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Toward a modified collective action theory of genocide: A qualitative comparative analysis

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**TOWARD A MODIFIED COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY OF GENOCIDE:
A QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS**

A Dissertation Presented

by

William Robert Pruitt

to

The College of Criminal Justice

**In partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of**

Doctor of Philosophy

in the field of

Criminology and Justice Policy

Northeastern University

Boston, Massachusetts

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

**Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
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Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts, April, 2011**

Abstract

Genocide has a long history of occurring from pre-historic times to the present day. Unfortunately, the study of genocide has remained elusive in the field of criminology. Criminological scholars have left the 'crime of crimes' to political scientists, historians, sociologists, and others without engaging with it themselves. As an interdisciplinary field, criminology is well suited to combine the knowledge we have on genocide from these disparate fields to develop one coherent theory of genocide as a crime. John Hagan (2009) recently presented a collective action theory of genocide based upon his research in Darfur. This dissertation tests Hagan's theory on ten episodes of genocide. Drawing from theories of genocide in political science, sociology, law, and the field of genocide studies and framing the issue within the critical criminology areas of state crime and organized crime, as well as drawing from collective violence research, we modify Hagan's collective action theory of genocide by adding the element of a triggering catalyst and broadening the scope of the theory to explain genocide beyond using solely the variable of race. The modified collective action theory states that a nation-state with an exclusionist ideology will create a division among socially constructed groups. This division will be expanded and widened through the process of individualization and labeling the minority group as the 'other.' The crucial transition step is the collectivization of the population to act as a unit in destroying the minority group. The collectivization occurs through the state apparatus and once a sufficient catalyst occurs to release the tension built in the collectivization process, genocide will occur. To analyze the usefulness of this new theoretical

perspective on genocide, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is used to analyze ten episodes of genocide, as well as three cases where genocide did not occur. QCA analysis found some support for Hagan's collective action theory of genocide, as well as the modifications made to the theory. Dividing the episodes of genocide into those committed by the military alone and those committed by the military plus civilians, further illustrates the importance of collectivization and the triggering catalyst.

Acknowledgements

There are many people to thank for getting me to this place. No man is an island, and a dissertation is no better place to discover the truth of that statement. This project has undergone many changes in both direction and structure, all for the better I believe. This would not have been possible without the wonderful advice and contributions from my committee members. First, thank you to Ineke Haen Marshall for all of her guidance and assistance in making this dissertation the best it could be. I would also like to thank my other committee members, Phil He and Hillary Farber, for their advice and instruction on this dissertation.

A dissertation seems like an exercise in mental strength and ability, but it takes a strain on much more than the mind. I would not be where I am today without my amazing family and their undying support. I cannot thank them enough for understanding why I had to miss family gatherings, the stress phone calls in the middle of the week, and for a shoulder to cry on when things seemed impossible. A thank you is not enough, but I must say thank you, thank you, thank you to my mother, Patricia Pruitt, my father, William Pruitt, and my wonderful sister, Jennifer Pruitt, for all that they have given and sacrificed so that I might be where I am today.

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Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to all those who have suffered through genocide,
the most heinous crime on earth--those who survived,
those who we lost, their friends and their families.

It is my hope and desire that one day
we may eradicate this scourge from the world.

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CHAPTER ONE**INTRODUCTION**

“It is important that people should realize how very crucial the genocide problem is for our civilization and for the very existence of the United Nations.”

-Raphael Lemkin, December 23, 1947

HISTORY IS REplete WITH INSTANCES OF GENOCIDE—the intentional elimination of a minority group (e.g. Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990; Kiernan, 2007). Throughout time, states have resorted to the mass killing of people in order to secure their own position. Examples include the 1915 Armenian genocide, the 1988 Kurdish genocide, the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and most notably, the Holocaust of 1939 to 1945. Historically, most episodes of genocide were ignored by other nations and the perpetrators were not held accountable for their actions. This lack of an international response was most

likely linked to the notion of national sovereignty, a concept commonly interpreted to mean that a state could not be held accountable for their actions by other states.

Even after the Genocide Convention was ratified in 1950, little attention was paid to the agreements made in the Convention when faced with genocide. The world was mired in the Cold War and communism had become the predominant threat to the United States and the world. The interest in genocide generated by World War II and the Holocaust quickly faded. Thus, the study of genocide came to an abrupt halt and it stayed in limbo for several years. During this period there were episodes of crimes against humanity that might have risen to the level of genocide. However, no signatory nation to the Genocide Convention raised any concern over these instances. Examples include the Soviet Union Gulag camps and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.

Bartrop and Totten (2009) and Power (2002) provide a discussion of the recent history of the public and the academic interest in war crimes and genocide.¹ The United States was increasingly becoming the dominant world power and other nations would follow the lead of the US. When the United States failed to ratify the Genocide Convention or implement it when it was required, the other international community members saw no reason to take counter action. Cold War tensions diverted any attention to other criminal activity not associated with communism. In the late 1960's the West was faced with images of mass starvation in Nigeria; this starvation was really a genocidal policy of the state to defeat a secessionist group from breaking away. Other genocides occurred in East Pakistan and Burundi. Since these conflicts were not seen as important to the fight against communism, no country, least of all the United

¹ The following section draws its material primarily from Bartrop & Totten (2009) and Power (2002).

States, took any action to stop or punish these acts. This sole ideological focus on communism soon led to the US invasion of Vietnam and the resulting long-lasting war. In neighboring Cambodia, genocide reigned for nearly four years from 1975 to 1979. The genocide began as the US withdrew from Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge came to power in Cambodia. While some attention was paid to this genocide, the victims were mostly political opponents not protected by the UN Convention. This meant that the UN Convention could not be applied and no state called for protection of the political dissidents. “The Cold War showed with great clarity that the world’s major players paid only lip service to their postwar commitment to ‘never again’ stand by while genocide took place” (Bartrop & Totten, 2009: 150). It was not until the Bosnia-Herzegovina war in the early 1990’s that true scholarship and official action on genocide arose. The genocide in Bosnia became the most closely watched and reported genocide in history.

There are several reasons to study genocide within criminology. Genocide is a horrendous crime with far-reaching human and social costs. Genocide also remains relatively poorly understood from a theoretical viewpoint. There are, of course, some theories of genocide, which will be discussed later, but these address only parts of the phenomenon. These theories can be found in psychology, political science, sociology, history, and anthropology. Criminology, with some exceptions (see Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2009; Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003), has remained silent on the topic of genocide. While no single study will provide all the answers on genocide and its prevention, any study that contributes to knowledge on this topic is meaningful. One purpose of this dissertation is to test one of the newest theories of genocide—Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s collective action theory. A second purpose of the dissertation

is to elaborate upon Hagan's collective action theory broadening its applicability. In order to accomplish these goals it is important to analyze the current theoretical approaches to genocide and the role criminology can play in understanding the phenomenon.

Defining 'Genocide'

In any examination of genocide it must be decided how the word 'genocide' is to be defined. Different fields of study define genocide through a particular perspective, as best fits their needs. As will be illustrated below, legal scholars focus on the criminal definition of genocide, while social scientists tend to broaden the definition of genocide. The definitional debate over the word genocide is important because many governments and scholars, instead of fighting genocide, often become trapped in an argument over whether certain acts are "technically" genocide. While the definition of acts of genocide is crucial to any legal response it is less vital to international intervention because even if the acts fail to meet the legal criteria of genocide most often it is still a crime against humanity, which has a broader definition. How genocide is defined is essential to identifying, responding, and punishing the resulting atrocities.

The term genocide was created by the Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin in 1944. Lemkin formed the word genocide by combining the Greek word 'genos' meaning race or tribe and the Latin word 'cide' meaning killing (Lemkin, 1945). Once he coined the term 'genocide,' Lemkin went on to offer a complete and broad definition of the crime. For Lemkin, genocide is the annihilation of a national group. The killings may be directed at individuals, but the broader purpose is to eliminate the entire group to which

that person belongs (Lemkin, 1946). In his book *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, Lemkin defines genocide as “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” (Power, 2002: 43).

The United Nations has formed an official definition of genocide for all legal prosecutions. According to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide,

Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

This is the official legal definition of genocide that is being applied in the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). This definition has been attacked almost from its inception as being too weak and requiring too strict of an intent in order for genocide to have been committed legally. The main attack on the UN definition is the exclusion of political groups and social groups. By excluding political groups from the UN definition several episodes of mass violence cannot be considered genocide (Chalk, 1989). The exclusion of social groups means that the elimination of homosexuals, the mentally ill,

and the mentally retarded by the Germans would not be punishable as genocide (Chalk, 1989).

Social scientists have created their own definitions for scholarly analysis. Frank Chalk (1989) is a strong believer that the UN definition of genocide is inadequate for scholarly research on genocide. The exclusion of political and social groups from the definition of genocide appalls Chalk because of the atrocities that would have to be overlooked. "It seem[s] obvious to us that researchers of genocide must investigate the destruction of such social groups or surrender any hope of explaining the modern world in all its complexity" (Chalk, 1989: 151). Chalk clearly prefers a broader and more expansive definition of genocide, though he realizes that a definition of genocide will vary by the field of study. In their historical and sociological analysis of genocides throughout time, Chalk and Jonassohn define genocide as "a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrators" (Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990: 23).

Charny offers a generic definition of genocide. He states his definition as follows: "Genocide in the generic sense is the mass killing of substantial numbers of human beings, when not in the course of military action against the military forces of an avowed enemy, under conditions of the essential defenselessness and helplessness of the victims" (Charny, 1994: 75). Charny then expands upon his own generic definition to offer eight other definitions for specific types of genocide.² Israel Charny's definition of

² Charny's definitions included:

"1. Genocidal massacre: mass killing as defined above in the generic definition of genocide but in which the mass murders is on a smaller scale, that is, smaller numbers of human beings are killed.

genocide is so broad that almost every instance of mass killing would qualify. His definition has been called “much too generous” in regard to classifying genocide for research (Huttenbach, 2002: 169). A limited definition of genocide places restrictions on the episodes that can be called genocide, but a broad definition with no limits provides no guidance for labeling atrocities as genocide.

After surveying episodes of genocide and the current research in the area, Shaw (2007) comes to his own definition of genocide. Genocide is “a form of violent social conflict, or war, between armed power organizations that aim to destroy civilian social groups and those groups and other actors who resist this destruction” (Shaw, 2007: 154). He offers his definition of genocide as a general framework instead of a rigid legal or social scientific definition. Shaw’s primary goal is to restore Lemkin’s original concept of genocide as a generic term covering many different types of action. By focusing his definition on social conflict between two groups he abandons the idea of one-sidedness

2. Intentional genocide: genocide on the basis of an explicit intention to destroy a specific targeted victim group. . . in whole or in substantial part;

- a) Specific intentional genocide refers to intentional genocide against a specific victim group
- b) Multiple intentional genocide refers to intentional genocide against more than one specific victim group [...]
- c) Omnicide refers to simultaneous intentional genocide against numerous races, nations, religions, etc.

3. Genocide in the course of colonization or consolidation of power: genocide that is undertaken. . . in the course of or incidental to the purposes of . . . colonization or development of a territory [...]

