

**Understanding Social Conservatism:
The Effects of Moral Values and Authoritarianism**

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Abstract

Attitudes pertaining to social issues have been the impetus behind numerous political movements and political behaviors throughout US history, and issues such as abortion, pornography, school-prayer, censorship, and homosexuality have mobilized voters and defined the ways in which individuals evaluate the candidates and parties. There are several theoretical perspectives in the social sciences that have been used to understand public responses to social and moral issues. Differences in moral values or world views are often cited by sociologists as a basis for preferences on these sorts of issues. Religious/secular differences have also grown prominent, particularly in the context of the “culture wars” thesis (Hunter 1991). And yet alternative, and more psychological interpretation, comes from the long history of research on authoritarianism. Unfortunately, there is no systematic research that simultaneously tests the impact of all these factors on social issue attitudes. To further understand the factors underpinning social issue preferences, we use data from a representative phone survey of New York state residents (n=750) that received an experimental survey, as well as the 2000 and 2004 ANES cross-section datasets and 2000-2004 ANES panel. We find that there are fundamental differences between those that take moderate positions on social issues from those that endorse the most extreme policy options.

Political issues vary enormously in their character. Some, like deficit reduction for example, are likely to be relatively unemotional for most people. In contrast, conflicts over matters of proper moral behavior are, for many people, very deeply felt. Issues like abortion, gay rights, pornography, and prayer in public schools have been among the most emotional conflicts in the U.S. over the past 30 years. Although national economic and security issues may overwhelm most other factors in accounting for the outcome of presidential elections, social and moral issues have been prominent in national and local election campaigns, and have contributed to grassroots mobilization. They have been the focus of many PAC's and other interest groups; they have provided much of the issue basis for the Religious Right. And they have been the subject of a number of major court cases. Yet, with the significant exception of abortion and (perhaps) gay rights, we know relatively little about the structure and determinants of public opinion on these issues.

There are several theoretical perspectives in the social sciences that have been used to understand public responses to social issues. Among the more prominent have been moral values, authoritarianism, and religiosity. While all of them have been used in studies of social issue preferences they have not been adequately differentiated in the empirical literature. An increasingly popular approach to explaining social issue preferences has been whether one favors a traditional social structure and opposes non-conventional lifestyle choices (Mulligan 2008; Weisberg 2005). Conflict over many social issues can then be understood as the desire to protect these traditional arrangements. On the other hand, a more psychological interpretation comes from the long history of research on authoritarianism. Revisited numerous times over the past 50 years, a new line of work has suggested that authoritarianism is a predisposition for social conformity over personal autonomy, where individuals who value social conformity should favor socially conservative positions in order to protect the social and moral order (Feldman and

Stenner 1997; Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). In addition, religious affiliation and interpretations of religious doctrine could also influence social and moral issue preferences, directly and through moral values and authoritarian beliefs. Indeed, there are multiple biblical references noting that disobedience of established authority is tantamount to disobedience to divine authority¹.

A major empirical problem is that these constructs should be empirically correlated. In particular, both theory and research leads us to expect substantial correlations between conservative moral values and authoritarianism. As a result, models that exclude one or more of these factors are likely to misspecified – perhaps badly. There is also little work that examines the conditions under which these alternative factors are most likely to influence preferences on moral and social issues. Brewer (2003), for example, finds that the information environment strongly affects the relative weight attached to particular considerations when forming preferences. For instance, greater political awareness was found to magnify the impact of moral traditionalism on attitudes towards homosexuality so long as media portrayals of gays posing a threat to morality were available (Brewer 2003). With this in mind, we use a series of survey experiments and a quasi-experiment to determine whether there are political conditions in which one or more of these constructs are more influential. This approach also allows us to better differentiate the effects of these various predictors.

Moral Values

A great deal of research has viewed social conservatism as a defense of certain moral beliefs and values. From this perspective, processes of socialization involving the family, peers, education, and religion produce divergent patterns of moral values and beliefs or, as Luker (1984) and Klatch (1987) have termed them, worldviews. This interpretation thus sees the

¹ Consider Romans 13:1-6: "Every person must submit to supreme authorities. There is no authority but by act of God, and existing authorities are instituted by him; consequently anyone who rebels against authority is resisting a divine institution, and those who resist have themselves to thank for the punishment they will receive".

conflict over social issues as a battle over alternative conceptions of proper moral values and beliefs. While much of this literature has been produced in sociology, this can also be seen as a direct extension of recent research in political science that finds evidence for the effects of values on policy preferences (Feldman 1988; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985; Goren 2004; Weisberg 2005).

What are the values and beliefs at the heart of this debate? Broadly defined, *moral conservatism* involves a preference for traditional patterns of family and social organization. Conflicts over many social issues can be interpreted as a desire to protect a traditional kind of lifestyle or moral order than lends basic meaning to life. Many aspects of moral conservatism reflect traditional notions of the family and proper sexual practices. Wood and Hughes (1984, p. 89) describe this moral perspective as “adherence to traditional norms, respect for family and religious authority, asceticism and control of impulse. Above all, it is an unflinching and thoroughgoing moralistic outlook on the world; moralism provides a common orientation and common discourse for concerns with the use of alcohol and pornography, the rights of homosexuals, ‘pro-family’ and ‘decency’ issues.” Thus, in practice, moral conservatism can be observed as opposition to sexual practices like marital infidelity, homosexuality, and pornography.

The moral conservatism worldview can be contrasted with one often described as *expressive individualism*. This set of beliefs and values stems from a conception of morality that is based on individual freedom of choice rather than any set moral standards (see Bellah et al. 1985). As opposed to the belief in moral absolutes that is common to moral conservatism, moral liberalism tends to adhere to a belief in moral relativism and cultural pluralism (Woodrum 1988). More concretely, this perspective will be reflected in greater openness to nontraditional sexual practices and to relationships outside of the conventional family structure.

Seen in terms of these two worldviews, social issue conflict in the U.S. is a battle between two diametrically opposed images of proper moral behavior and lifestyles. In reality, it is much more likely that people are distributed over a continuum bounded at either end by these two competing worldviews. Critics of the cultural conflict perspective (Fiorina 2006) argue that the majority of Americans hold moderate positions on many social issues that would reflect a less extreme set of moral values than suggested by recent sociological arguments. Regardless of the actual distribution of the public, variation in moral values and beliefs are expected to play a major role in people's attitudes toward a wide range of social issues.

Authoritarianism

From the perspective of moral values, conservative preferences on social issues appear to be based on principles. Another long-standing approach in the social sciences – authoritarianism – provides a different understanding of conservative social issue positions. Measures of authoritarianism have been used for over 50 years to help explain attitudes toward social and moral issues. Rather than linking conservative issue positions with ideological principles, authoritarianism suggests psychological motives for these attitudes.

However, despite the large number of studies that have been conducted, research on authoritarianism has been severely criticized since the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al. 1950). A body of new research (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005; see also Oesterreich 2005; Stellmacher and Petzel 2005) has provided an alternative conceptualization of authoritarianism and measures of the construct that avoid many of the problems (response set, endogeneity) that plagued the original research.

The new conceptualization sees authoritarianism as a predisposition that reflects people's relative preferences for personal autonomy vs. social conformity. This trade-off is assumed to arise as a result of an fundamental conflict between these two values that is a consequence of

orientations toward the maintenance of social order. A critical assumption of this approach is that people must, to some extent, deal with the basic question of how social order is sustained. Social theorists since Durkheim (1897/1951) and Parsons (1937) have argued that a stable social order is sustained, at least in part, by the existence of behavioral norms that guide the interactions of the members of society. It is these common norms and values that are seen as central to the stability of society (Wrong, 1994; Etzioni, 1996). If members of society conform to these common norms the fear of social disorder (absence of social order) is reduced. Individuals should vary in how much they worry about the need for strong conformity to social norms (for more detailed discussions of this see Feldman [2003] and Stenner [2005]). While it is likely that concern with social conformity will be sufficiently weak in some people that it is dominated by the competing desire for personal autonomy, it may provoke a strong fear of unlimited freedom in others. Evidence from major studies of social values (Kohn 1977, 1983; Schwartz 1992) is consistent with the assumption that one of the basic value dimensions across a wide range of nations and social contexts is personal autonomy vs. social conformity.

It is important to recognize that this dimension is defined by the *relative priorities* attached to the values of social conformity and personal autonomy. In the abstract, many people may place a high value on personal autonomy, particularly in an individualistic society like the U.S. The key to this conceptualization is the relative weights that people give to these two values when they are forced to confront the trade-off between them. *How highly will people value personal autonomy when it comes into conflict with their desire for social conformity?*

Social conformity should lead to support for restrictive policies on moral issues when people perceive a threat to social order. What could be seen as such a threat? Most obviously, beliefs, values, and behavior that are inconsistent with perceptions of social conventions (Feldman 1989; Feldman and Stenner 1997). But also behavior that is a challenge to the

government's ability to enforce compliance with social rules and regulations. And, among people who value social conformity, any action that may challenge conformity – either by advocating nonconformity or simply by being nonconformist – could be seen as a threat.

