that I-sharing with a fellow African American increased warmth ratings of African Americans, but it could also mean that I-sharing with a European American increased the warmth ratings of European Americans. Regardless of the specific direction of the change, we can say that we observed an ingroup preference on the warmth dimension when participants I-shared with a fellow African-American, but no such ingroup preference when they I-shared with a European American.

We next turned to the question of whether the perceived competence of African Americans and European Americans varied as a function of I-sharing. To answer this question, we submitted competence ratings to a 2 (I-sharer: African American, European American) x 2 (Group: African Americans, European Americans) repeated measures ANOVA. For competence we observed a statistically significant main effect, such that African Americans received lower competence ratings ($M = 6.38, SE = .18$) than European Americans ($M = 6.64, SE = .18$), $F (1, 54) = 4.81, p < .05$, partial eta squared = .082. As with the warmth ratings, we also observed an interaction between I-sharer and Group, $F (1, 54) = 9.43, p < .05$, partial eta squared = .149. As depicted in Figure 2, however, the direction of the effect differed from what we observed with the warmth ratings. For competence ratings, participants who I-shared with a fellow African American rated African Americans and European Americans as equal in competence, $F < 1$. Participants who I-shared with a European American, however, rated African Americans as lower in competence ($M = 6.25, SE = .26$) than European Americans ($M = 6.89, SE = .25$), $F (1, 52) = 13.85, p < .05$, partial eta squared = .204. This could mean that I-sharing with a European American increases competence ratings of the outgroup or that I-sharing with an African American increases competence ratings of the ingroup. Either way, we can say that the same ingroup preference that we observe on the dimension of warmth when participants I-share with an ingroup member, does not emerge on the dimension of competence. Indeed, when participants I-share with an outgroup member, they actually show an outgroup preference for the dimension of competence.

Discussion

When it comes to warmth and competence ratings, I-sharing appears to have differential effects on how African Americans judge African Americans and European Americans in general. On the dimension of warmth, we observed an ingroup preference when participants I-shared with a fellow African American. This same ingroup preference did not emerge on the dimension of competence. Moreover, on the dimension of competence, we observed an outgroup preference when participants I-shared with a European American. This outgroup preference did not emerge on the dimension of warmth. In sum, the effect of I-sharing on evaluations of the warmth and competence of the ingroup and outgroup depended on the dimension in question.

Did these results hinge, in part, on the within participants nature of our design? Recall that participants received information about the extent to which they I-shared with both of their (ostensible) interaction partners. They I-shared with one and they did not I-share with the other. This raises the question of whether the contrastive nature of the I-sharing experience contributed to the differential ratings of the ingroup and outgroup.

We have two reactions to the possibility. First, we have reason to believe that the same results would have emerged had we used a between participants design. In a recent study on attitudes toward the heavyweight as a function of I-sharing, Crimin et al. (2008, Study 2) used a between participants design to examine whether I-sharing with a heavyweight person fosters more positive attitudes toward the heavyweight in general. The findings corroborate
those reported here: I-sharing with an outgroup member (in this case a heavyweight individual) fostered more positive attitudes toward the outgroup, even in the absence of a contrasting experience of not I-sharing with the ingroup member.

Even if the within participants nature of our design drove our effects, we find it notable that a specific interaction with one individual spilled over to impact warmth and competence judgments of the group to which the individual belongs. Moreover, the specific nature of the spillover depended on the dimension of interest. These findings contribute to the current literature on warmth and competence by illuminating the role that interactions with a group member can play in altering ratings of a group at large. In addition, they stimulate a number of hypotheses about the nature of this effect and whether it depends on the specific groups under investigation. Here we concentrated on African Americans and we found that I-sharing differentially affected ratings of warmth and competence for the ingroup and outgroup. Of course, without a control group, we cannot make claims about the precise direction of I-sharing’s effects. Given past work that points to African Americans receiving higher warmth than competence ratings and European Americans receiving higher competence than warmth ratings (Allport, 1954; Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1950; Cuddy et al. 2007), it seems most likely that I-sharing with an outgroup member dismantled ingroup preference on the dimension of warmth and that I-sharing with an ingroup member dismantled outgroup preference on the dimension of competence. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that I-sharing with an ingroup member fostered an ingroup preference on the dimension of warmth or that I-sharing with an outgroup member elevated ratings of the outgroup on the dimension of competence.