4. Genocide in the course of aggressive (“unjust”) war: Genocide that is undertaken . . . in the course of military actions by a known aggressive power. . . for purposes of or incidental to a goal of aggressive war [...]

6. Genocide as a result of ecological destruction or abuse: genocide that takes place as a result of criminal destruction or abuse of the environment [...]

[...]

C. “Cultural genocide”

1. Ethnocide: intentional destruction of the culture of another people, not necessarily including destruction of actual lives [. . .]

- a) Lingucide: forbidding the use of or other intentional destruction of the language of another people [. . .]”

in genocide. Shaw incorporates the concept that genocide is actually a two-sided event that grows out of conflict between two groups.

Helen Fein, in her early writing, offered a definition of genocide with the intent to prevent future episodes. Fein defined genocide as “the calculated murder of a segment or all of a group defined outside of the universe of obligation of the perpetrator by a government, elite, staff or crowd representing the perpetrator in response to a crisis or opportunity perceived to be caused by or imposed by the victim” (Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990: 15). Years later, Fein modified her definition of genocide to answer some of the critiques made against her original definition. Fein was attempting to adopt a new definition of genocide from a sociological viewpoint. Her new definition reads as follows: “Genocide is sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim” (Fein, 1990: 24). Fein has made her definition mirror the UN definition as much as possible.

In his initial work, Leo Kuper accepted and used the UN definition of genocide. He did so because the UN definition is internationally recognized (Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990). Kuper also believed that by adopting the UN definition he could put pressure on the United Nations to more actively enforce the Genocide Convention. While Kuper uses the UN definition he is not willing to ignore instances of mass violence that technically fall outside of UN protection. Kuper divides genocide into two categories—genocide as the result of internal strife and genocide arising during international war (Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990). The UN definition has eliminated the link between war and

genocide. While Kuper's definition does not necessarily alter the UN definition it does modify it by including political groups and highlighting a nexus between genocide and war.

The on-going debate over how to define genocide is crucial to the field of genocide studies because it involves more than just semantics. The definitional debate highlights the immaturity of the field as a whole. A parallel could be drawn with the field of criminology over how to define crime. "The definition of criminal behavior varies widely from one society to another" (Hopkins, 1975). Durkheim defined crime as an action that "shocks the collective consciousness of a community by violating some widely and strongly held societal value" ([1895] 1982: 67-68). Quinney (1970) defined crime as behavior that conflicted with the interests of society that has the power to make public policy. Sutherland (1944) argued that white-collar crime should be considered criminal behavior for criminologists to study because it caused social injury and had penalties attached—the legal definition of crime as compared to Durkheim's more sociological definition. Chambliss (1989) further expanded the definition of crime by including acts of state dating back to 17th century pirates. These discussions over what is and is not crime mirror the current debate over the definition of genocide showing that all fields are tasked with properly identifying their subject of concern.

The present study—using a criminological perspective—employs the United Nations definition of genocide because it is the only definition that addresses genocide as a crime (see Table 1). No definition will satisfy all academics and professionals concerned with genocide. Certainly the UN definition is not perfect—it was the result of compromise. Accepting and recognizing these faults is important; one must always

admit the limitations in the operationalization of a particular concept. While the UN definition is flawed, it is the definition used to prosecute genocide as a criminal offense.

For the remainder of this study, genocide will be defined as:

“[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction []; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [or] (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (UN Convention, 1948).

Dissertation Outline

First, in the next chapter, we discuss the various scholarly approaches to genocide including its legal, psychological, political, and sociological dimensions. Scholars in these fields often address different aspects of genocide, which provides a strong basis for an introduction to the theories of genocide that are developed in these various fields. Criminology has generally ignored genocide with a few notable exceptions. In chapter two, we discuss the various reasons behind this lack of interest in genocide and how it has been addressed most recently by John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond.

In chapter three, we next analyze the various theories of genocide across these fields. Many of these theories can be categorized by their primary focus and concentration. In many cases, these theories have not been thoroughly tested or examined across numerous episodes of genocide. We conclude the discussion of the

theories of genocide with an introduction to Hagan's collective action theory, one of the newest theories of genocide with a criminological focus.

Next, in order to support our elaboration of the collective action theory, in chapter four, we review several theoretical insights that can contribute to our knowledge of genocide including the literature on state crime, organizational crime, and collective violence. We attempt to show how the literature on state and organizational crime and collective violence provides a solid basis for understanding and further elaborating the collective action theory. Then, in chapter five, we present Hagan's collective action theory of genocide in more detail and we propose an elaboration of the theory using the insights from state and organizational crime as well as collective violence. In chapter six, the methodology of our study is explained. We then present, in chapter seven, ten case studies of instances of genocide, as well as three matching cases where genocide did not occur. Using qualitative comparative analysis, we test Hagan's collective action theory on several episodes of genocide. In the concluding chapter, we discuss the applicability of Hagan's collective action theory to the sample of genocide case studies, as well as the elaborations proposed in the Modified Collective Action Theory of genocide.

CHAPTER TWO

THE MANY ANGLES OF GENOCIDE STUDY

“We study the injustices of history for the same reason that we study genocide, and for the same reason that psychologists study the minds of murderers and rapists... to understand how those evil things came about.”

-Jared Diamond
Professor of Geography & Physiology
University of California at Los Angeles

INTRODUCTION

GENOCIDE IS A TOPIC THAT CUTS ACROSS MANY different fields of study. Scholars from law, psychology, political science, sociology, and criminology have analyzed genocide.

These various fields offer distinct views of genocide as a phenomenon. The legal field is concerned with the legal challenges involved in the enforcement of the United Nations Convention on Genocide and finding justice after genocide. Psychology uses individual-based variables such as personality traits and disorders and cognitive characteristics to analyze individual behavior during genocide. Political scientists are

concerned with the effect of genocide on a state's political structure and vice versa. Sociologists' main objective is to analyze genocide as a social event and to understand the structural and cultural factors involved in genocide. No one field can claim dominion over genocide; there are too many prisms that can be used to study the topic. Taken separately these fields offer useful information on a single dimension of genocide. However, taken together these studies greatly expand the understanding and possible response to genocide. This chapter focuses on the different disciplinary approaches to the study of genocide with a hope to show that there is room for the field of criminology to add its own unique contribution to the field of genocide study.

LAW

The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide created a legal responsibility to stop and to punish genocide. Since the passage of the UN Convention there have been only two courts to ever consider genocide cases. In the mid-1990s the United Nations established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). These tribunals have been tasked with interpreting the Convention and applying it in prosecutions of *génocidaires*.³ Several legal scholars have tried to assist the ICTY and ICTR by offering their interpretation of the Genocide Convention.

³ *Génocidaire* is the French word for a person who commits genocide. Lacking an appropriate English translation of this word, the term *génocidaire* will be used to mean anyone who is involved in committing genocidal acts.

Lawyers and legal scholars approach genocide as a violation of international law. The signatories to the UN Convention agreed to prevent genocide when possible and to punish those responsible for committing genocide. As part of adopting the UN Convention, each nation had to add genocide as a criminal offense in their respective legal codes (Power, 2002). From this, an international prohibition against genocide emerged rather quickly following passage of the UN Convention. Unfortunately, in most instances of genocide there is no punishment for the atrocity. Legal scholars have focused their research on three main issues in the prosecution and enforcement of genocide statutes—intent, sovereign immunity, and universal jurisdiction. The intent element of the UN Convention has caused some concern that it is too restrictive. The issue of sovereign immunity had to be dealt with before prosecutions were possible, and the claim of universal jurisdiction causes some concerns within the legal field. Each of these issues will be discussed in the next few paragraphs.

Like many crimes, the UN Convention requires that genocide be committed with intent, not through negligence or recklessness. It has been argued that requiring specific intent for genocide is too strict. A general knowledge requirement has been offered to replace specific intent (Fournet, 2007). Fournet (2007) argues that if the perpetrators have knowledge that their act is in pursuit of genocide as a whole then criminal liability should attach. The reason for Fournet's concern is that génocidaires will be able to avoid punishment by claiming that they did not have the intent to destroy an entire group. While it would be possible to make a defense of lack of intent, there is no assurance that it would be successful. The ICTR in the *Akayesu* case stated that "intent can be inferred from a certain number of presumptions of fact" (Alonzo, 2002:

1373). The court further explained that intent can be inferred from words and actions. Evidence to be considered in regard to intent includes the physical targeting of a specific group or their property; the use of derogatory language towards members of the target group; the weapons used and the extent of bodily injury inflicted; the methodical planning and systematic manner of the killing (Alonzo, 2002). Finally, the number of victims from the targeted group can also be considered.

The ICTY in the *Sikirica* case abandoned most of these considerations and applied a definition of intent based solely on the number of victims killed (Alonzo, 2002). The court stated that the “ordinary meaning” of “in part” in the UN Convention requires that “a reasonably significant number, relative to the total of the group as a whole, or else a significant section of a group as its leadership” be killed before intent for genocide can be satisfied (Alonzo, 2002: 1395). The court failed to articulate any specific number of victims where intent can be reasonably inferred. There has not been another court decision focusing on the precision of the intent element since the *Sikirica* decision. There is reason to believe that the ICTR’s definition and inference standard is considered a more accurate interpretation of the UN Convention than the *Sikirica* analysis. The Genocide Convention was passed upon the idea that the destruction of any group harms humanity as a whole. Therefore, it is irrelevant if genocide is part of a larger plan (i.e., war strategy), perpetrated by the state or private individuals, whether it is successful or not, or how large in scope it is (Alonzo, 2002).

While the intent element is a concern for the International Criminal Tribunals currently trying génocidaires, another perceived problem was that—because of the concept of sovereign immunity—no state official could ever be tried for genocide. Prior

to 1945 the notion of sovereign immunity was very powerful. There was an unspoken agreement that one nation would not intervene into another nation's domestic affairs (Beres, 1988). Since most genocides occur within the borders of one nation, it could be considered a domestic affair. While this issue has not been a problem for the ICTY or the ICTR, it was an obstacle to the Nuremberg trials following World War II. The lack of response to the Armenian genocide during World War I was based on sovereign immunity (Power, 2002). Other nations believed that they could not intervene even if they desired to do so because domestic affairs must be handled by the home nation. Only when the world saw the horrific atrocities committed by Germany during the Second World War and believed that the perpetrators might not be punished for their acts did the doctrine of sovereign immunity come under serious attack. Sheldon Glueck, the well-known criminologist, attacked the doctrine of sovereign immunity and quickly dismissed it. Sovereign immunity is based on the idea of national comity and courtesy with the expectation that the sovereign will act in a law-abiding and trustworthy manner (Glueck, 1944). If a sovereign nation violates these expectations it has abrogated its immunity. When a sovereign willfully orders his people to commit flagrant violations of law, he has clearly voided his immunity and made himself liable (Glueck, 1946). Some sovereigns may still claim immunity but no court is willing to accept that defense anymore.