The desire to restrict social behavior among those who value social conformity over autonomy should be a function of the degree of perceived threat to social cohesion. This is a key component of this new understanding of authoritarianism. As behaviors and social activities become more of a perceived threat to the maintenance of social norms, those high in the desire for social conformity should support government actions to restrict political and social activities. However, absent some combination of nonconformity and challenging behavior, those who value social conformity should be only somewhat more intolerant than those who seek personal autonomy. The dynamics of authoritarianism thus depend on the interaction of threat and the commitment to social conformity. Conservative social issue preferences derived from authoritarianism would thus be part of an attempt to minimize all forms of social nonconformity, not a specific desire to advance particular values.

Religious Conflict

The effects of religion on vote choice and political attitudes used to be conceptualized in denominational terms. Based on a long history of conflict organized around major religious traditions, empirical analyses would most frequently include some indicators for major religious categories like Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish in order to capture the effects of religious orientations. The assumption was the effects of religion on political attitudes and behavior would be a function of doctrinal differences or inter-group attitudes defined by major religious denomination. Thus, early studies of U.S. voting behavior (Campbell et al. 1960) noted the consistent differences in partisanship and vote choice between Protestants and Catholics that

could be accentuated by major political issues like prohibition (Gusfield 1966) or a Catholic candidate for president (e.g. Kennedy in 1960).

For advocates of the “culture wars” theory (Hunter 1991), these denominational differences have become subservient to a more general conflict between those with “orthodox” religious beliefs and those who take a more liberal or “progressive” position. In other words, instead of interdenominational conflict, there appears to be a growing gap between the conservative or orthodox and the liberal or secular *within* most religious traditions. The conflict, then, is believed to stem from the recent increase in religiously based special interest groups, such as the Moral Majority, as well as a number of decisions made by religious elites to promote greater cooperation among religious traditions (Wuthnow, 1988). Denominations now tend to resemble one another in their demographic makeup more than was the case a half century ago, and the gap between religious liberals and conservatives have widened.

This division has had a variety of political implications from positions on social and economic policy to vote choice (Leege and Kellstedt 1993, Wuthnow 1988; Dionne 1991; Hunter 1991; Layman 1997/2001). Protestants who adhere to an orthodox interpretation of Biblical text for example, have steadily aligned with the GOP, and the strength of religious commitment in predicting vote choice has increased over the past quarter century (Layman 2001). Consistent with this, Huddy, Feldman, and Dutton (2006) found that increasing attendance at religious services was positively associated with an increased probability of voting for George Bush in both 2000 and 2004 for *all* of the major religious dominations in the U.S. (although there were still some differences between Protestants, Catholics, and Jews). Fiorina (2006) has also shown that there have been large differences in Presidential vote choice across levels of religiosity, especially since 1992. By all accounts of the culture war theory, differences in religiosity should be seen most clearly on social and moral issues.

There are thus alternative accounts of the possible relationship between religion and social issue preferences. Although the denominational model has been more common in political science, it has not been used to make direct predictions about preferences on social issues although there may be some directional hypotheses (school prayer, for example). The religiosity model, on the other hand, does make clear predictions for issue preferences on a wide range of social and moral concerns.

It is not completely clear whether these differences in religiosity should be conveyed completely by moral values and beliefs. Some discussions of the culture wars suggest that there is a direct relationship between the orthodox-secular divide and conservative vs. liberal moral values (Hunter 1991). Thus, those who are highly religious should also hold traditional views of morality while the more secular should subscribe to a more relativistic conception of morality. If this were true, we should find that measures of religiosity have no direct effect on social issues preferences once moral beliefs and values are held constant. On the other hand, it is certainly possible that some social issues (prayers in public schools, for example) could be a direct function of certain religious beliefs that are not fully captured by moral values.

Distinguishing Authoritarianism from Moral Values and Religiosity

One of the long standing criticisms of research using measures of authoritarianism is that it often confounds the psychological variable with ideology: it is possible that authoritarianism is just a proxy for conservative moral values and beliefs. Authoritarianism and conservative moral values should be substantially correlated. In the traditional conceptualization of authoritarianism one of the major components is “conventionalism.” And both the original F-scale and Altemeyer’s revision, the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale) include items that are very close to social issue preferences (Martin 2001). Even when newer measures avoid items with explicit social issue content there is every reason to expect a correlation between the two constructs. If

authoritarianism is a desire to maintain social order and norms, it should lead to support for traditional moral values. This creates a substantial problem for empirical research. If studies include a measure of just one of these constructs it is likely that the equations will be misspecified. While we guard against that to some extent by including in our models a measure of moral values (and religiosity) along with authoritarianism it is never completely possible to reject the possibility measurement error in one or both variables may lead to biased estimates.

For this reason we also employ a second analytic strategy to demonstrate a unique effect of authoritarianism: experimental framing of social issue questions. Based on the new conceptualization of authoritarianism, we should find that when social issues are framed to highlight the threat to common social values the impact of authoritarianism will increase relative to a frame (threat of violence or denial of rights, for example) that does not raise the same specter of social threat. Since those who are very religious and/or strongly value traditional moral values should take a stand on social issues for more principled reasons, the same framing effect should not be observed for those variables.

Another way to distinguish the effects of authoritarianism comes from the research of Altemeyer (1989). Across a large number of studies Altemeyer has shown that increasing authoritarianism is strongly associated with the willingness to grant power to the government to punish norm violators. This is consistent with the conceptualization of authoritarianism used here since it highlights the link between high authoritarianism and the use of government to *enforce* conformity. Thus we also predict that framing social issues in a way that emphasizes government regulatory power (as opposed to highlighting moral concerns) should heighten the effect of authoritarianism but not the effect of moral values or religiosity.

Finally, we can distinguish authoritarianism from moral values in one other way. A large number of studies show that increasing authoritarianism is associated with intolerance of

politically and socially deviant groups (see Altemeyer 1988; Feldman 2003). We should thus find a strong effect of authoritarianism on political intolerance, particularly when the question frame highlights the potential of the group to undermine the political order. There is some research showing that conservatives are somewhat more likely than liberals to be intolerant (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; Sniderman et al. 1989) but it is unclear whether this has just due to its association with authoritarianism. At a minimum, we expect the effect of authoritarianism on intolerance to be substantially larger than moral values and to vary significantly with threat. This would reinforce the basic argument that moral values (and religiosity) provide a very different basis for social issue preferences than authoritarianism.

Data and Methods

To further understand the origins of social and moral conservatism, we examine the impact of individual and situational factors affecting these issue preferences. First, we determine whether religiosity, moral conservatism, and authoritarianism differentially predict attitudes towards social policy. Second, we examine the extent to which issues framed as threatening to moral values resonate differently among certain individuals. Specifically, social issues that are framed as threatening to both the moral and social order (e.g., homosexuality is a threat to our moral values and should not be protected) versus non-threatening (e.g., homosexuality should not be protected), should arouse particularly strong response among authoritarians. We draw upon an original data collection and ANES data to test the hypotheses set out here.

Experimental Survey Data

The new data in this analysis come from a survey of 740 New York adults contacted in the Fall of 2000. The survey was conducted by the Center for Survey Research at xxxx, and was in the field from October to December of 2000. The majority of respondents were white (n=574), the remainder were either African American (n=64), Hispanic (n=31), or Asian (n=18; other,

n=53). Attitudes on a wide array of social issues are examined: school prayer, censorship, attitudes regarding homosexual relations, tolerance of unpopular groups such as the KKK and communists, pornography, homosexual rights, and prostitution.

The measurement of these variables varies, and the full text for these items is listed in the appendix. For the school prayer and censorship items all respondents were asked the same questions “Which of the following statements is closest to your position on prayer in public schools/ sex on television today?” with three response categories: a liberal response, a conservative response but no government intervention, and a conservative response with the necessity for government regulation.² To examine whether certain individuals respond differently depending upon whether items are framed as threatening or non-threatening to moral cohesion, respondents were asked about homosexuals and two unpopular groups, the KKK and communists, framed as either threatening or non-threatening to morality. For instance, “Which of the following statements is closest to your views on homosexual rights?”

No-Threat Frame

- (1) Some people think that Congress should pass a law to protect the civil rights of gays and lesbians.
- (2) Other people think that we should not pass such a law because there is no reason to single out homosexuals for protection.

Moral Threat Frame

- (1) Some people think that Congress should pass a law to protect the civil rights of gays and lesbians.
- (2) Other people think that we should not pass such a law because homosexuality is a threat to our moral values and should not be protected.

For the unpopular groups, the question was posed as threatening to the “values that American society is based on.” Finally, pornography and prostitution were framed as either emphasizing or

² For school prayer: “Prayers should be allowed in public schools; students should be allowed to pray silently at the beginning of each school day; a common prayer should be said aloud at the beginning of school”. For censorship: “there is no problem with the portrayal of sex on television; there is too much sex on television and parents should be able to restrict what their children see; there is too much sex on television and new government regulations are needed to control it”

not the government's regulatory powers. For instance, "Which of the following is closest to your views on pornography?"

No Regulation Frame

- (1) There is nothing wrong with pornography.
- (2) Pornography is wrong but people should decide for themselves.
- (3) Pornography is wrong and it should be illegal.

Government Regulation Frame

- (1) There is nothing wrong with pornography.
- (2) Pornography should be regulated by the government but should not be made illegal.
- (3) Pornography should be illegal for ALL people.