In the midst of these unknowns lay several nuggets of gold. The ingroup preference that emerged on warmth ratings when participants I-shared with an African American simply did not exist when participants I-shared with a European American, nor did it exist on the dimension of competence. Also, for the dimension of competence, an outgroup preference actually emerged when participants I-shared with a European American. Why would I-sharing have such differing effects on the warmth and competence ratings given to these two groups?

One possibility emerges out of the literature on selective valuation and psychological disengagement (Crocker & Major, 1989; Major & Schmader, 1998; Major et al., 1998). According to this work, members of stigmatized groups protect their self-esteem by emphasizing the dimensions on which their group fares well (according to stereotypes about their group) and de-emphasizing or devaluing the dimensions on which their group fares poorly. For African Americans, this would mean placing an emphasis on warmth (but not competence) as a dimension that characterizes their group. Viewed from this perspective, one could argue that I-sharing has the effect of elevating group ratings on the dimension that gets most emphasized for the group being rated.

Another possible interpretation for these data exists, however. Apart from the stereotypes associated with the particular ingroup and outgroup in question, it could be that I-sharing with an ingroup member would always tend to increase the perceived warmth of one’s ingroup, but that I-sharing with an outgroup member would always tend to increase the perceived competence of the outgroup. Although in a relevant study Yzerbyt and colleagues (Yzerbyt et al., 2005) found no support for this interpretation, research on the distinction between liking-based respect (i.e., warmth) and competence-based respect supports this possibility. This research suggests that liking-based respect (but not competence-based respect) applies to judgments about people with whom we have personal relations (Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2005). In light of this past work, it seems possible that I-sharing increases warmth ratings for ingroup members at large, regardless of the ingroup under
investigation, because it fosters intensified liking for the ingroup. In contrast, I-sharing with an outgroup member - particularly an outgroup member of high status - might not increase liking per se, and thus might not be expected to affect warmth ratings of the outgroup. To the extent that the outgroup member belongs to a high status group, however, I-sharing with that person might be expected to increase competence ratings of the outgroup (regardless of the outgroup under investigation). Researchers will need to look at this question across a wide range of social groups to assess this possibility.

We recognize that our single study, with its focus on just one social group, raises just as many questions as it answers. Future researchers will want to replicate our findings, explore the mechanism underlying them, as well as their generalizability. In particular, it might be fruitful to continue asking whether I-sharing improves attitudes toward the outgroup and to ask whether this possible effect of I-sharing depends on the dimension in question. After all, in the present study, I-sharing did not have uniform effects on warmth and competence ratings. These findings raise the interesting possibility that I-sharing cannot change the broad content of group stereotypes; perhaps it can only improve upon existing group stereotypes. For instance, I-sharing with a group that prevails on the dimension of warmth may cause one to view that group as even warmer. However, I-sharing may not turn a primarily warm group into a competent one nor will it turn a primarily competent group warm.

Alternatively, perhaps the specific stereotype content of a given group matters less than the group’s ingroup or outgroup status. Maybe I-sharing can only go so far as to enhance people’s respect, but not their liking, per se, for an outgroup at large. This calls to mind research on the compromise people try to strike between egalitarianism on the one hand and ingroup favoritism on the other (Singh, Sharmini, & Choo, 2004). By allowing each group in question to corner a market (whether it be warmth or competence), our participants may have walked the fine line between favoring their own group and respecting another.

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Figure 1.
Warmth ratings of African Americans and European Americans as a function of I-sharing partner's racial identity.
Figure 2.
Competence ratings of African Americans and European Americans as a function of I-sharing partner’s racial identity.