Another main concern related to the legal response to genocide is the concept of universal jurisdiction. The UN Convention says that génocidaires can be tried by any nation regardless of where the actual acts occurred (Beres, 1988). Universal jurisdiction is assumed (Beres, 1988); for example, the International Criminal Tribunal

for the genocidal crimes in Yugoslavia sits in the Netherlands, and the ICT for the Rwandan genocide meets in Tanzania. Even though the Nuremberg trial and the International Criminal Tribunals are based on universal jurisdiction, there are still arguments raised against the practice.

The history of international crime has no basis for universal jurisdiction. Early treaties recognized that there should be international cooperation for the punishment of criminals—mostly pirates (Clark, 2001). These treaties though were entered into by independent nations who agreed to prosecute pirates on behalf of each other. These treaties did not advocate universal jurisdiction (Clark, 2001). Currently, one of the complaints that the United States has against the International Criminal Court (ICC) is the universal jurisdiction that the ICC can exercise (Bishai, 2008). The United States has raised the issue of universal jurisdiction again making it a possible argument against international courts prosecuting genocide. The legal dimension of genocide focuses on the appropriate response following genocide as defined by the UN. Legal scholars are not concerned with the causes of genocide, but instead with the legal response to address genocide and punish génocidaires.

PSYCHOLOGY

Psychology—the study of human thought and behavior—has a role to play in the study of genocide and the field has produced several works on genocide. Ervin Staub has studied genocide for several years. In his 1989 book *The Roots of Evil*, Staub proposes a basis for the origins of genocide. He states that genocide is more likely to occur when a person or society is faced with difficult life conditions and adheres to

certain cultural characteristics that generate psychological processes that lead to one group turning against another group (Staub, 1989: 13). The individual is considered susceptible to supporting genocide because of his/her own personal characteristics and cultural beliefs.

Some psychologists root their analysis of genocide in the studies of Milgram. In the 1950s Milgram conducted studies where one person was asked to deliver what they believed to be electric shocks to another person (Brannigan, 1998). There was an authority figure with the person asked to do the shocking who would have no response when participants began to express pain from the shocks. Milgram found that people were willing to override their inhibition to harm others when there was an authority figure present (Brannigan, 1998). Obedience to power had a strong influence on people's behavior. This obedience to authority left little room for a person to oppose what they believed to be legitimate orders. Brannigan (1998) evaluates the events of the Holocaust in light of Milgram's studies. It appears plausible that some people may have participated in the Holocaust because of orders they perceived to be legitimate, but Brannigan believes that this does not explain why some people waited several months before participating. Also, Brannigan finds this explanation lacking when it was clear that some génocidaires in Germany enjoyed their work.

Another application of Milgram's study to genocide found that the obedience to authority discovered by Milgram fit well with the banality of evil argument (Kressel, 2002). The banality of evil argument was developed by Hannah Arendt in her study of the Adolf Eichmann trial in Israel (Kressel, 2002: 148). She found Eichmann to be relatively free of hatred, but an obedient soldier in following orders. Arendt claimed that

genocide was perpetrated, not by hate-filled evil monsters, but by the average German. The obedience to orders claim has also been made by génocidaires in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Bosnia (Kressel, 2002). There is no evidence though, that this obedience to authority claim is truly what Milgram found in his study. People may choose to obey an order for any variety of reasons including fear, hatred of the victim, desire for promotion, or agreement with the order (Kressel, 2002). Milgram never examined these external forces in his studies. While the obedience to authority claim may explain the involvement in genocide of some individuals, it fails to offer a significant reason for the resort to genocide as a policy.

Other psychologists have turned to the psychology of hate as the basis for genocide and other mass atrocities. Hatred of an out-group can arise rationally if that group is seen as taking resources away from the in-group (Sternberg, 2003). This hatred can also arise irrationally based on long-lasting prejudices against the out-group (Sternberg, 2003). If this hate leads to distancing and dehumanization of the out-group, then genocide is much more likely to occur. Individuals can have their feelings of hate validated if the out-group is labeled as a legitimate enemy by superiors. This leads the individual members of the in-group to believe that their feelings of hate and animosity are right and the only response one can have toward the out-group (Sternberg, 2003). Once these feelings have been justified, it becomes easier to use violence against the out-group because they “deserve” such treatment.

Alexander Alvarez has applied the techniques of neutralization, created by Sykes and Matza, to the Holocaust as an explanation for individuals' involvement. While the techniques of neutralization can be considered a criminological tool, its application by

Alvarez to the Holocaust appears to support the idea that the techniques are more of a psychological explanation of genocide. The Holocaust was bureaucratized in many ways and participation was so pervasive that it would not be considered deviant to participate (Alvarez, 1997). Before the Holocaust began and after the Holocaust ended, the many perpetrators lived law-abiding lives (Alvarez, 1997). There is some evidence from perpetrators that they viewed their “work” as unpleasant and traumatic (Alvarez, 1997). If the perpetrators of the Holocaust were not inhuman, there must be an explanation for why they participated in such atrocities. Applying the techniques of neutralization, Alvarez examines the psychological process that may have contributed to some génocidaires participation. First, denial of responsibility allows the perpetrator to believe that their actions are outside of their own control. They are not responsible; there is a greater force at work. Denial of injury allows the perpetrator to classify their behavior in a more socially acceptable manner. They claim no one was really hurt by their actions—killing was referred to as “special treatment” or “cleansing” (Alvarez, 1997).

Denial of victim occurs when the perpetrator is able to claim that the victim is responsible for their situation. The victim is to blame for their own victimization. By casting the Jews as the enemy, the Germans were allowed to make a claim of self-defense and attempt to place their actions in a more tolerable position (Alvarez, 1997). Condemning the condemners eases moral responsibility by stating that everyone is corrupt and they have no right to pass judgment on us. During the Holocaust, no major Western power allowed an increase in immigration quotas to accept more Jews, nor did they attempt to stop the killings by bombing the concentration camps. The Germans

could cite this lack of action as wrong in its own right, thereby reducing any moral superiority that the Western nations claimed to have over Germany (Alvarez, 1997).

The final technique, that of appeal to higher loyalty, permits the génocidaire to claim that they are not acting selfishly, but to please a higher power. That power can be human or supernatural. Hitler used devotion to patriotism to claim that the génocidaires were supporting Germany by their actions (Alvarez, 1997). The techniques of neutralization seem to offer an explanation for why people participated and how they were able to justify their behavior. Psychological explanations of genocide are micro-level. Psychologists are mostly concerned with why and how *people* can commit such mass killings. Rarely does psychology offer an explanation for genocide; it is more likely to offer an explanation for why individuals or groups participate in genocide.

POLITICAL SCIENCE

Political scientists have attempted to analyze genocide within the sphere of politics and power. Rummel (1995) hypothesized that democide (his word for any state-sponsored mass killing) was less likely to occur in a democratic state. Essentially, while power kills, absolute power kills absolutely (Rummel, 1995). In his analysis of democide and political structure, Rummel (1995) found that as one progresses from a democratic state to a totalitarian state, the likelihood of democide increases rapidly. The more a nation's power structure controls the social, economic, and cultural groups and institutions within their borders, the greater the ability to rule arbitrarily. An arbitrary government accounted for the magnitude and intensity of genocide (Rummel, 1995). The nature of power becomes the explanation of genocide.

Verdeja (2002) offers five factors that contribute to genocide; these factors revolve around the government and its structure. First, a segmented society can more easily accept an 'us-versus-them' ideology (Verdeja, 2002). Totalitarian governments can create and maintain a segmented society through their complete control over all state institutions. Rapid and profound social change is the second factor Verdeja identifies. Many times totalitarian governments have ascended to power through war or are facing a threat from other political powers. This creates a scene where social change is possible depending on how the people respond to the government.

Thirdly, an exclusivist political ideology that reinforces the social differences between groups can lead to genocide (Verdeja, 2002). Most totalitarian governments will not share power with "others" and will promote the causes of their own people over others. The state's capacity to organize and carry out mass atrocities will directly affect the success of genocide (Verdeja, 2002). A totalitarian regime controls all social institutions within the state easily adapting the state's existing structure to the evil ends of genocide. The final causal factor of genocide for Verdeja is an international component that affects the duration of the genocide. Verdeja (2002) recognizes that genocide is only stopped by some form of international response. This last factor has less of an effect on the process leading to genocide and more on the ability of the international community to stop the killing once it has begun. The international community usually chooses not to intervene for many reasons, but the power of the perpetrators' government is a concern. For example, it has been claimed that the United States has refused to end the genocide in Darfur because the government in Sudan has offered some useful information on the "war on terror" (Savelsberg, 2009;

Hoffman, 2009). In this way, political relationships can have a negative effect for the victims of genocide.

In 2003, Barbara Harff made a complete list of all genocides since 1945. Harff's definition of genocide was extended to include mass killings based on political belief (a group not covered by the United Nations Convention on Genocide). Based on her findings, she believed that genocide was more probable during or after an internal war, regime collapse, or revolution—all political events (Harff, 2003). Harff focused on the ideology of the regimes involved and found that they tended to have an exclusive ideology that justified their elimination of the out-group. These leaders also tended to be from isolated nations with little international trade or responsibilities (Harff, 2003). This may have led some leaders to feel insulated from any international repercussions for their actions. Analyzing the episodes of genocide since 1945 and the state in which they occurred, Harff was able to calculate the probability of genocide. If a state had none of the risk factors (internal war, regime collapse, revolution, past genocide, exclusive ideology) the probability of genocide was .028. An autocratic nation with no other risk factors had a .090 probability of genocide. If all risk factors were present in a state, there was a .90 probability of genocide. Harff's work is one of the few empirical studies of genocide offering support to certain causal factors behind genocide.

Not all political scientists though, are willing to adopt the premise that totalitarian governments are the only states that will resort to genocide. For many years in the field of political science there was the democratic peace theory, which states that "democracies rarely fight one another because they share common norms of live-and-let-live and domestic institutions that constrain the recourse to war" (Conversi, 2006:

247). When applied to genocide studies, many scholars focused solely on totalitarian states ignoring democratic regimes. Conversi disagrees with the democratic peace theory in genocide study, using the genocides in Yugoslavia and Rwanda as examples of non-totalitarian states involved in murdering their own citizens.

Rummel stated that absolute power kills absolutely and the only response to that is democracy. On the other side of the argument, Mann believes that democracy will not stop genocide, but can actually encourage it (Conversi, 2006). Mann's hypothesis states that genocide has its roots in failed democratization or in the face of increasing political parties attempting to create democracy (Conversi, 2006). Mann's theory requires that genocide studies focus not just on authoritarian states, but also on democratic nations. Yugoslavia disintegrated into genocide after the fall of communism and the beginning of a more democratic government. Rwanda became enveloped in genocide soon after a power-sharing treaty was signed whereby the controlling elites were required to share power with the minority Tutsis. In both cases, it can be argued that these states were in a process of becoming more democratic when genocide occurred. Kolin (2008) proposes that when the state engages in genocide, it is actually engaged in being a dual state. A dual state consists of two parts, one which functions to perform the necessary conditions for maintaining the social order, and the other part is genocidal in purpose targeting the victim group and eliminating them (Kolin, 2008). This state within a state theory poses that warfare has been part of the creation of the state for centuries and thus using genocide to retain power is not unusual.