Independent Variables. We expect that religiosity, moral conservatism, and authoritarianism will all be significant predictors of social issue preferences. Since traditional measures of authoritarianism have been plagued by methodological problems, we use Feldman's (2003) 10-item measure of social conformity versus autonomy. The items are listed in the appendix. Answers to these items were summed for each participant and rescaled from 0 (high personal autonomy) to 1 (high social conformity) ($\alpha=0.70$). This is the measure of authoritarianism that we use throughout the New York State analysis.

A scale of moral conservatism was generated from four questions about homosexuality, marriage, pornography, and sex. The items were intended to tap an individual's degree of social conservatism. Answers to these questions were summed and rescaled from 0 (Extremely Liberal) to 1 (Extremely Conservative) for each respondent. The alpha coefficient generated from these items indicates acceptable levels of reliability ($\alpha=0.84$) and a cohesive structure of moral values.³

Given that religion could manifest itself in a number of ways – for instance, respondents could be distinguished based on inter-denominational differences between religious groups *or* on

³ Several scales of moral conservatism were generated since some of the items used in this scale were similar to a few of the dependent measures (e.g., attitudes towards homosexuals and pornography). Unsurprisingly, because the items scale together well, this had a negligible effect throughout the various analyses.

intra-denominational differences between the “progressive” and “orthodox” elements within a respective religion – indicators for religious denomination and religious attendance was included (Hunter 1991; Layman 1997/2001). Denomination was constructed as a four category variable (Other, Jewish, Catholic, and the baseline category, Protestant) and religiosity was included based on the approximate number of times the respondent attends religious services per month.

Several additional attitudinal controls were used. An anti-egalitarianism scale was generated from six questions concerning equal rights and equality in the United States. The items were summed, averaged, and rescaled from 0 (Egalitarian) to 1 (Anti-Egalitarian) ($\alpha = 0.49$). Party ID and ideology were also included from two self placement items such that higher scores denote Republican and conservative leanings. Several demographic control variables were also included throughout the analysis. Education equals 1 for those with a college degree or greater and 0 otherwise. Gender was included and coded 1 for Males and 0 for Females. A dummy variable for minority status such that 1=Minority and 0=White. The respondent’s age was included which ranges from 17-92 years.

American National Election Studies Data

We also use national survey data from the 2000 and 2004 ANES. This allows us to cross-validate the results using national samples. In addition, the measures of two of the key constructs – moral values and authoritarianism – are open to alternative operationalizations (see for example Weisberg 2005). We therefore use different measures of authoritarianism and moral conservatism in the ANES data order to demonstrate that our estimates of the effects of moral values and authoritarianism on social issues preferences are not a function of problematic measures.

In order to achieve cross-sample comparability we created variables in the ANES data as similarly as possible to those used with the New York State data with two key differences. We

constructed an alternative scale of moral conservatism based on the moral tradition questions in the 2000 and 2004 NES⁴ ($\alpha_{2000}=0.64$, $\alpha_{2004}=0.67$). Authoritarianism was constructed from the child-rearing questions asked in both 2000 and 2004 ($\alpha_{2000}=0.60$, $\alpha_{2004}=0.61$).⁵ Answers to these items were summed for each participant and rescaled from 0 (high personal autonomy) to 1 (high social conformity). Anti-egalitarianism was constructed from Feldman's (1988) egalitarianism scale coded such that higher scores denote greater in-egalitarianism⁶ ($\alpha_{2000}=0.66$, $\alpha_{2004}=0.72$). Religion variables was operationalized similar to the New York State survey with indicators of religious denomination (Other, Jewish, Catholic, and the baseline category, Protestant) and religious attendance (number of times attending church per month)⁷. Party ID and ideology were also included from two self placement items such that higher scores denote Republican, conservative leanings. Several demographic control variables were also included throughout the analysis. Education equals 1 for those with some college education and 0 otherwise. Gender was included and coded 1 for Males and 0 for Females. A dummy variable for minority status such that 1=Minority and 0=White. The respondent's age was also included throughout the analysis.

A limitation in using NES data, however, is that the dependent variables measured in the New York State survey were not asked. Thus, we consider reactions to several other social issue attitudes – abortion, the death penalty, and homosexual relations – to examine the comparative

⁴ Moral conservatism (2000:V001530-V001533 “New morals are causing society to breakdown”, “People should adjust morals values to a changing world”, There would be less problems if there were a greater emphasis on traditional family ties, “People should tolerate other's morality”; 2004: V045189-V045192 “People should adjust moral values to a changing world” “New lifestyles are causing society to breakdown”, “People should be more tolerant of different moral standards”, “More emphasis on traditional family ties.”

⁵ See Feldman and Stenner (1997) and Stenner (2005) for extended discussions of this measure. The specific questions were 2000: V001586-V001589 Qualities to Encourage in Children “Independence or Respect for elders”, “Obedience or Self-Reliance”, “Curiosity or Good Manners” :Considerate or Well-Behaved”; 2004:V045208-V-45211 Qualities to Encourage in Children “Independence or Respect for elders”, “Obedience or Self-Reliance”, “Curiosity or Good Manners” :Considerate or Well-Behaved”.

⁶ The egalitarianism questions were 2000: V001521-V001526; 2004:V045212-V045217.

⁷ Since the ANES includes a much richer set of religiosity questions (e.g., a literal interpretation of the Bible; number of times an individual prays per week) we ran all the analysis with alternate indicators of religiosity. These results did not vary from what is presented here, so for consistency with the New York State data where these additional questions were not asked, we only present the number of times attending church variable as an indicator of religiosity.

impact of the independent variables on these issues. Abortion was measured by a self-placement question asking respondents the extent to which they favored abortion: (4) "By law, abortion should never be permitted", (3) "The law should permit abortion only in cases of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger", (2) "The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established", and (1) "By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice". Attitudes towards the death penalty were assessed from a single question "Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for person's convicted of murder" 1 (Oppose Strongly) to 4 (Favor Strongly). And attitudes towards homosexuality were collected from a question on gay marriage (only asked in 2004) and gay adoption.⁸

Results

Since one of our hypotheses is that authoritarianism will be correlated with other constructs that predict moral and social issue attitudes, we begin by examining the extent to which authoritarianism is operationally distinct from religiosity, moral conservatism, and ideology using the New York data. The correlations in Table 1 suggest that, although authoritarianism is related to these constructs, authoritarianism shares less than 25% of each other's variance. More specifically, authoritarianism is highly related to moral conservatism, converging with literature suggesting that authoritarianism is often inextricably bound in right-wing ideological belief (Jost et al., 2003). Moral conservatism, on the other hand, is most heavily correlated with religiosity, suggesting that religiosity may be partially conveyed by traditional values and beliefs. It is also interesting to note that religiosity is only weakly related to authoritarianism.

[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]

⁸ Abortion- 2000: V000694; 2004: V045132; Death Penalty- 2000:V000752; 2004-V043187; Gay Marriage- 2004: V004321; Gay Adoption 2000-V000748; 2004:V045158

Turning to the multivariate analyses, we begin by examining the joint effects of authoritarianism, moral conservatism, and religiosity on moral and social issue preferences. Using the New York data, attitudes towards school prayer, censorship of sex on television, and attitudes towards homosexual relations were regressed on these variables, as well as the control variables discussed above. These results are presented in Table 2. Due to the nature of the dependent variable, logit coefficients are presented with standard errors listed in parentheses. Since the coefficients aren't readily interpretable in this form, the column Δ gives the change in predicted probability of being in the most conservative category of the dependent variable as each independent variable varies from the 1st to 99th percentile (or minimum to maximum for the dummy variables) holding all other variables at their respective means and modes.

[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]

Consistent with our expectations, both moral conservatism and authoritarianism have a sizeable impact on censorship and school prayer preferences. However, religiosity has a non-significant impact in all three cases, suggesting that its effect might be conveyed in part by traditional beliefs. By examining the predicted change in the probability of being in the most conservative category of the dependent variable it is clear that the substantive effect of authoritarianism is quite large. Authoritarianism has the largest impact on attitudes toward media censorship and its substantive effect on school prayer is exceeded only by party identification. For instance, there is a near 40% increase in the probability of endorsing the notion that more government regulation is needed to control sex on television when comparing low to high levels of authoritarianism. And, in two of the three equations, the effect size of authoritarianism is greater than the effect size associated with moral conservatism.⁹ These initial models suggest that

⁹ A generalized ordered logit model was also estimated as a test for the parallel lines assumption that coefficients are constant across categories of the dependent variables. Both the likelihood ratio test and global Wald test constraining each parameter estimate to be equal across category comparisons seemed to indicate negligible differences between

authoritarianism has effects on these issues that hold even with statistical controls, and its marginal effects are comparable to those of traditional moral values.

As evidenced in this table, religiosity only has a negligible impact. Of course, this could be due to a non-significant relationship to the dependent variable *or* a significant relationship of religiosity to one (or several) of the independent variables which conveys the effect of religiosity. More specifically, the relationship between religiosity and attitudes concerning school prayer and censorship could be mediated by authoritarianism and/or moral conservatism (cf., Stenner 2005). If this is the case, then it would be erroneous to conclude that religiosity has no effect on social issue attitudes. To test whether religiosity has an indirect effect on social belief we used Baron and Kenny's (1986) test for mediation where one must assess (1) whether the mediator (authoritarianism and moral conservatism) is related to the independent variable (religiosity); (2) whether the independent variable (religiosity) is related to the dependent variable; and (3) when simultaneously entered in the same equation whether the independent variable's impact on the dependent variable is significantly reduced by including the mediator variables. Because condition (1) was met, as demonstrated by the correlations in table 1, we tested condition (2) by re-estimating the multivariate equations from table 2 excluding both authoritarianism and moral conservatism. In these equations, religiosity was found to have a significant impact on school prayer ($b=0.09$, $SE=0.04$, $p<0.05$), censorship of sex on TV ($b=0.12$, $SE=0.04$, $p<0.01$), and attitudes regarding homosexual relations ($b=0.26$, $SE=0.04$, $p<0.001$). By next adding authoritarianism and moral conservatism to these equations (same as table 2), the effect of religiosity becomes significantly reduced (prayer: $b=0.02$, $SE=0.04$, n.s.; censorship: $b=0.04$, $SE=0.05$, n.s.; homosexuality: $b=0.07$, $SE=0.05$, n.s.). In other words, the

variables (Williams, 2006). Given that the parallel lines assumption wasn't strongly violated, and the response categories seem to logically range from extremely liberal to extremely conservative, we used ordered logit to estimate the multicategory response models.

coefficient associated with religiosity decreases by 78% in the prayer equation, 67% in the censorship equation, and 73% in the homosexual rights equation after controlling for authoritarianism and moral conservatism. Further, note that the non-significance of religiosity was not driven by multicollinearity since the standard errors associated with religiosity only change negligibly in the mediator-included versus mediator-excluded models. Thus, when moral conservatism and authoritarianism are included in the equation, the magnitude of the coefficient associated with religiosity drops to non-significance, suggesting that the effects of religiosity are conveyed indirectly through authoritarianism and moral conservatism¹⁰.

To examine the robustness of these results we used the 2000 and 2004 ANES data to estimate models for several social issues: abortion, the death penalty, and gay rights (allowing gay and lesbian couples to adopt and, in 2004 only, gay marriage). The specification of these models was identical to those just presented with two notable exceptions: the specific measures of moral values and authoritarianism are different from the those used in the New York data.

[INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 HERE]

As shown in Tables 3 and 4, the estimated effects of the two key predictors on these social issue preferences are relatively similar to those obtained in the New York data. As before, the delta columns present the effect size of each variable (change in predicted probability) holding constant all other variables at their means and modes. These estimates are in the same range across the two data sets. Authoritarianism has substantively large effects on these issue preferences in both years even when controlling for moral conservatism and religiosity. As was also seen in the New York data, the largest substantive effect of moral values is in the gay rights equations. Religiosity has somewhat stronger, though inconsistent, effects in the national data. Most interesting is the significant *negative* effect of religiosity on support for the death penalty in

¹⁰ The coefficients associated with the religion dummy variables didn't change significantly across equations.

both years. The convergence of results from these two datasets shows that our estimates of the effects of authoritarianism and moral values are consistent across two very different sample and, most importantly, do not appear to depend on the specific set of survey questions used to measure these constructs.

Separating Authoritarianism from Moral Conservatism

As we noted above, one of the criticisms of authoritarianism has been that it may be confounded with ideology (Martin 2001). While this rendered less likely given the way we control for conservative moral values and beliefs, ideological self-identification, and religiosity, it is always possible to argue that our specification or measurement was insufficient to rule out other explanations. For this reason we used experimental framing procedures in the New York data to isolate the conditions under which authoritarianism influences social issue preferences. We expect to find that when social issues are framed to highlight the threat to common social values the impact of authoritarianism will increase relative to a frame that does not make the threat to moral values salient. However, we do not expect a differential impact of moral conservatism on social attitudes across threat frames. If the evidence supports these expectations it will allow us to more distinguish the effects of authoritarianism from moral values more clearly.

To test this, attitudes towards homosexuality were regressed on the same set of factors separately for the threat and no-threat conditions. The results are listed in Table 5. The expectation is that authoritarianism, but not moral conservatism or religiosity, should be activated when framing homosexuality as detrimental to moral cohesion.

[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]

As shown in this table, moral conservatism has a strong and relatively constant effect across the two conditions. Consistent with our expectations, moral conservatism doesn't differ

in its effect across models. On the other hand, authoritarianism only strongly predicts attitudes towards homosexuals when the issue is framed as a moral threat. The marginal effect of authoritarianism is about twice as large when the question is posed in a threatening manner. Notice that in the no threat condition the marginal effect of moral values far exceeds that of authoritarianism; their effects on homosexual rights are more comparable in the threat to moral cohesion frame.

A second way to distinguish the effects of authoritarianism from general moral conservatism and religiosity is to examine the extent to which the estimated coefficients differ when the link to the government's power to regulate and punish norm violators varies. By framing social issues in a way that emphasizes government regulatory power, we expect to see a stronger effect of authoritarianism on social issue preferences but no increase in the effect of moral values or religiosity. As noted above, attitudes concerning the regulation of pornography and prostitution were both framed as either emphasizing the government's regulatory capabilities or not. Table 6 presents the estimated impact of each variable on conservative attitudes towards pornography and prostitution in these two frames. For pornography, the effect of authoritarianism increases somewhat across frames; whereas, for prostitution, the effects of authoritarianism is substantially stronger in the regulation frame than in the no-regulation frame. When in the no-regulation prostitution frame condition there is only a .12 change in the predicted probability of being in the most conservative category across the range of the authoritarianism variable. Simply reminding individuals of the government's regulatory power, however, leads to a change in the predicted probability of .41. Similar to the above models, moral conservatism had a relatively constant effect irrespective of the frame, suggesting that moral conservatives don't require cues in a survey question to encourage them to strongly oppose pornography and prostitution.

[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]

A final way of distinguishing authoritarianism from conservative moral values is to examine each construct's impact on intolerance towards unpopular and deviant political groups (Feldman 2003). We expect that authoritarianism, but not moral conservatism, should predict intolerance. And the effect of authoritarianism on intolerance should be substantially larger when individuals are reminded that these groups may be harmful to traditional norms. For this reason, we examine tolerance towards two unpopular groups, the KKK and communists, where the questions were framed as either a direct threat to moral order (e.g., "Some people think that members of extremist groups like the [KKK/communists] should not be able to hold public demonstrations because they threaten the values that American society is based on" *or* no-threat to moral order (e.g., "Some think that.....should not be allowed to hold demonstrations in residential areas because of the chance that violent confrontations may occur"). Table 7 provides the estimated impact of each these variables by frame condition and group on intolerance.

[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]

While moral conservatism doesn't appear to consistently predict intolerance, authoritarianism significantly predicts intolerance across frame conditions when the targeted group is communists. For the KKK question, authoritarianism only predicts intolerance when the group is framed in terms of the threat the group poses to American values. Authoritarianism, but *not* religiosity or moral conservatism, strongly predicts intolerance when questions are framed as the moral threat that groups pose. This reinforces the conclusion that moral values and religiosity provide a very different basis for issue preferences than authoritarianism.¹¹

A Quasi Experiment

¹¹ We have no explanation for the failure of the value framing manipulation to increase the effect of authoritarianism on intolerance of communists. The lack of salience of communists in contemporary American society may be a factor. The most important result from these estimates is the large effect of authoritarianism on intolerance and the absence of any consistent effect of moral values and religiosity.

These results have suggested that authoritarianism becomes a considerably stronger factor in issue preferences when the threat that a group or issue poses to moral cohesion is made salient. We have demonstrated that questions which draw on these threats magnifies the effects of authoritarianism on issue preferences. We can, however, go further in illuminating the dynamics of authoritarianism. Do people's authoritarian beliefs shift in political significance over time, and if so, why? While the assumption has commonly been that authoritarianism is a relatively stable and enduring trait (Jost et al. 2003; Duckitt 2001; Adorno et al. 1950), activated in the presence of threat (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005), a limitation is that much of the literature examining authoritarianism and threat is a reliance on cross-sectional survey data. A more stringent test, however, would be to examine the interface of threat and authoritarianism by way of panel data, assessing whether authoritarianism varies in political relevance over time among a set of individuals. Thus, to augment our findings concerning the role of normative threat and authoritarianism on social-issue preferences we utilize the 2000-2004 NES panel study. We suggest that responses concerning homosexual rights in 2000 and 2004 serve as a quasi experiment since the threat that homosexuals posed to the family and marriage was much more salient in 2004 than in 2000. While homosexuality was a political factor in the 2000 election, it became more politically relevant near the 2004 election with increased concern about gay marriage. For this reason, we test the hypothesis that authoritarianism should be a significant predictor of homosexual attitudes in 2000, but because of the salience of the homosexual threat to marriage and the traditional family, it should be a much stronger predictor of attitudes towards homosexual in 2004. We use the ANES 2000-2002-2004 panel data for this part of the analysis.

Many of the substantive variables, such as moral conservatism, authoritarianism, egalitarianism, and ideology, were only asked in 2000, and not repeated in 2002 or 2004. Similarly, the dependent variable (two questions about homosexuality) was not asked in 2002,

but was asked in identical format in 2000 and 2004. Thus, we estimate a model predicting 2000 and 2004 responses to these homosexuality items using independent variables from the first wave. Given that much work has demonstrated considerable stability in political values, partisanship, and ideology (e.g., Goren, 2005), we don't view this data limitation as being especially problematic.