Political science studies genocide to answer the question why some states resort to genocide and others do not. Political scientists have analyzed and supported the

idea that genocide is a crime committed by the state. The political structure of the state is a contributing factor to genocide worldwide; the political nature of genocide cannot be ignored. In fact, according to Kolin, “violence is a core element of state ideology, serving to make mass violence the means of socializing a majority to live in a culture of violence” (2008: 67).

SOCIOLOGY

The field of sociology has studied genocide as a social fact⁴ produced by the particular cultural and structural composition of society. Sociologists have focused their attention on the concepts of ethnic conflict and the social norm of violence (including groupthink) to examine genocide. Ethnic conflicts can lead to collective violence expressed as terrorism, civil war, or genocide (Williams Jr., 1994). Since the end of the Second World War, the number of ethnic conflicts has been increasing due to new multi-ethnic states, nation building activities, and the spread of new ideology (Williams Jr., 1994). Williams found that the level of division between ethnic groups, their concentration in one geographic location, inequality, and fear of exclusion all increased the possibility of ethnic conflict (Williams Jr., 1994).

Another crucial element in ethnic conflicts is the relationship between the ethnic groups and the state. This relationship becomes even more important if the state claims sole sovereignty over all ethnicities within their borders (Williams Jr., 1994). If there is disagreement concerning collective goods of society, including language,

⁴ “What constitutes social facts are the beliefs, tendencies and practices of the group taken collectively” (Durkheim, [1895] 1982: 54). Social facts are external, coercive and may be studied in an objective manner.

religion, political rights, and parity in the economy, the likelihood of ethnic conflict increases. If an ethnic group challenges the state on these grounds, the state may feel force is an appropriate response, including elimination of the group in severe cases.

Aside from ethnic strife, other sociologists have attempted to explain why genocide flourishes as a social norm. Once genocide, or any group behavior, has begun society tends to develop an acceptance of the violence (Dutton, Boyanowsky, & Bond, 2005). Society and its institutions begin to change in a manner that supports the violence; violence breeds more violence in societies like this. Eventually, killing and participation in genocide becomes the “right” thing to do. Societies may then become involved in “groupthink” (Dutton, Boyanowsky, & Bond, 2005). Groupthink can create an illusion of invincibility, which often leads to excessive optimism and risk-taking behavior (Dutton, Boyanowsky, & Bond, 2005). Groupthink also allows the society to rationalize their actions and their position on violence. Since groupthink creates a shared illusion of unanimity, it becomes even more difficult to dissent (Dutton, Boyanowsky, & Bond, 2005). Once the ability to dissent is silenced there is little hope of stopping the violence.

Stone (2004) is not surprised that a society engages in genocide because he argues that violence is a social norm in society. This norm can be manipulated and mobilized under certain circumstances (Stone, 2004). If violence is a norm, then the truly deviant behavior is not committing violence. By a society transgressing in this manner, a so-called “ecstatic community” is formed where perpetrators feel a heightened sense of belonging to society since everyone has transgressed together (Stone, 2004). The ecstatic community creates a new level of bonding among society

members. From this solidarity can emerge personal release and a social revival (Stone, 2004). This social revival allows people to participate in acts that they otherwise would have considered wrong. According to Stone, génocidaires are more often than not, regular citizens—“all civilized men are capable of savagery” (Stone, 2004: 59, quoting Bataille, 1987: 186).

While some sociologists have focused on the social causes of genocide, the genocidal event itself has also been the object of sociological investigation. For sociologists, the concept of genocide includes more than the mass murder of an entire population. One example of the sociological study of the genocidal event is the work done by Dadrian (1975). Dadrian has offered several different types of genocide categorized based on three factors: the intent of the perpetrator; the level of victimization; and the scale of the casualties (Dadrian, 1975). The four types of genocide that he distinguishes are cultural genocide, latent genocide, retributive genocide, and optimal genocide.

Cultural genocide occurs when assimilation has been taken to the extreme. Often the victim group is excluded from the power structure and violence is used to secure compliance (Dadrian, 1975). Cultural genocide seeks to eradicate the unique identity of the victim group while at the same time reinforcing the culture of the dominant group. Latent genocide is the unintended consequence of the pursuit of certain goals (Dadrian, 1975). The perpetrators here focus not only on the target group but specifically the power base of that group. Retributive genocide is a limited form of genocide with the objective of meting out punishment to a minority population that is challenging the dominant group (Dadrian, 1975). Optimal genocide is massive in scope

and indiscriminate in application. Optimal genocide has the goal of the complete obliteration of the target group (Dadrian, 1975). The victim group is viewed as a threat to the dominant party and the power to destroy them lies in the hand of the dominant group.

There is, of course, much overlap between the sociological perspective on genocide and that of criminology. Criminology is a sub-field within the field of sociology. However, it is more than that. Criminology, as will be seen, is a multi-disciplinary area which includes elements of sociology in its foundation as well as several other disciplines. From this criminological approach a theoretical framework for studying genocide can be developed.

CRIMINOLOGY

At its core, according to Edwin Sutherland, criminology is concerned with the study of law-making, law-breaking and law enforcement (Sutherland, 1947). As a field, criminology is different from the previously examined academic arenas. Criminology is an interdisciplinary field by design. From its inception, criminology in the United States has been very closely linked with sociology (Sutherland, 1947; Shaw & McKay 1942), while criminology in Europe maintains closer ties with law (LaFree, 2007). While criminology has benefited greatly from its close relationship with sociology, the field touches on many other disciplines as well. Criminology is where scholars from diverse backgrounds can come together to study a single, yet important, social phenomenon (Laub, 2006). For example, Laub (2006) consciously designed his life-course paradigm to accommodate scholars from the fields of sociology, economics, biology, psychology,

and history. The early work of Eleanor and Sheldon Glueck on juvenile delinquency (1950) was an interdisciplinary analysis culled from the fields of sociology, social work, and psychology (Laub & Sampson, 1991).

This diverse background should encourage the study of genocide from an interdisciplinary approach. However, as a discipline, criminology has ignored genocide as an area of study. This seems patently contradictory when genocide has been called “the crime of crimes.” The lack of criminological attention to genocide has been noted by several scholars in the field (Day & Vandiver, 2000; Yacoubian, Jr., 2000; Rothe & Ross, 2008; Laufer, 1999; Maier-Katkin, Mears & Bernard, 2009). In one study examining presentations made at the American Society of Criminology meetings from 1990 to 1998, only twelve presentations involved genocide (Yacoubian, 2000). This amounted to a scant .001% of all presentations in the nine years examined. During the same years, only six presentations made at the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences involved genocide (Yacoubian, 2000). An informal analysis of ASC presentations from 1999 to 2008 reveals twenty presentations on the issue of genocide. While nearly double the number of presentations from the previous ten years, the number of genocide presentations still pales in comparison to other issues. Yacoubian (2000) also looked at the number of articles published on genocide in several mainstream criminology journals. He found only one article on genocide out of 3,138 articles published between 1990 and 1998 (Yacoubian, 2000). As will be seen, this acts as only one internal barrier to the study of genocide within criminology.

In a comparable study, Rothe and Ross (2008) examined the coverage of state crime in popular undergraduate criminology textbooks. Genocide is an act of a state

and would appear under state crime when and if covered. However, of the eight most popular criminology textbooks, three texts did not cover state crime at all and two texts gave only brief coverage under the topic of state-sponsored terrorism (Rothe & Ross, 2008). Only one text covered state crime as an act of a nation and not as a political action or as occupational crime (like white-collar crime). None of the textbooks offered a comprehensive review of the literature on state crime or a theory of state crime. The absence of state crime from criminology textbooks is another barrier within the field to the study of non-traditional crime.

Internal barriers to the study of genocide in criminology begin with the marginalization of the topic at the undergraduate level. This marginalization continues into the graduate level of criminology and beyond. It is difficult to obtain funding in the United States to study a topic that occurs mostly outside of our country (Rothe & Friedrichs, 2006). The focus on quantitative methods and the pressure to publish or perish also influence one's choice of mainstream topics over more esoteric ones (Maier-Katkin, Mears, & Bernard, 2009). In order to survive in academia, one needs to avoid the study of genocide because of its more qualitative methodology and difficulties in publishing in major journals (Rothe & Friedrichs, 2006). As a result of these barriers the field of criminology now suffers from a paucity of literature and theory on genocide. As William Laufer said in his chapter "The Forgotten Criminology of Genocide,"

It is all too easy to say that criminology's neglect of genocide suggests a disciplinary denial; that our failure to recognize genocide implicitly contributes to the evil of revisionism; and that we should know better than to have the boundaries of our field permanently fixed by the criminal law—especially where extant law is so frail and uncertain. It is all too easy to say these things, because they are true (Laufer, 1999: 80).

This quote sums up the inadequacy of the criminology of genocide perfectly. And in order to reverse this course, it must become more acceptable for genocide to be viewed and analyzed as a crime. Scholars must pay heed to the gap that currently exists, not only in criminology, but in the study of genocide as a whole.

There are few criminological analyses on genocide. What does exist, often speaks about the absence of a criminology of genocide. Some articles offer explanations for why criminology has not studied genocide (Morrison, 2004; Laufer, 1999), but they do not continue to offer a critical assessment of genocide or a theory of genocide. Other contributors offer their ideas on what a criminology of genocide should include, including how to organize a theory of genocide (Woolford, 2006). Woolford maintains that it is possible to redevelop criminological theories to address genocide so long as issues of politics, history and society are included. Again, though, these works fail to execute their ideas and put them into practice.

One of the few publications on genocide in criminology is Brannigan and Hardwick's analysis of genocide using Gottfredson and Hirschi's general theory of crime. Brannigan and Hardwick (2003) attempt to structure genocide as a crime that can fit within the general theory of crime. While the rationalization of genocide under the general theory of crime is difficult to accept fully, it is a first step toward criminological theorizing about genocide. In fact the authors themselves note that the general theory of crime is not truly appropriate for genocide, but they believe it is the only current criminological theory that could be applied to genocide (Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003).

Recently, John Hagan of Northwestern University received the prestigious Stockholm Prize in Criminology for his research on genocide (The Stockholm Criminology Symposium 2009). In 2002, Hagan and Greer wrote an article explaining the important roles played by criminologists Austin Turk and Sheldon Glueck on developing international law. In an analysis of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Hagan and Levi (2005) explained how interest in international law is growing within criminology and the effects that has on the understanding of crime. Hagan then began to study the genocide in Darfur in depth. In 2006, Hagan, Schoenfeld, and Palloni examined how crime victimization surveys can affect the work of humanitarian agencies during emergencies. In an article in the *American Sociological Review*, Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) used survey data from the United States government to detail how the government of Sudan contributed to the racial division that led to genocide in Darfur. The authors continue this analysis in their book *Darfur and the crime of genocide*.

Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009) use quantitative analysis to suggest that the genocide in Darfur is based on race and encouraged by the government. Utilizing the work of Coleman, Gamson, and Matsueda on collective action and collective efficacy, the authors devise a collective action theory of genocide. The details of the collective action theory of genocide will be discussed in a later chapter (see chapter six). For now, let the following brief summary suffice. The theory explains that macro-level constructs of competition and ideology led to the creation of micro-level interest groups (Arabs and black Africans). Then individuals in the Arab group, having internalized racial ideology, began violent acts rising to the level of genocide against

black Africans (Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2009; Matsueda, 2009). While Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's work is exceptional and definitely a step forward in the criminology of genocide, their theory appears so narrow that it may only apply to genocide based on racial divides. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond posit that the genocidal state is the result of a progression from state level ideology to individual racial distrust. Then this individual racial animosity causes a collectivized racial intent which then leads to the execution of genocide at the state level. This approach begins at the state level but the ultimate genocide is the result of individual action. While it is true that individuals commit genocide, the state plays a crucial role. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond acknowledge the importance of the state as the initiator of the racial animosity but the actual genocidal events--in their theory--seem to be the result of individual hatred. The link between the state and the individual in initiating genocide is vital. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond posit that this link is collective racial animosity; yet there may be a stronger meso-level link between the state and the individual. Hoffman (2009) and Matsueda (2009) criticize Hagan and Rymond-Richmond for failing to engage with theories from other disciplines.

While the study of genocide is a significant opportunity to extend the boundaries of criminology, it also presents an opportunity for criminology to be transformed through critical exchange and dialogue with those philosophers, historians, cultural anthropologists, political scientists, and social theorists who have confronted mass atrocity and the practice of human rights over the years and to whose disciplines criminologists still rarely turn. (Hoffman, 2009: 484)

So there still exists a need for a theory incorporating criminological and other disciplinary ideas to assist us in understanding genocide in all locations (Hoffman, 2009).

CONCLUSION

Genocide is a topic that has numerous angles from which one can approach it. Each field offers its own theories and explanations of genocide. In this study, we argue that criminology is best suited to integrate these diverse fields of study and their contributions on genocide into a coherent theoretical perspective on the crime of genocide. In the next chapter, we examine the several different theories of genocide and the contributions they make to our understanding of the phenomenon.

CHAPTER THREE

THEORIES OF GENOCIDE

“On this particular evening Sir Edward was sitting in front of his library fire, sipping some very excellent black coffee and shaking his head over a volume of Lombroso. Such ingenious theories and so completely out of date!”

-Agatha Christie
“Sing a song of sixpence”
December 1929

INTRODUCTION

GENOCIDE PROBABLY HAS MYRIAD CAUSES AND NO single theory may ever be able to encompass all of the elements. Henry Huttenbach (2004) has warned that the field of genocide studies is too immature to attempt theorizing genocide. His concern is that much of the current research on genocide involves studies of the Holocaust. While there are several other examples of genocide, these instances have not been examined as fully as the Holocaust. Huttenbach (2004) recommends that the field wait until other

genocides have been explored as thoroughly as the Holocaust before creating theories of the event. The warning by Huttenbach is important to acknowledge. Yet, there are reasons to not fully accept his position. While the Holocaust may be the most studied genocide, many other episodes of genocide have been analyzed and scrutinized. Also, Huttenbach fails to offer a suggestion as to the quantity of studies that would satisfy him and at which point theorizing could begin. Huttenbach (2004) fears that once theories of genocide are proposed, future genocides will be “forced” to fit a specific theory when an entirely new theory may be appropriate. Theorizing involves creating generalizations to be tested and modified by research. If a theory of genocide fails to account for certain episodes then the theory should be re-examined. However, true social scientists should have no qualms about disposing of a theory that does not work and creating a new theory that does work. The rigor of the scientific method addresses Huttenbach’s concern about fitting instances of genocide into specific theories.

There are several theories of genocide and its causes. Most of these theories are based on qualitative data. Few empirical studies have been done due to the difficulty of obtaining accurate information during and after genocide has occurred. The lack of quantitative studies has been seen as a weakness in genocide studies. Not surprisingly, an overview of genocide theory will show areas of agreement as well as disagreement. We should seek to answer some of the remaining questions about the phenomenon and address the gaps in the current theories. Following the structure set out by Hiebert (2008) in her analysis of genocide theories, this section identifies how current theories overlap and strengthen each other (see Figure 1 for Hiebert’s analytic structure and theorists who fit each category).

AGENCY-ORIENTED THEORIES

The agency-oriented theories are concerned primarily with the behavior of the perpetrators either individually or acting in groups. Agency-oriented theories of genocide focus on the decision-making and perpetrators of the event (Hiebert, 2008). Agency-oriented approaches include the role of the elites, the frontline killers, and the role that society plays as a cause of genocide.

Elites

Theories that focus on the elite state that senior government decision makers decide to eliminate a group of people (Hiebert, 2008). The motivation for this decision could be personal, psychological, or ideological. Brown (1997) believes that a state is essentially concerned with only their own needs and the best way to achieve those needs. By focusing on their desires a state tends to become indifferent to the needs or desires of other states. When the state feels that their power is beginning to wane, the elites may decide that genocide is the best way to maintain their control (Brown, 1997).

In Fein's (1993) analysis of genocide, she found that control over the state machinery is critical to genocide. The government elites who have control over every state institution are more likely to resort to genocide because control of the state means genocide is more likely to be successful. In an analysis of colonial and modern genocide, Palmer (1998) found that the role of the state's elites was crucial. The decision-makers had to be certain that genocide is necessary to be victorious (Palmer, 1998). Also, the state's leaders are likely to choose genocide when they base their

decision on predetermination. The elite may believe themselves to be superior based on religion, race, or history (Palmer, 1998).

Frontline Killers

Theories that focus on frontline killers are asking why individuals participate in genocide (Hiebert, 2008). Much of the work done in the area of frontline killers is psychological in nature because the focus is on how individuals come to decide to participate in mass violence. Alvarez (1997) proposed a comprehensive explanation of how ordinary people become involved in genocide. By applying the techniques of neutralization to the individual's decision to participate, Alvarez showed the process that some people might undergo in their transformation to génocidaire.

In a similar vein, Brannigan (1998) approaches genocide looking for an individual level explanation behind the thought process of génocidaires. Brannigan desires an individualistic approach because of the varying degrees of participation of the German people during the Holocaust. In order to explain why some people took to their role in the genocide with vigor and others refused to participate, one must understand the psychology of the individual. Only by understanding these "frontline killers" can genocide be fully explained (Brannigan, 1998).

Much like Brannigan, Pramono (2002) believes in an individual approach to studying genocide. In her overview of the current theories of genocide, Pramono highlights the absence of individual-level theories. Most theories of genocide are state-centered because of the involvement of the state in all episodes of genocide. In response, Pramono (2002) suggests that theorists need to focus on the individual

involved in genocide because it is the individual who commits the killings. While not necessarily a frontline theory to genocide, Pramono argues that the absence of such theories is harming the field of genocide study.

Society

The role that society plays in genocide includes bystanders and others who tacitly permit genocide to flourish (Hiebert, 2008). Ervin Staub's theory states that the structure of a society, combined with difficult life events and social disorganization, leads to genocide (1989: 4). Staub firmly believes that intervention by bystanders--either internal or external--can affect the likelihood and success of genocide. Other countries can act as bystanders and their intervention, or lack thereof, affects the course of genocide in the perpetrator state. In many cases it would be easier for the international community to intervene than it would for the bystanders trapped inside the country where genocide occurs. The failure of the international community to act in these situations exacerbates the genocide.

Freeman (1991) also highlights the crucial role that society plays in genocide. Genocide is a social process that is initiated and implemented by social agents (Freeman, 1991). A common indication of impending genocide is societal crisis; this crisis will alter the way in which society reacts to problems that arise. Genocide may become a more feasible option when society agrees that it is the appropriate response. Hiebert recognizes that there is a lack of theories analyzing the role of society; she argues that the few studies that do exist should be reinforced with research.

STRUCTURAL THEORIES

Structural theories of genocide focus on the organization of the perpetrator state (Hiebert, 2008). These theories differ from the above agency-oriented approach of society because these structural theories are macro-level—the state as an institution. Structural theories include an analysis of culture, regime type, crisis, and modernity. Below, we will briefly discuss each of these structurally-based themes.

Culture

Utilizing culture to explain genocide is difficult because of the lack of a unifying definition of culture (Hiebert, 2008). Nonetheless, culture does have a role in genocide. Scherrer (1999) argues that genocide is the result of cultural aspects within the state. The two main cultural aspects that lead to genocide are ethnicity and colonization (Scherrer, 1999). Ethnicization of the state is the dominant force behind genocide according to Scherrer. Staub (1989) also believes that genocide has a cultural dimension that is crucial to understanding the phenomenon of genocide. Cultural characteristics may predispose some states to committing genocide. Some cultures may feel a sense of superiority over others in their community and if faced with losing that control, genocide may result (Staub, 1989). The divisive nature of the culture might influence the policy choice of the state.

Regime Type

This typology is concerned with how the structure of political regimes determines the adoption, or not, of genocide (Hiebert, 2008). The main focus has been on

totalitarian states versus democratic nations. The main weakness in these theories tends to be the fact that even though non-democratic states have more instances of genocide, it has not been possible to establish a cause-and-effect relationship (Hiebert, 2008). In her quantitative study of genocide since 1945, Fein (1993) found that totalitarian regimes were more likely to experience genocide. Totalitarian states can readily target one group as the enemy because the government is capable of isolating and highlighting the minority without concern of repercussion (Fein, 1993). Also, most non-democratic nations are based on military rule making the resort to violence easier (Fein, 1993). However, while it appears that genocide has occurred more in totalitarian states than in democratic nations, there has been little research to confirm these observations.

Palmer (1998) concluded that there are two types of states that become involved in genocide—weak states and strong states. Weak states are less likely to resort to genocide because a weak state cannot sustain continued violence. A strong state though, is able to support genocide and implement it successfully (Palmer, 1998). Strong states also have the ability to execute genocide quicker and in a more brutal manner. Totalitarian regimes tend to be strong states in the sense that they have control over all state institutions and apparatuses. Palmer's analysis that weak and strong states affect the success of genocide is plausible, but we lack strong empirical evidence that such association exists. Also, the fact that there is the possibility of genocide does not ensure its actual implementation.

Moses (2008) states that genocide studies actually began as a version of totalitarian theory. His critique of totalitarian theory is that its focus is too centered on

totalitarian regimes at the expense of neglecting other nations. In order to break away from the strictures of the totalitarian theory, genocide studies must embrace a critical theory that looks beyond the single episode of genocide and its attendant circumstances. Rummel (1995) hypothesized that the more democratic a nation is, the less likely they are to commit democide. Democide, according to Rummel (1995), encompasses all state-sponsored mass killings. Rummel concluded that the extent to which a state controls all social, economic, and cultural institutions partially accounts for the intensity of genocide (Rummel, 1995). The degree to which the elite can rule arbitrarily accounts for the magnitude of genocide. For domestic episodes of democide, political power, measured as democratic or totalitarian, was the single explanatory variable (Rummel, 1995). Rummel's analysis shows that democratic states do not commit democide on the same scale as non-democratic nations, but there does exist the possibility for democide in democracies. Theories of genocide that focus on regime types miss those episodes of genocide that do occur in democratic nations.