To test our hypotheses more thoroughly, we used MPLUS (release 4: Muthen and Muthen 2006) to estimate a structural-equation model (SEM) with latent variables corresponding to each of our key constructs. The structural model was then specified identical to the equations estimated previously in order to predict 2000 and 2004 attitudes towards homosexuals. The attitudes towards homosexuals variable is a latent construct with feelings towards homosexuals and the extent to which one favors homosexual rights to prevent job discrimination as indicators (both recoded from 0 to 1 where high scores denote the more conservative response). While better indicators would be homosexual marriage or adoption, these questions were not asked for the 2004 panel respondents. In the model, we allowed the error terms for these indicators to be correlated.

[INSERT TABLE 8]

Unstandardized estimates using mean and variance adjusted Weighted Least Squares (WLSMV) for this model are shown in table 7. On the whole, the model provided a decent fit to the data. The sample size was large enough to generate a significant chi-square, χ^2 (118) = 543.085, $p < .001$, but the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) indicated a reasonable fit (RMSEA = .08). What is particularly interesting about these estimates are that authoritarianism becomes a *much* stronger predictor of attitudes towards gays in 2004 than in 2000, consistent with our expectations. Confirming this pattern of results, constraining the paths connecting authoritarianism with gay attitudes to be equal significantly decreases the model's fit,

$\Delta\chi^2(1) = 3.70, p=.05$, suggesting that authoritarianism grew to be a much stronger predictor of attitudes towards gays in 2004.¹² Not only that, but the decrease in moral conservatism from 2000 to 2004 was also significant $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 5.52, p<0.025$. The change in slope for religiosity, on the other hand, was non-significant $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 1.38, p<0.30$.

Moreover, since SEM is an ideal modeling procedure to determine whether a variable has a direct or indirect (mediated) effect on the dependent variable, we ran an additional model allowing the effects of religiosity to be mediated by authoritarianism and moral conservatism. In this model, we freed two parameters allowing religiosity to predict moral conservatism and authoritarianism. Thus, religiosity was allowed to have an indirect and direct effect on attitudes towards homosexuals. The RMSEA indicated an adequate fit (RMSEA = .077). The estimates indicated that religiosity had a significant effect on moral conservatism ($\gamma = 0.05, p<.01$) and authoritarianism ($\gamma = 0.04, p<.01$), and as hypothesized, authoritarianism predicted attitudes towards gays in 2000 ($\beta = 0.48, p<.001$) and in 2004 ($\beta = 0.56, p<.001$). Similarly, moral conservatism was also a significant predictor of attitudes towards gays in 2000 ($\beta = 0.54, p<.001$) and 2004 ($\beta = 0.38, p<.001$), which is slightly contrary to that presented in table 7. What is more, religiosity had an indirect effect on attitudes towards gays in 2000 via moral conservatism ($\underline{IE} = .03$; standardized $\underline{IE} = .24; p<.001$), and via authoritarianism ($\underline{IE} = .02$; standardized $\underline{IE} = .16; p<.01$). Religiosity also had an indirect effect on attitudes towards gays in 2004 via moral conservatism ($\underline{IE} = .02$; standardized $\underline{IE} = .17; p<.01$), and via authoritarianism ($\underline{IE} = .02$; standardized $\underline{IE} = .19; p<.01$).

Conclusions

¹² Mean and Variance Adjusted Weighted Least Squares (WLSM) was used because of the ordinal nature of the job-discrimination variable (a four category variable). Since comparing nested models requires a scaling correction procedure (Satorra and Bentler, 1999), the chi-square statistic for the more/less restrictive models had to be weighted by a scaling factor.

Our analyses have shown that there are at least two very different sources of preferences on social/moral issues: traditional moral values and authoritarianism. Across a range of issues both had substantively significant effects on policy preferences. In each case, more traditional moral values and higher levels of authoritarianism led people to endorse more conservative positions on these issues. We also find that much of the influence of religiosity on social issue preferences is indirect, via its effects on authoritarianism and moral values.

It is significant that we find roughly comparable effects of moral values and authoritarianism when their effects are estimated with the other held constant. It would be easy to attribute the influence of moral values to authoritarianism and vice versa. And we do find a substantial correlation (.40) between the two. Increasing levels of authoritarianism are associated with more traditional moral values as the long research literature would lead us to expect. But it would be a mistake to conclude from this correlation that the effects of either construct could be reduced to the other.

Our analyses go an important step beyond demonstrating the independent effects of moral values and authoritarianism. The survey experiments show that the relationships between these two predictors and issues are quite different. Across all of the experimental manipulations we observed no change in the effects of moral values. Across a wide range of social issues – school prayers, TV censorship, homosexual rights, prostitution, and pornography – the estimated effects of moral values are substantial and do not depend on question wording that increases the salience of threats to common norms or governmental powers. People apparently do not need such cues to translate their moral values into consistent preferences for public policy.

The dynamics of authoritarianism are very different. Across several experimental manipulations, the effects of authoritarianism on social issue preferences varied considerably. Authoritarianism had significantly larger effects when it was suggested that homosexuality

would threaten moral values than when this cue was not in the question. While it would be easy to imagine that an explicit reference to moral values would influence the coefficient for moral values, it only had an impact of the estimated coefficient for authoritarianism. Similarly, increasing the salience of governmental enforcement increased the effects of authoritarianism on opinions toward prostitution and pornography. And, in addition to its effects on social issue preferences, authoritarianism had a pronounced effect on intolerance of communists and the Ku Klux Klan in contrast with the absence of any such effect for moral values.

The evidence thus suggests that the independent effects of moral values and authoritarianism reflect very different mechanisms. Moral values reflect preferences for alternative views of proper social behavior. As such, they are easily converted into consistent preferences for social policy. Those high in authoritarianism are more concerned with maintaining social order. When they see particular behaviors as threatening to that order – whether those behaviors involve choices about proper moral values or political views – they will support government efforts to restrict social and political actions and viewpoints. It is the regulation of any potential threat to social order that is of concern to people high in authoritarianism, not the maintenance of particular moral values. Future research needs to look more closely at the implications of these different mechanisms for the mobilization of people around these potentially divisive issues.

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Table 1
Scale Correlations. New York State

	Authoritarianism	Anti-Egalitarianism	Moral Conservatism	Religiosity	PID	Ideology
Authoritarianism	---					
Anti-Egalitarianism	0.27	---				
Moral Conservatism	0.40	0.13	---			
Religiosity	0.22	0.04	0.48	---		
PID	0.18	0.32	0.22	0.14	---	
Ideology	0.33	0.26	0.29	0.20	-0.50	---

Table 2:
The Impact of Authoritarianism, Moral Conservatism, and Religiosity on attitudes towards school prayer, homosexual relations, and censoring sex on television. New York State.

	School Prayer	Δ	Censorship of Sex on TV	Δ	Homosexual Relations	Δ
Authoritarianism	1.79 (0.57)**	0.22	2.82 (0.60)***	0.38	2.41 (0.65)***	0.15
Anti-Egalitarianism	0.13 (0.45)	0.02	-0.11 (0.47)	0.01	0.66 (0.53)	0.05
Moral Conservatism	0.85 (0.34)**	0.15	0.98 (0.35)**	0.19	3.91 (0.41)***	0.56
Education	-0.62 (0.17)***	0.11	-0.02 (0.18)	0.00	-0.25 (0.20)	0.02
Age	0.01 (0.006)*	0.12	0.02 (0.005)***	0.25	0.002 (0.006)	0.01
Religiosity	0.02 (0.04)	0.03	0.04 (0.05)	0.06	0.07 (0.05)	0.05
Race	0.38 (0.26)	0.07	0.23 (0.27)	0.05	0.51 (0.29)#	0.05
Gender	-0.28 (0.17)#	0.04	-0.49 (0.18)**	0.08	1.02 (0.21)***	0.11
PID	1.30 (0.33)***	0.21	-0.42 (0.33)	0.08	0.48 (0.35)	0.03
Ideology	-0.03 (0.32)	0.01	0.47 (0.32)	0.09	0.38 (0.36)	0.03
Catholic	0.53 (0.22)**	0.07	0.08 (0.23)	0.01	-0.27 (0.25)	0.02
Jewish	-1.61 (0.36)***	0.09	0.01 (0.36)	0.00	-0.50 (0.42)	0.03
Other	0.05 (0.26)	0.01	-0.19 (0.27)	0.03	-0.49 (0.31)	0.04
Threshold 1	0.18	---	-0.16	---	3.30	---
Threshold 2	3.42	---	3.49	---	4.72	---
N	641	---	634	---	611	---
Log-Likelihood	-537.75	---	-501.79	---	-429.93	---

Note: High scores on the scale denote the conservative response. All variables are continuous except for Gender (1=Male; 0=Female) Race (1=Non- White; 0= White), Education (1=Greater than high school; 0=Otherwise; and Religion. Religion should be interpreted in relation to the baseline category of Protestant. PID and Ideology are coded such that high scores denote Republican, conservative leanings respectively. The remainder of the variables are coded from 0 to 1 with the exception of Age, which is how old the respondent was (in years), and Religiosity, which is the approximate number of times the respondent attends church per month. Change in predicted probability (Δ) denotes the change from the first to the 99th percentile for the continuous variables and the difference between groups for the dummy variables in the most conservative response category. Entries are maximum likelihood coefficients using ordered logit.

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, #p<0.10

Table 3:
The impact of authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, and religiosity
on social issue attitudes. 2000 NES

	Abortion	Δ	Death Penalty	Δ	Gay Adoption	Δ
Authoritarianism	1.33 (0.21)***	0.31	0.98 (0.21)***	0.24	1.19 (0.26)***	0.28
Moral Conservatism	1.73 (0.31)***	0.36	-0.03 (0.31)	0.01	3.50 (0.40)***	0.67
PID	0.17 (0.19)	0.04	0.80 (0.19)***	0.20	0.10 (0.24)	0.03
Ideology	1.14 (0.25)***	0.25	0.85 (0.25)***	0.21	1.69 (0.31)***	0.39
Anti- Egalitarianism	-0.04 (0.33)	0.01	1.35 (0.34)***	0.27	1.14 (0.42)**	0.22
Race	-0.43 (0.23)	0.08	-0.15 (0.25)	0.05	-0.11 (0.29)	0.03
Gender	0.06 (0.17)	0.02	-0.22 (0.18)	0.05	0.07 (0.22)	0.02
Age	-0.01 (0.003)	0.10	-0.01 (0.003)#	0.10	0.01 (.004)***	0.25
Education	-0.53 (0.12)***	0.13	-0.10 (0.12)	0.02	-0.61 (0.15)***	0.14
Religiosity	0.33 (0.04)***	0.31	-0.19 (0.04)***	0.19	0.09 (0.05)*	0.09
Catholic	-0.01 (0.25)	0.00	0.12 (0.28)	0.03	-0.29 (0.29)	0.07
Other	0.31 (0.31)	0.19	-0.26 (0.30)	0.06	0.20 (0.38)	0.04
Jewish	-1.51 (1.06)	0.19	-0.56 (0.52)	0.13	-1.91 (1.10)	0.33
Constant	---	---	---	---	-4.35 (0.37)***	---
Threshold 1	2.13	---	-0.68	---	---	---
Threshold 2	2.95	---	0.04	---	---	---
Threshold 3	5.01	---	0.97	---	---	---
N	1345	---	1299	---	1271	---
Log-Likelihood	-1487.298	---	-1430.62	---	-650.96	---

Note: The dependent variable is coded such that high scores denote a conservative response. All variables are continuous except for Gender (1=Male; 0=Female) Race (1=Non-White; 0= White), Education (1=Greater than high school; 0=Otherwise; and Religion. Religion should be interpreted in relation to the baseline category of Protestant. PID and Ideology are coded such that high scores denote Republican, conservative leanings respectively. The remainder of the variables are coded from 0 to 1 with the exception of Age, which is how old the respondent was (in years), and Religiosity, which is the approximate number of times the respondent attends church per month. Change in predicted probability (Δ) denotes the change from the first to the 99th percentile for the continuous variables and the difference between groups for the dummy variables in the conservative category. For Abortion, the (Δ) column is the change in probability of completely opposing abortion/allowing abortion but only in cases of rape. Entries are maximum likelihood coefficients using ordered logit or binary logit for Gay Adoption. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, #p<0.10

Table 4:
The impact of authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, and religiosity
on social issue attitudes. 2004 NES

	Abortion	Δ	Death Penalty	Δ	Gay Adoption	Δ	Gay Marriage	Δ
Authoritarianism	1.08 (0.24)***	0.24	0.92 (0.24)***	0.22	1.43 (0.30)***	0.33	1.10 (0.31)***	0.27
Moral Conservatism	2.77 (0.37)***	0.53	0.86 (0.37)*	0.20	4.10 (0.51)***	0.72	4.57 (0.53)***	0.81
PID	0.25 (0.23)	0.06	0.95 (0.24)***	0.23	0.65 (0.28)*	0.15	0.65 (0.30)*	0.15
Ideology	0.43 (0.39)	0.10	0.57 (0.39)	0.14	-0.06 (0.49)	0.02	1.44 (0.52)**	0.34
Anti-Egalitarianism	0.36 (0.36)	0.07	1.70 (0.37)***	0.33	0.86 (0.47)#	0.21	0.53 (0.51)	0.10
Race	0.08 (0.16)	0.01	-0.61 (0.16)***	0.14	0.56 (0.20)**	0.14	0.44 (0.21)*	0.10
Gender	-0.22 (0.12)#	0.06	-0.34 (0.13)**	0.09	-0.67 (0.16)***	0.17	-0.28 (0.17)#	0.06
Age	-0.01 (0.004)#	0.11	-0.01 (0.004)#	0.12	0.009 (0.005)#	0.16	-0.02 (0.005)***	0.30
Education	-0.56 (0.13)***	0.14	-0.38 (0.14)**	0.09	-0.55 (0.17)***	0.13	-0.82 (0.18)***	0.18
Religiosity	0.27 (0.04)***	0.25	-0.25 (0.04)***	0.24	0.20 (0.05)***	0.19	0.14 (0.05)**	0.23
Catholic	0.06 (0.15)	0.01	-0.24 (0.15)	0.06	-0.65 (0.19)***	0.13	-0.49 (0.20)*	0.12
Other	-0.24 (0.21)	0.05	-0.18 (0.21)	0.05	-0.17 (0.26)	0.04	-0.13 (0.25)	0.03
Jewish	-1.67 (0.66)*	0.25	0.10 (0.40)	0.03	-0.76 (0.65)	0.14	-0.95 (0.60)	0.22
Constant	---	---	---	---	-3.82 (0.45)***	---	--	---
Threshold 1	1.65	---	-0.75	---	2.10	---	4.13	---
Threshold 2	2.58	---	0.06	---	3.38	---	4.38	---
Threshold 3	4.65	---	1.15	---	4.07	---	---	---
N	1017	---	997	---	985	---	984	---
Log-Likelihood	-1154.21		-1127.57	---	-496.67	---	-535.78	---

Note: The dependent variable is coded such that high scores denote a conservative response. All variables are continuous except for Gender (1=Male; 0=Female) Race (1=Non-White; 0= White), Education (1=Greater than high school; 0=Otherwise; and Religion. Religion should be interpreted in relation to the baseline category of Protestant. PID and Ideology are coded such that high scores denote Republican, conservative leanings respectively. The remainder of the variables are coded from 0 to 1 with the exception of Age, which is how old the respondent was (in years), and Religiosity, which is the approximate number of times the respondent attends church per month. Change in predicted probability (Δ) denotes the change from the first to the 99th percentile for the continuous variables and the difference between groups for the dummy variables in the conservative category. For Abortion, the (Δ) column is the change in probability of completely opposing abortion/allowing abortion but only in cases of rape. Entries are maximum likelihood coefficients using ordered logit and binary logit for Gay Adoption.
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, #p<0.10

Table 5:
The impact of Authoritarianism, Moral Conservatism, and Religiosity
on limiting the rights of homosexuals by threat/no-threat frame. New York State

	Homosexual Rights (no threat)	Δ	Homosexual Rights (threat)	Δ
Authoritarianism	1.10 (0.99)	0.20	3.86 (1.19)***	0.25
Anti-Egalitarianism	2.13 (0.80)**	0.42	1.50 (0.95)	0.13
Moral Conservatism	3.45 (0.70)***	0.58	3.24 (0.66)***	0.42
Education	0.03 (0.31)	0.01	-0.27 (0.35)	0.02
Age	-0.03 (0.01)*	0.38	-0.02 (0.01)	0.07
Religiosity	-0.11 (0.09)	0.20	0.07 (0.09)	0.05
Race	-0.56 (0.46)	0.13	0.57 (0.49)	0.05
Gender	0.49 (0.30)#	0.11	1.19 (0.37)***	0.13
PID	1.27 (0.56)*	0.29	0.94 (0.60)	0.07
Ideology	0.46 (0.57)	0.11	0.61 (0.58)	0.04
Catholic	0.77 (0.40)*	0.19	-0.62 (0.44)	0.06
Jewish	-1.72 (0.80)*	0.26	0.29 (0.68)	0.04
Other	0.52 (0.48)	0.13	-0.05 (0.52)	0.01
Constant	-2.06 (0.81)**	---	-4.63 (0.95)***	---
N	290	---	312	---
Log-Likelihood	-108.19	---	-120.01	

Note: The dependent variable is coded 1=Restrict rights and 0=Provide rights. All variables are continuous except for Gender (1=Male; 0=Female) Race (1=Non-White; 0= White), Education (1=Greater than high school; 0=Otherwise; and Religion. Religion should be interpreted in relation to the baseline category of Protestant. PID and Ideology are coded such that high scores denote Republican, conservative leanings respectively. The remainder of the variables are coded from 0 to 1 with the exception of Age, which is how old the respondent was (in years), and Religiosity, which is the approximate number of times the respondent attends church per month. Change in predicted probability (Δ) denotes the change from the first to the 99th percentile for the continuous variables and the difference between groups for the dummy variables in the conservative category. Entries are maximum likelihood coefficients using binary logit. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, #p<0.1