Divided Society

Theories of genocide that concentrate on divided societies examine the ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic breaks within the society (Hiebert, 2008). The belief is that society may become vulnerable to genocide along these cleavages. A society that imposes inequalities upon its minority population is more likely to experience genocide (Hiebert, 2008). A fractured society may not have far to go before genocide appears to be the appropriate solution to these differences.

Fein (1993) expected that if ethnic stratification was present then genocide would be more likely to result because the minority group will rebel against the dominant power structure. In order to maintain their power, the dominant group will use genocide to stop the rebellion (Fein, 1993). The results showed that rebellion does increase when faced with ethnic stratification. If the likelihood of rebellion is high, then the possibility of genocide increases if those in power believe that eliminating the minority group is the only way to end the rebellion. Unfortunately, it was not possible to evaluate whether ethnic stratification led directly to genocide or if it was moderated by the presence of rebellion. In a similar study, Harff (2003) hypothesized that an exclusionist culture is likely to lead to genocide. An exclusionist ideology is “a belief system that identifies some overriding purpose or principle that justifies efforts to restrict, persecute, or eliminate certain categories of people” (Harff, 2003: 63). This ideology can be based on race, religion, or any other categorization. Harff found that countries that expressed an exclusionist ideology were more likely to experience genocide.

Analyzing the onset and the severity of genocide and other instances of state-sponsored mass violence, Krain found that ethnic stratification did not have a significant effect on the onset of such violence. In addition, ethnic stratification did not have a significant effect on the severity of the mass violence (Krain, 1997). Krain’s conclusion raises questions over the actual importance of divided society in the occurrence of genocide. If a society has a division between a majority and minority group, genocide may be utilized against the minority group not because the division led to the violence, but because other stresses led to the use of violence and the government can place blame on the minority group.

The idea that a society will be divided prior to genocide has been taken up by several theorists. During and after genocide, the divisions within society become obvious; however, prior to genocide these divisions are often not as intense or clear. The weakness of these theories is they ignore the fact that genocide exacerbates divisions that may be difficult to identify before the conflict.

Modernity

Modernization theories of genocide argue that the material structure of the modern state facilitates genocide (Hiebert, 2008). It could be argued that modernization is a process that occurs through choice or evolution, thus the inevitableness of modernization would seem to lessen the responsibility of the state. The weakness of these theories is that they fail to explain why states choose to perpetuate genocide in the first place (Hiebert, 2008).

Cushman (2003) identifies two parallel elements that have occurred during the twentieth century. First, the twentieth century has been marked by rapid progress in modernization and second, the twentieth century has seen more episodes of genocide than any other time period. To Cushman (2003), the fact that these two factors have occurred simultaneously is not coincidence. Aspects of modern society--such as instantaneous communication, numerous intellectuals, newer and more sophisticated weapons, and greater international political negotiations--have led to the facilitation of genocide (Cushman, 2003). These same elements though, can be used to prevent genocide; unfortunately, they have not been utilized toward that end.

Morrison (2004) states that there are two ways to view the impact of modernity on genocide. First, modernity can be seen as a progression of liberty, reason, and progress; then genocide is a perversion of modernity (Morrison, 2004). Second, modernity can be viewed as a radically fractured and unbalanced program (Morrison, 2004). In this case, genocide can be an inherent possibility because of the uncertainty that modernity carries with it. In his opinion, if genocide is viewed in a modernity rubric, then there is little that the field can do to study genocide. Arguably, though, all crime can be seen as inevitable. Crime has existed for the known existence of the world and studying it has not erased it, but it has raised consciousness to the subject; so too can the study of genocide within criminology raise the awareness of scholars and others concerned with mass atrocities in our world.

Currently, modernization has taken on a global significance. Globalization may require some states to accelerate their modernization in order to remain competitive (Moses, 2008). If the state is forced to increase the rate of modernization there may be direct conflict with groups in society who are not prepared for such changes. When the state is faced with such obstruction, genocide may seem to be the politically expedient option (Moses, 2008). In the end though, modernity and modernization may indeed be an indicator that genocide is possible, but these theories cannot explain the decision to resort to genocide and why other modernized nations did not experience genocide.

Crisis, revolution, war

There has been an assumption within genocide studies that there is a link between crises, revolutions, war, and genocide (Hiebert, 2008). Empirical analyses

have shown some positive relationships between these two variables. In her comprehensive examination of genocide, Fein (1993) acknowledged that there is a complex link between genocide and war. Both genocide and war are acts of aggression and war can lead to genocide as well as genocide leading to war. Fein (1993) found that the more aggression is used, the more it will be continued to be used. War can be used to cover the existence of genocide and hide the actions taken as well as the number of victims. War can also destabilize a government leading to the rise of opposition and conflict.

Similarly, Freeman (1991) found societal crisis to be a common precipitant to genocide. When crisis weakens a nation, the struggle over power increases and may end in genocide. A failing nation that had previous internal wars or regime crises was more likely to experience genocide (Harff, 2003). If a failing state had instances of prior genocide, these states were more likely to resort to genocide again (Harff, 2003). Krain (1997) found that civil war was the best predictor for the onset of genocide. Internal and international war increased the possibility of the onset of genocide. When decolonization and civil war occurred together, there was a large effect on the onset of genocide (Krain, 1997). Passionate war may disguise a state that tries to implement genocide (Rummel, 1995). War may actually make genocide a practical choice to win and the results of war may be the loss of protection for the victim group (Rummel, 1995).

Scherrer (1999) observes that genocides tend to occur during war or crises within a state. Every genocide has to be analyzed separately to determine what historical and regional characteristics have led to that instance of genocide. This type of

analysis however, looks at genocide after it has occurred and does not seek to understand how to prevent the event. In Verdeja's (2002) theory of genocide, he sees that profound social change is a precondition. These structural changes can include war, revolution, coups, or any major social transformation (Verdeja, 2002).

The connection between war, revolution, crisis and genocide seems natural. Genocide is the ultimate war on people. Genocide is a crisis of immeasurable proportions. Empirical analyses have shown that there is a connection between these destructive events and genocide.

VICTIM-GROUP CONSTRUCTION THEORIES

Genocide theories based on the construction of the victim group differ from the other theories of genocide because of the focus on victims and not perpetrators (Hiebert, 2008). These theories have been divided into three categories—the victim as the 'other,' victim dehumanization, and victim as threat to the state (Hiebert, 2008). In some ways, these theories are not concerned with the explanation of the onset of genocide, but with the targeting of the group victims.

The victim as the 'other'

When groups of people are classified in in-group and out-group terms, it becomes easy to label one group as the 'other' (Hiebert, 2008). Once a group has been identified as the 'other' it becomes possible to remove that group from the realm of obligation. If a specified group of people are removed from the state's sense of obligation, then there is no barrier to eliminating the group. Using the techniques of

neutralization, génocidaires can deny the victim and their suffering (Alvarez, 1997). If the group is seen as the 'other' then this denial is simpler and the elimination of those people is less disturbing.

In Palmer's (1998) study, she found that exclusion of the group was present in all four episodes analyzed. The colonial genocides involved groups that were not well integrated within the larger community before the genocide (Palmer, 1998). The modern genocides of the Jewish people and the Armenians involved groups that were better integrated into their community (Palmer, 1998). Before the genocide against these groups however, they were deemed to be the 'other' and not welcomed among the broader society. It was more difficult to exclude these groups from the community, but they were successfully excluded prior to the instigation of genocide. Identifying the victim group as the 'other' also fits theoretical models of genocide because it is difficult to kill your neighbors, but it is not so difficult to kill a stranger.

Dehumanization

The process of dehumanization occurs when people are redefined as not being part of the human species meaning there is no need to protect them or save them if they are in danger (Hiebert, 2008). Like identifying victims as the 'other,' dehumanization lessens the barrier to commit genocide. The moral compunction to kill is overcome by the dehumanization process and perpetrators can act guilt-free (Hiebert, 2008; Freeman, 1991). The process of dehumanization includes different actions. The out-group is assigned derogatory, degrading, and subhuman characteristics (Alvarez, 1997). The murder of an animal is much less stigmatizing than that of a human being.

Staub's (1989) theory of genocide includes an element of devaluation--a widespread human tendency that serves a psychological basis as a precondition to doing harm. The roles among which devaluation occurs most often include race, religion, status, wealth, power, and politics (Staub, 1989: 60). This devaluation leads to viewing people as objects upon which you can act with little risk of retaliation. Issues of dehumanization and devaluation are almost certainly relevant to genocide, but these theories fail to offer a complete explanation for genocide.

Threat to state

The labeling of the victim as a threat to the state makes destruction of the group plausible—genocide may be seen as the option to eradicating the threat (Hiebert, 2008). When faced with a threat, the people of the state will most likely fear those identified as the threat. This fear can become anger and even hatred resulting in the twisted logical position that genocide is the only way to save their nation (Hiebert, 2008). By isolating the victim group as a threat to the state, the citizenry is more likely to accept the punishment meted out to the threatening group, even if the threat is imagined. Through exaggeration and hyperbole, Hitler saw the Jews as a literal disease that could kill Germany if not eradicated. The Holocaust eventually grew out of Hitler's devotion to "save" Germany from death by eliminating the disease (Koenigsberg, 2009). German chair of propaganda Joseph Goebbels noted in his diary that the Holocaust was barbaric but required because there was a "life-and-death struggle between the Aryan race and the Jewish bacillus" (Koenigsberg, 2009: 3).

When a state faces some threat to its existence, its citizens readily come together to eliminate the threat. During World War II, the United States isolated Americans of Japanese descent for “security purposes.” The US Supreme Court upheld this isolation as constitutional holding that the need to protect against espionage outweighed an individual’s right to be free (*Korematsu v. United States*). The solidification of people in response to danger still occurs. This solidarity is easily seen even in today’s international community. Following the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, the people of the United States quickly and resolutely proclaimed their unified desire to eradicate the threat. This call to nationalism is a natural response to a threat. If that fervor is used negatively, and the threat is identified as an internal threat, genocide may result.

Hiebert’s (2008) comprehensive overview of genocide theory offers several categories in which to place theories of genocide. But there are many other theories that do not fit into these categories. This merely shows the great diversity and complexity among the many theories of genocide. There are biological and some criminological theories of genocide that do not fit into Hiebert’s analytic structure. These theories are no less important to the study of genocide and provide crucial insights from different viewpoints.