Table 6:
The impact of Authoritarianism, Moral Conservatism, and Religiosity
on Attitudes Towards Prostitution and Pornography by Regulation/No-Regulation Frame, New York State

	Prostitution (no government intervention)	Δ	Prostitution (government intervention)	Δ	Pornography (no government intervention)	Δ	Pornography (government intervention)	Δ
Authoritarianism	0.66 (0.78)	0.11	2.43 (0.91)**	0.37	2.64 (0.83)**	0.35	3.10 (0.88)***	0.47
Anti- Egalitarianism	0.62 (0.70)	0.11	-0.89 (0.64)	0.19	-1.33 (0.66)*	0.17	-0.64 (0.68)	0.11
Moral Conservatism	1.47 (0.51)**	0.29	1.67 (0.52)***	0.38	2.79 (0.51)***	0.52	2.49 (0.53)***	0.54
Education	0.29 (0.25)	0.07	-0.63 (0.26)	0.15	0.04 (0.25)	0.01	0.07 (0.26)	0.02
Age	-0.04 (0.008)***	0.53	-0.01 (0.01)	0.08	0.01 (0.01)	0.09	0.02 (0.01)**	0.31
Religiosity	0.12 (0.07)#	0.20	0.05 (0.07)	0.10	-0.02 (0.06)	0.02	0.12 (0.07)#	0.23
Race	0.08 (0.37)	0.02	0.39 (0.38)	0.09	-0.11 (0.38)	0.01	-0.87 (0.38)*	0.17
Gender	-0.62 (0.25)**	0.15	-0.52 (0.25)*	0.11	-0.74 (0.25)**	0.08	-1.02 (0.27)***	0.19
PID	0.01 (0.45)	0.00	0.25 (0.48)	0.06	0.46 (0.47)	0.07	-0.72 (0.48)	0.11
Ideology	0.10 (0.43)	0.01	0.55 (0.47)	0.13	-0.21 (0.47)	0.03	0.39 (0.47)	0.09
Catholic	-0.16 (0.32)	0.04	-0.14 (0.33)	0.03	-0.50 (0.32)	0.08	-0.29 (0.33)	0.07
Jewish	-1.06 (0.48)*	0.25	-0.36 (0.51)	0.08	-0.65 (0.48)	0.10	-1.69 (0.53)**	0.30
Other	-0.29	0.07	-0.75	0.16	0.09	0.02	-1.12	0.23

	(0.38)		(0.38)*		(0.39)		(0.38)**
Threshold 1	-2.70	---	-2.60	---	0.77	---	-0.93
Threshold 2	-0.96	---	0.98	---	2.77	---	3.09
N	304	---	322	---	313	---	323
Log-Likelihood	-278.03	---	-245.76	---	-275.36	---	-231.72

Note: The dependent variables are coded 0=liberal response, 1=conservative response but with no government intervention, 2=conservative response with government intervention. All variables are continuous except for Gender (1=Male; 0=Female) Race (1=Non-White; 0= White), Education (1=Greater than high school; 0=Otherwise; and Religion. Religion should be interpreted in relation to the baseline category of Protestant. PID and Ideology are coded such that high scores denote Republican, conservative leanings respectively. The remainder of the variables are coded from 0 to 1 with the exception of Age, which is how old the respondent was (in years), and Religiosity, which is the approximate number of times the respondent attends church per month. Change in predicted probability (Δ) denotes the change from the first to the 99th percentile for the continuous variables and the difference between groups for the dummy variables in the conservative category. Entries are maximum likelihood coefficients using ordered logit. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, #p<0.10

Table 7:
The impact of Authoritarianism, Moral Conservatism, and Religiosity
on Intolerance of the KKK and Communists by Threat/No-Threat frame. New York State

Variables	Tolerance of the KKK (no threat)	Δ	Tolerance of the KKK (threat)	Δ	Tolerance of Communists (no threat)	Δ	Tolerance of Communists (threat)	Δ
Authoritarianism	1.67 (1.22)	0.27	6.41 (1.52)***	0.85	5.93 (1.66)***	0.75	3.27 (1.53)*	0.50
Anti-Egalitarianism	-1.73 (1.05)#	0.33	0.09 (1.10)	0.02	-0.50 (1.14)	0.11	-0.81 (1.28)	0.13
Moral Conservatism	0.47 (0.77)*	0.10	0.75 (0.75)	0.18	-1.26 (0.87)	0.26	1.08 (0.82)	0.23
Education	0.18 (0.38)	0.04	-0.43 (0.40)	0.11	0.40 (0.45)	0.09	0.15 (0.42)	0.03
Age	-0.03 (.013)**	0.42	-0.01 (0.01)	0.18	0.04 (0.01)**	0.56	0.01 (0.01)	0.15
Religiosity	0.02 (0.11)	0.02	-0.09 (0.11)	0.16	0.04 (0.11)	0.08	-0.15 (0.10)	0.21
Race	0.16 (0.51)	0.03	-0.58 (0.64)	0.12	0.16 (0.66)	0.04	-0.36 (0.62)	0.06
Gender	-0.76 (0.35)*	0.18	-0.93 (0.42)*	0.20	-1.05 (0.42)**	0.22	-0.74 (0.42)#	0.13
PID	0.30 (0.71)	0.07	-1.15 (0.84)	0.25	0.45 (0.85)	0.10	0.51 (0.76)	0.11
Ideology	0.14 (0.72)	0.03	-0.29 (0.68)	0.07	0.42 (0.79)	0.10	-0.22 (0.79)	0.05
Catholic	-0.41 (0.52)	0.08	-0.89 (0.53)#	0.20	0.22 (0.50)	0.05	-0.55 (0.56)	0.13
Jewish	-0.39 (0.77)	0.09	-0.38 (0.81)	0.09	0.10 (0.81)	0.03	-0.24 (0.90)	0.06
Other	-1.12	0.25	-0.60	0.14	0.51	0.13	0.17	0.04

	(0.61)#		(0.58)		(0.61)		(0.72)
Constant	1.77 (0.98)#	---	-0.10 (0.96)	---	-4.78 (1.21)***	---	-1.90 (1.25)
N	159	---	158	---	147	---	150
Log-Likelihood	-97.90	---	-87.97	---	-78.64	---	-80.49

Note: Tolerance is coded 1=intolerant 0=tolerant. All variables are continuous except for Gender (1=Male; 0=Female) Race (1=Non-White; 0= White), Education (1=Greater than high school, 0=Otherwise; and Religion. Religion should be interpreted in relation to the baseline category of Protestant. PID and Ideology are coded such that high scores denote Republican, conservative leanings respectively. The remainder of the variables are coded from 0 to 1 with the exception of Age, which is how old the respondent was (in years), and Religiosity, which is the approximate number of times the respondent attends church per month. Change in predicted probability (Δ) denotes the change from the first to the 99th percentile for the continuous variables and the difference between groups for the dummy variables in the conservative category. Entries are maximum likelihood coefficients using binary logit.
 ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, #p<0.10

Table 8: Authoritarianism, Religiosity, and Moral Conservatism on Attitudes towards Gays. 2000-2002-2004 ANES Panel Study

2 Wave Estimate (2000-2004)

	2000	2004
Authoritarianism	0.21 (0.09)***	0.36 (0.11)***
Anti-Egalitarianism	0.61 (0.17)***	0.52 (0.18)***
Moral Conservatism	0.30 (0.10)***	0.10 (0.10)
Education	0.05 (0.02)**	0.08 (0.02)***
Age	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Religiosity	0.02 (0.01)***	0.03 (0.006)***
Race	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.05)*
Gender	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
PID	0.69 (0.18)***	0.28 (0.18)#
Ideology	0.87 (0.25)***	0.70 (0.24)***
Catholic	0.05 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
Jewish	-0.04 (0.10)	-.10 (0.09)
Other	0.07 (0.09)	0.08 (0.07)
<u>Model Fit</u>		
N	578	
χ^2 (105) to baseline model	993.644	
p-value	0.001	
RMSEA	0.08	
SRMR	1.767	

Note: WLSMV estimates. All factors on 0-1 scale with the exception of Age, which is how old the respondent was (in years), and Religiosity, which is the approximate number of times the respondent attends church per month. Factor loadings were omitted for clarity, although all loadings were significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. Indicators of the latent dependent variable, attitudes towards Gays, consisted of responses in 2000 and 2004 to two questions: one asking participants the extent to which they oppose/favor laws preventing discrimination of gays in the workplace; and the other a feeling thermometer rating of gays and lesbians. Several covariances were specified but are not presented here: (1) between the error terms for the indicators of the dependent variable at 2000 and 2004; and (2) between disturbances for latent variables. Although we omit factor loadings, variances and covariances; disturbances; and disturbance covariances, these statistics can be obtained by the authors upon request.

Appendix

Questions from the New York State Survey

Independent Variables

(Responded to on a four point scale from disagree strongly to agree strongly)

Authoritarianism- Social Conformity versus Autonomy scale.

People should not try and understand how society works but should just accept the way it is. Students must be encouraged to question established authorities and criticize customs and traditions of society.*

It's best for everyone if people try to fit in instead of acting in unusual ways.

People should be encouraged to express themselves in unique and possibly unusual ways.*

Our society will break down if we allow people to do or say anything they want.

People should be guided more by their feeling and less by the rules.*

Society is always on the verge of disorder and lawlessness and only strict laws can prevent it.

Children should be encouraged to express themselves even though their parents may not always like it.*

If we give people too much freedom there will just be more and more disorder in society.

Society should aim to protect citizens' right to live anyway they choose.*

Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.

We should admire people who go their own way without worrying about what others think.*

Moral Conservatism

There has been a lot of discussion about the way morals and attitudes about proper behavior are changing in this country. For example, if a man and woman have sexual relations before marriage do you think it is (1=always wrong; 2= almost always wrong; 3= wrong only sometimes; 4= not wrong at all)?

What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex (1=always wrong; 2= almost always wrong; 3= wrong only sometimes; 4= not wrong at all)?

And what about a man and woman living together without being married? Is it (1=always wrong; 2= almost always wrong; 3= wrong only sometimes; 4= not wrong at all)?

And what is your opinion about an adult who reads pornographic magazines or watches pornographic movies in their own home? Is it (1=always wrong; 2= almost always wrong; 3= wrong only sometimes; 4= not wrong at all)?

Anti Egalitarianism

We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.

One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance.*

This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are.

We would have many fewer problems in this country if we treated people more equally.*

We have to teach children that all people are created equal, but almost everyone knows that some people are better than others.

If we really gave every person an equal chance, almost all of them would turn out to be equally worthwhile.*

Dependent Variables

TV Censorship

Which of the following statements is closest to your position on sex on television today?

- (1) There is no problem with the portrayal of sex on television.
- (2) There is too much sex on television and parents should be able to restrict what their children see.
- (3) There is too much sex on television and new government regulations are needed to control it.

School Prayer

Which of the following is statements is closest to your position on prayer in public schools?

- (1) Prayers should not be allowed in public schools.
- (2) Students should be allowed to pray silently at the beginning of the school day.
- (3) A common prayer should be said aloud at the beginning of school.

Homosexual Relations

Do you think that homosexual relations between consenting adults should be legal or illegals:

- (1) Homosexual relations SHOULD be legal
- (2) Homosexual relations SHOULD NOT be legal

If (1):

Do you think that homosexuals should be able to marry legally or not?

- (1) Homosexuals SHOULD be able to marry legally.
- (2) Homosexuals SHOULD NOT be able to marry legally.

The scale was constructed such that 3= homosexual relations should not be legal, 2= homosexual relations should be legal but homosexuals should not be able to marry legally, 1= homosexual relations should be legal and homosexuals should be able to marry legally.

Homosexual Rights

No Threat

Which of the following statements is closest to your views on homosexual rights?

- (1) Some people think that Congress should pass a law to protect the civil rights of gays and lesbians.
- (2) Other people think that we should not pass such a law because there is no reason to single out homosexuals for protection.

Threat

Which of the following statements is closest to your views on homosexual rights?

- (1) Some people think that Congress should pass a law to protect the civil rights of gays and lesbians.
- (2) Other people think that we should not pass such a law because homosexuality is a threat to our moral values and should not be protected.

Pornography

No Regulation Frame

Which of the following statements is closest to your views about pornography?

- (1) There is nothing wrong with pornography.
- (2) Pornography is wrong but people should decide for themselves
- (3) Pornography is wrong and it should be illegal.

Regulation Frame

Which of the following statements is closest to your views about pornography?

- (1) Pornography should be legal for anyone over 18.
- (2) The distribution of pornography should be regulated by the government but not made illegal.
- (3) Pornography should be made illegal for all people.

Prostitution

No Regulation Frame

Which of the following statements is closest to your views about prostitution?

- (1) There is nothing wrong with prostitution.
- (2) Prostitution is wrong but people should decide for themselves.
- (3) Prostitution is wrong and it should be illegal.

No Regulation Frame

Which of the following statements is closest to your views about prostitution?

- (1) Prostitution should be illegal for anyone over 18
- (2) Prostitution should be regulated by the government but not made illegal.
- (3) Prostitution should be illegal for all people.

Intolerance towards the KKK

Threat

Which of the following statements is closest to your views on public demonstrations in residential areas?

- (1) Some people think that members of extremist groups like the Ku Klux Klan should not be allowed to hold public demonstrations in residential areas because they threaten the values the that American society is based on.
- (2) Other people think that all political groups should be allowed to hold public demonstrations because freedom of speech is our most important value.

No Threat

Which of the following statements is closest to your views on public demonstrations in residential areas?

- (1) Some people think that members of extremist groups like the Ku Klux Klan should not be allowed to hold public demonstrations in residential areas because of the chance that violent demonstrations will occur.
- (2) Other people think that all political groups should be allowed to hold public demonstrations because we cannot restrict this right based on a small threat of violence.

Intolerance towards communists

Threat

Which of the following statements is closest to your views on public demonstrations in residential areas?

- (1) Some people think that members of extremist groups like communists should not be allowed to hold public demonstrations in residential areas because they threaten the values the that American society is based on.
- (2) Other people think that all political groups should be allowed to hold public demonstrations because freedom of speech is our most important value.

No Threat

Which of the following statements is closest to your views on public demonstrations in residential areas?

- (1) Some people think that members of extremist groups like communists should not be allowed to hold public demonstrations in residential areas because of the chance that violent demonstrations will occur.
- (2) Other people think that all political groups should be allowed to hold public demonstrations because we cannot restrict this right based on a small threat of violence.

*Indicates reverse-coded questions

**Table A:
Descriptive Statistics for the New York State Survey**

	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Authoritarianism	740	0.38	0.18	0	1
Anti-Egalitarianism	740	0.37	0.20	0	1
Moral Conservatism	729	0.28	0.31	0	1
Education	728	0.56	0.50	1	1
Age	723	44.13	15.95	17	92
Religiosity	740	1.64	2.08	0	8
Race	698	0.17	0.38	0	1
Gender	733	0.44	0.50	0	1
PID	740	0.43	0.32	0	1
Ideology	740	0.49	0.31	0	1
Catholic	714	0.46	0.50	0	1
Jewish	714	0.08	0.28	0	1
Other	714	0.24	0.43	0	1

Note: All variables are continuous except for Gender (1=Male; 0=Female), Race (1=Non-White; 0= White), Education (1=Greater than high-school; 0=high school or less), and Religion variables are coded 1 if the respondent classified himself/herself as a member of the religion. The means for these dummy variables (as entered above), thus, represent their proportion within the sample. PID and Ideology are coded such that high scores denote Republican, conservatism, respectively. The remainder of the variables are coded from 0 to 1 with the exception of Age, which is how old the respondent was (in years), and Religiosity, which is the approximate number of times the respondent attends church per month.

**Table B:
Descriptive Statistics for 2000 NES (cross-section)**

	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Authoritarianism	1551	0.59	0.28	0	1
Anti-Egalitarianism	1552	0.37	0.18	0	0.96
Moral Conservatism	1552	0.60	0.22	0	1
Education	1807	0.61	0.49	0	1
Age	1798	47.27	16.96	18	97
Religiosity	1789	1.76	1.69	0	4
Race	1807	0.07	0.25	0	1
Gender	1807	0.11	0.31	0	1
PID	1776	0.48	0.35	0	1
Ideology	1623	0.53	0.22	0	1
Catholic	1807	0.05	0.23	0	1
Other	1807	0.03	0.18	0	1
Jewish	1807	0.01	0.10	0	1

Note: All variables are continuous except for Gender (1=Male; 0=Female), Race (1=Non-White; 0= White), Education (1=Greater than high-school; 0=high school or less), and Religion variables are coded 1 if the respondent classified himself/herself as a member of the religion. The means for these dummy variables (as entered above), thus, represent their proportion within the sample. PID and Ideology are coded such that high scores denote Republican, conservatism, respectively. The remainder of the variables are coded from 0 to 1 with the exception of Age, which is how old the respondent was (in years), and Religiosity, which is the approximate number of times the respondent attends church per month.

**Table C:
Descriptive Statistics for 2004 NES (cross section)**

	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Authoritarianism	1063	0.58	0.29	0	1
Anti-Egalitarianism	1066	0.37	0.20	0	1
Moral Conservatism	1065	0.56	0.22	0	1
Education	1212	0.62	0.49	0	1
Age	1212	47.27	17.14	18	90
Religiosity	1204	1.65	1.66	0	4
Race	1212	0.28	0.45	0	1
Gender	1212	0.53	0.50	0	1
PID	1195	0.48	0.35	0	1
Ideology	1205	0.53	0.22	0	1
Catholic	1212	0.24	0.43	0	1
Jewish	1212	0.03	0.17	0	1
Other	1212	0.15	0.36	0	1

Note: All variables are continuous except for Gender (1=Male; 0=Female), Race (1=Non-White; 0= White), Education (1=Greater than high-school; 0=high school or less), and Religion variables are coded 1 if the respondent classified himself/herself as a member of the religion. The means for these dummy variables (as entered above), thus, represent their proportion within the sample. PID and Ideology are coded such that high scores denote Republican, conservatism, respectively. The remainder of the variables are coded from 0 to 1 with the exception of Age, which is how old the respondent was (in years), and Religiosity, which is the approximate number of times the respondent attends church per month.