BIOLOGICAL THEORIES

Biological theories of crime were prominent until the 1960s when sociological theories became the dominant influence (Rafter, 2008). Biological and biosocial theories of crime are now on the rise again (Rafter, 2008). In application to genocide,

biological factors may play some part in understanding the complexity. Barta (2005) traced the idea of a biological basis for genocide to Charles Darwin. During his research, Darwin was a witness to several tragedies, which would today be called genocide. To Darwin, the evolution of a higher humanity could not occur without the demise of the lower (Barta, 2005). Darwin saw the elimination of a group of people as an “obscure problem” (Barta, 2005: 129). But, while Darwin believed that natural selection was the cause of these extinctions, he recognized that there were many other causes as well (Barta, 2005). Darwin never foresaw that his theory would be actively used to promote genocide because he explicitly stated that natural selection was an unplanned occurrence (Barta, 2005). To actively plan and execute a natural selection process (genocide) is directly contrary to Darwin’s theory. However, the work of Hitler and the German state during World War II clearly highlights how the use of biology and eugenics can turn genocidal.

From 1933 to 1945, the Nazis utilized the biological theories of crime to justify their extermination of millions of people. Rafter (2008) has termed this period of history, “criminology’s darkest hour.” Germany developed a criminal-biology science to identify, isolate, and ultimately eliminate people who they believed were hereditary criminals. In application, the head of Germany’s Ministry of Health stated that the Roma (derisively called “gypsies”) were “the products of matings with the German criminal asocial subproletariat” and not capable of assimilating due to their mental deficiencies (Rafter, 2008: 185). These studies were used to promote the idea of racial purity in Germany, which could only be achieved if “inferior” races were prohibited from reproducing. Groups that were deemed to be racial inferior included the Roma, the Jews, and the

mentally and physically handicapped (Rafter, 2008). In the ultimate prohibition of their ability to reproduce, millions of people from these groups were murdered during the Holocaust.

From these warped ideas emerged an Aryan criminology inside Germany that was used to justify the killing of inferior people. The central core of Aryan criminology held that biology determined criminal behavior and these traits would be passed on to future generations (Rafter, 2008). While the Holocaust cannot be reduced to simply an exercise of criminal-biological science, the support that this theory gained lent it an air of legitimacy. Hitler and his political regime fully supported the findings behind this Aryan criminology, thus offering a sense of rationalization for the government and public who executed the genocide against the Jews, Roma, homosexuals, and the disabled.

CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORIES

There are few criminological theoretical approaches to genocide; Hagan's collective action theory, which will be discussed in the next chapter, is one and another approach was developed by Brannigan and Hardwick (2003). These authors applied Gottfredson and Hirschi's general theory of crime (GTC) to genocide (Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003). They argued that if the general theory of crime is truly general, then it should be able to explain genocide. The authors believe that the GTC is more than just low self-control, but a combination of low self-control and social circumstances that either constrain or expedite behavioral outcomes (Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003). Basically, crime is the product of the actor (low self-control) and opportunity.

Brannigan and Hardwick (2003) believed that génocidaires exhibited a lack of self-control, but this was different than the similar condition found in garden variety criminals. Primarily, genocide reflects the vulnerability and defenselessness of the targeted group especially when the state fails to broker peace in conflicts between competing racial or ethnic groups. These situations can be monitored and controlled, but if left unchecked then the opportunity to commit genocide arises (Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003). Using the general theory of crime they find it unlikely that all those involved in genocide suffer from low self-control (Brannigan & Hardwick, 2003). However, this does not mean that the trait of low self-control is irrelevant. It is less important to match the profile of low self-control to individual actors, than it is to apply it to the understanding of the mechanisms that create the opportunity for such behavior to flourish.

CONCLUSION

As can be seen by the multitude of theories of genocide, there is no consensus on what causes genocide. In fact, genocide scholars were cautioned against adopting a theory of genocide prematurely (Huttenbach, 2004). As editor of the *Journal of Genocide Research*, Huttenbach warned researchers not to blindly accept any theory of genocide yet because it would deaden the field of theory in genocide studies. From a sociological and criminological standpoint, this fear appears unnecessary. We can draw an analogy with the study of street crime. There are a variety of theories of crime, many that contradict other theories. This has not stopped the theorizing of crime, but in some ways has encouraged it through critiques and elaborations. Likewise, the theorizing of

genocide will advance by integrating some elements of the existing theories into new theories. In the next chapter, we lay the foundation for our later argument that a modified version of Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's collective action theory of genocide may be based on the insights provided by state crime, organizational crime, and collective violence.

CHAPTER FOUR**THEORETICAL INSIGHTS RELEVANT TO THE STUDY OF GENOCIDE**

“[Mma Ramotswe] had recently taken out a subscription to the Journal of Criminology (an expensive mistake, because it contained little of interest to her) but among the meaningless tables and unintelligible prose she had come across an arresting fact: the overwhelming majority of homicide victims know the person who kills them.”

-Alexander McCall Smith
Tears of the Giraffe

INTRODUCTION

CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY IS A SUBFIELD WITHIN THE discipline of criminology. As the name implies, critical criminologists tend to be critical of the field and of society. As such, they “take the field to task rather than tinker with its parts” (Martel, Hogeveen, & Woolford, 2006: 635). According to critical criminologists, the field of criminology, unlike many

other academic fields, has failed to examine its own basis of knowledge and other important self-reflexive processes (Martel, Hogeveen, & Woolford, 2006). This lack of self-reflection was highlighted at the most recent American Society of Criminology (ASC) conference when Dr. Nicole Rafter called on the field to pay scholarly attention to its own history (61st Annual Meeting of the ASC, Philadelphia, PA, Edwin H. Sutherland Award and Address, 2009).

Critical criminologists do not automatically accept state definitions of crime; they often prefer to define crime in terms of social harm and/or violations of human rights (Einstadter & Henry, 2006). This preference for defining crime as violation of human rights and not merely accepting state definitions is very useful when studying state crime and genocide. A state is unlikely to define its own actions as a crime, including atrocious acts like genocide. For most criminologists, if the act is not deemed a crime by the state, then there is no reason to study the phenomenon; this point will be elaborated upon shortly.

Critical criminology can be defined as being “specifically concerned with the manner in which structural forces, cultural ideologies, and social processes create, sustain, and exacerbate social problems” (Kauzlarich, 2007: 68). While this definition may seem to apply to the entire field of criminology, critical criminologists believe themselves to be on the margin of the field (Martel, Hogeveen, & Woolford, 2006). The marginalization of critical criminology from the broader field of criminology has resulted in a failure to pay attention to issues including state crime (of which genocide is a subfield) and organizational crime (of which state crime can be considered a subfield).

It should be noted though, that organizational crime is also considered problematic and worthy of study by non-critical criminologists (Chambliss, 1989; Sutherland, 1940).

STATE CRIME

State crime has been defined as “acts defined by law as criminal and committed by state officials in the pursuit of their job as representatives of the state” (Chambliss, 1989: 184) and “socially injurious acts designed to alter, expand, or reproduce key elements of the political order” (Lynch & Michalowski, 2006: 186). State crime is not studied as much by criminologists as traditional street crime. Though most state crime scholars agree that the state should be treated as a criminal actor because some crimes are just unthinkable outside of the state context and some crimes are the result of explicit state policy (Brants, 2006). This agreement rests on the idea that international law creates a foundation for defining state crime in terms of human rights, social harm, or economic harm (Rothe, 2009a). International law permits the treatment of a state as a criminal actor because no single state is responsible for defining crime in the international community. In this way, no state can exclude itself from criminal liability by changing its definition of crime.

Once it has been established that state crime is worthy of study, researchers find that many criminological theories are individual-decision based theories at a micro-level of analysis. These types of theories are not very useful when analyzing state crime because state crime is usually a macro-level event resulting from several different causes and not one single cause (Rothe, 2009a). State crime calls for a macro-level theory. Rothe (2009a) proposes a theory of state crime that includes three conditions

which may produce state crime. The state may be (1) motivated by economic pressure, political goals, and anomie; (2) opportunity arises if the state controls information, propaganda, and the military; if (3) constraints such as the media, public opinion, and political pressure is not effective, then state crime may occur (Rothe, 2009a). Similarly, Kramer and Michalowski (2005) have proposed that state crime is likely when pressure for goal attainment intersects with the availability of illegitimate means in the absence of effective social control. Within this framework the state structure can then create criminogenic pressure based on its political, economic, and cultural beliefs (Kramer & Micahlowski, 2005). The field of state crime is a growing area of research that has contributed greatly to the understanding of large-scale criminal acts committed by states around the world. In this study, we argue that we can benefit from these developments when focusing on the crime of genocide. Theorizing and research on state crime draws heavily from the insights derived from the broader field of study of organizational crime.

ORGANIZATIONAL CRIME

Interest in organizational crime evolved from Sutherland's critique of criminology for not studying crimes of the powerful (Braithwaite, 1989). Similar to genocide, state crime, and critical criminology, the study of organizational crime has been relatively isolated within criminology (Friedrichs, 1996). Organizational crime is crime perpetrated by organizations or by individuals acting on behalf of organizations (Braithwaite, 1989: 334). A more nuanced definition of organizational crime states:

Organizational crimes are illegal acts of omission or commission of an individual or a group of individuals in a legitimate formal organization in accordance with the operative

goals of the organization, which have a serious physical or economic impact on employees, consumers or the general public (Schrager & Short, Jr., 1977: 411-412).

This definition can be broken down into its component parts. First, organizational crime involves illegal acts either through omission or commission. Second, organizational crime is committed by an individual or a group of individuals working for the organization in order to benefit the organization. Thirdly, organizational crime requires the presence of a legitimate formal organization. Fourth, organizational crime must have a serious physical or economic impact. Finally, the adverse physical or economic impact must be on employees, consumers, or the general public.

In organizational crime, courts have been willing to punish both the individual who committed the criminal act and the organization that condoned the behavior (Gross, 1980). When courts treat both individuals and organizations as criminally responsible, they have recognized that an organization can exist as a free-standing entity. A similar conclusion regarding the state would solidify the argument that the state is similar to an organization in behavior. There are several reasons why organizations might be considered criminally liable by the courts. First, organizations are a collection of power positions that influence the thoughts and actions of the people in those positions (Ermann & Lundman, 2002). Another reason to believe that organizations can act as an entity beyond its individual members is that the people who occupy the aforementioned positions of power are replaceable (Ermann & Lundman, 2002). The organization does not cease to function when some employees leave their position; the organization remains intact and functional. Further, the structure of an organization might influence deviance by limiting information to members of the organization (Ermann & Lundman,

2002). By limiting information availability the organization can isolate those with knowledge of the deviance away from the elites who lack knowledge. These elites can then later, truthfully, say that they were unaware of the deviance being committed and make a scapegoat out of a small number of employees. Organizations can also support deviant behavior through establishing norms, rewards, or punishments that encourage such behavior (Ermann & Lundman, 2002). Finally, an organization can directly initiate deviance through their position of power (Ermann & Lundman, 2002). Having power over individuals means the organization can order them to commit deviant acts; it remains the individual's choice whether or not to participate.

Braithwaite (1989) has offered a theory of organizational crime based upon Sutherland's differential association. Braithwaite (1989) believes that organizational crime is more likely to occur when there are blockages of legitimate opportunities to achieve organizational goals and illegitimate opportunities are available. Further, blockages of opportunities may create subcultures and organizational crime is more likely to occur when these subcultures have great resistance to law (Braithwaite, 1989). Braithwaite called for a "theory of tipping points" which would explain when the balance between conformity and non-conformity favors one side over the other.

Other organizational crime theorists have posited their own theories on why organizations commit deviant acts. Vaughan (1982) believed that organizations motivated by an emphasis on economic success that are unable to attain resources legally will resort to deviance to achieve their goals. She also believed that members of the organization are prone to deviance if they identify with the organization and its goals creating tension to succeed at all costs (Vaughan, 1982). Shover and Hochstetler

(2002) do not think that organizational crime requires a separate theory because the individual actors' behavior can be explained using a rational choice model. If the individual members weigh the costs and benefits of their behavior then it is unnecessary to have to explain the deviance of the organization as an actor. However, this contradicts the foundation of organizational crime that was based on the idea that "organizations, not just individuals, commit deviant acts" (Ermann & Lundman, 1978).

THE STATE AS AN ORGANIZATION

The state may be viewed as a particular type of organization. The state is "a centralized set of institutions and personnel wielding authoritative power over a nation" (Rose & Miller, 2010: 274). The government, which represents the state, has the obligation of ruling and addressing the nation's problems (Rose & Miller, 2010). As stated above, organizational crime involves illegal acts of an individual or group of individuals in a legitimate formal organization acting in compliance with the organization's goals (Schrager & Short, Jr., 1977). The government of a state is a legitimate goal-oriented organization. A government obtains legitimacy in many different ways including admission to the United Nations or other international body, support in elections from the people of the state, or through exertion of a dominance of power. In addition, the government has its goals that it seeks to attain through the legislative and executive branches: to provide support and maintenance for its population. The nation's goals will include ways to achieve prosperity for the state. There may also be several other goals that the state seeks to achieve based on the government regime and the economics of the state.

The state, as represented by its government, cannot act on its own accord. The state must have people who act on its behalf--those in the government. "We are saying no more than that no organization can run without persons, but persons alone are not enough" (Gross, 1980: 59). Both a government and an organization exist independently of the people who work in the system. Those in the system are replaceable (Ermann & Lundman, 2002); politicians can be voted out or thrown out during a coup. If the people are replaced, the state does not collapse or fail to exist; the state is still a recognized entity regardless of turnover in who is in office. "State crimes are more often organizational crimes rather than individual or small-group deviance" (Lynch & Michalowski, 2006: 186). Therefore, the structure and organizational culture of the state may make the execution of crime easier. Arendt (1977) claimed that "the structure and ideology of totalitarian governments, for instance, are prone to create institutions of social control and political policing in which terrorizing, physically abusing, or even killing perceived political enemies becomes a taken-for-granted part of everyday life." Thereby, government agents come to accept the organizational culture created by those in power in which objectively evil acts become necessary means to reach organizational goals.

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

Genocide may be viewed as an act of collective violence. Therefore, then theorizing on collective violence is relevant in our discussion. Collective violence is defined by the World Health Organization as "The instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of a group—whether this group is

transitory or has a more permanent identity—against another group or set of individuals, in order to achieve political, economic, or social objectives” (Mattaini & Strickland, 2006: 501). This type of violence though can take many different forms; there is no single manner in which to execute collective violence. What is shared by all incidents of collective violence is the fact that the events are committed collectively rather than by individuals (Barkan & Snowden, 2001). Also, the goal of collective violence is to influence—by achieving or impeding—social, political, or economic change (Barkan & Snowden, 2001). The influence that proponents of collective violence desire to achieve can be used to cause inequality as much as it is possible to achieve equality.

Due to the fact that collective violence is executed with a final result in mind, it may be seen as a rational act. Human beings turn to collective violence as a response to a perceived threat thus making collective violence a rational act (Mattaini & Strickland, 2006). If collective violence is rational, then we cannot blame it on random behavior or simplify it to conflict between groups. Rational behavior implies a decision-making process that can be analyzed in hopes of preventing future acts of collective violence.

Collective violence is a phenomenon that has occurred from early history in the form of genocide, mob violence, and gangs. The ideology behind collective violence rests upon the subordination of the individual to the group (Gould, 1999). Then the group becomes independent of the individual members that make up the collectivity (Gould, 1999). Still, even in that situation, the elite maintain a power position. The individuals have subordinated their interests to that of the group, but the group is led by a power elite (Klein, 2007). This power elite can shape the focus and intention of the

collectivity, thus controlling the group both ideologically and behaviorally (Klein, 2007). From this standpoint, the group may be placed in conflict with another group who has a different ideology or goal. When the other group becomes identifiable, the competition becomes personalized and individualized (Grimshaw, 1970). This individualized competition in the group structure most often takes the form of violent conflict (Grimshaw, 1970). Between these two groups, a structure of subordination arises where one group will rise in prominence and power while the other takes the role of subordinate power. When these relationships are based on social categories (race, ethnicity, religion), collective violence will occur if there is a real or perceived assault on the structure (Grimshaw, 1970; Mattaini & Strickland, 2006). Once this subordinate standard is no longer accepted or functional, the likelihood of collective violence increases dramatically.

What appears to be a well settled element of collective violence is the fact that collective violence involves identifying 'the other.' Framing involves shaping the meaning and understanding of the group's goals and antagonists (Barkan & Snowden, 2001). This framing will offer an identity that the group can adhere to and a reason for their actions (Barkan & Snowden, 2001). This identity promotes partisanship and solidarity among the group members. Partisanship has been hypothesized to be a precondition to collective violence (De la Roche, 2001). The more partisan the group members are, the more likely that collective violence will occur because of the strong connections and homogeneity of the group itself (De la Roche, 2001). The partisan relations and identities may then create equivalence relations, which include value judgments of the other (Mattaini & Strickland, 2006). These judgments often take

negative formats such as “Arabs = terrorists.” Once established, these value judgments are difficult to change and may actually strengthen if they are disputed by others (Mattaini & Strickland, 2006).

Our knowledge of collective violence has much to contribute to the study of genocide. Most research on genocide cannot occur until after the incident has ended and the lives of hundreds, thousands, and possibly millions of people are gone. This creates a unique problem for genocide scholars to address--the issue of reasoning back from the conflict to the factors believed to influence the conflict. In that way, the transition to group action is often overlooked (Gould, 1999). In some cases, the factors leading to the genocide are used to explain the violence without explaining why most confrontations do not result in violent behavior (Gould, 1999). As seen, collective violence helps explain why groups engage in violent action in certain circumstances and not others. The final point to make is that group solidarity is imperfect. While people may share certain traits or characteristics based on ethnicity or lineage, each individual has their own interests that might be at odds with their fellow group members (Gould, 1999). This imperfect solidarity offers an explanation for why some members of a dominant group (Nazis, Hutus, Turks) do not participate in genocide, but instead offer aid to victims.

CONCLUSION

The approaches just discussed do not always explicitly focus on genocide, but they provide useful conceptual tools to analyze genocide. In the next chapter, we discuss Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's collective action theory of genocide. We

present Hagan's theory in detail explaining the elements and how they interact with each other in the original collective action theory. Then, we present some modifications to the collective action theory suggested by prior research and thinking on state and organizational crime and collective violence.

CHAPTER FIVE**HAGAN'S COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY OF GENOCIDE**

“You will be judged in years to come by how you responded to genocide on your watch.”

-Nicholas D. Kristof
Pulitzer Prize winning journalist

JOHN HAGAN AND WENONA RYMOND-RICHMOND (2009) have proposed a collective action theory of genocide. Their collective action theory begins at the macro-level and discusses how the micro-, meso-, and macro-levels interact to result in genocidal victimization. Previous research in state crime and organizational crime has highlighted the importance of analyzing decision-making at the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels (Vaughan, 2007; Kramer & Michalowski, 2005; Michalowski & Kramer, 2007). Briefly, their collective action theory of genocide states that:

[P]recipitating conditions, especially (1) land competition and *supremacist ideology* produce Arab versus Black identities (or *socially constructed racial groups*) and thereby provide a *vocabulary of motives and neutralization*; they motivate (2) individualized racial intent (*'race' as a vocabulary of motive*) further promoted by field commanders with high levels of 'social efficacy' and ties to (and support from) the Sudanese government; and lead, via (3) frenzied collective action in which the yelling of *racial epithets* produces collectivized racial intent at the meso-level, back to (4) the macro-level with its patterns of a genocidal state as an endogenous system. (Savelsberg, 2009: 478 (italics in original))

See Figure 2 for a visual interpretation of Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's collective action theory of genocide.

According to Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, the government of Sudan fostered the racial and ethnic divisions between Arabs and Black Africans by recruiting and mobilizing Arab militias. It was not difficult to recruit these nomadic Arabs because of the need for land and water resources. Their collective action theory of genocide is designed to analyze both the individual and collective level of the racial division. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond base their theory on the work of Coleman and Sampson and their transformation problem. The transformation problem asks "how systems are built from the interdependent and purposively collected actions of individuals" (Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2009: 165). In Coleman's original work he described the transformation problem as the process by which individual choices become collective decisions. This provides the link between the individual and the state level action that is genocide.

There are several elements to Hagan's collective action theory including the nation-state, socially constructed groups, individualization, and collectivized intent. In

regards to genocide, the action and inaction by the state violates the express duty of the state to protect its citizens. Autocratic governments, like Sudan, tend to already devalue their responsibility to protect its people. When these institutions abuse the trust of its people and govern through illegitimate use of power, the state has abandoned its purpose and entered the realm of state criminality. Directives to commit genocide usually are issued from certain government agencies; many times the directives are issued by government actors from mayors to official parliament members. It seems clear that the state is a crucial aspect of any genocide; genocide is not possible outside of the state context (Brants, 2006). Democracy serves as a barrier to genocide because there is less chance of forming a homogeneous collectivity. Therefore, while the state is essential to the commission of genocide, the level of democracy will also affect the likelihood of genocide.

The creation of socially constructed groups is influenced by state polity. As Hagan and Raymond-Richmond found, the existence of a minority group is usually highlighted by the desire to create socially distinct and locally organized groups. No minority group organizes itself deliberately to be a minority group; the status develops through recognition and labeling. Any plural society will consist of several different groups, only homogeneous societies lack such diversity (i.e. North Korea). These groups can be divided by their race, ethnicity, religion, or nationality (Freeman, 1991). Segmenting society into these different groups can make genocide easier to implement because the minority or target group is quickly identifiable. The minority group becomes the scapegoat for the dominant group and the problems of the state (Dutton, Boyanowsky, & Bond, 2005). Once these groups have been separated, the process of

individualization may occur whereby the individual is distinguished from the general group. This discrimination further separates the individual from the larger group and makes them the 'other' in the eyes of the majority.

The isolation of a group of people for attack in genocide cannot be ignored, but is often difficult to explain. Collective violence literature specifies one way in which that isolation and identification of the victim group occurs. This process involves identifying the 'other' (Barkan & Snowden, 2001). When that group becomes identifiable, the competition between the two groups will become personal and individualized (Grimshaw, 1970). Once the groups have been identified and individualized, a natural progression of subordination occurs where one group will rise in dominance and the other will become subordinate. The process of subordination is influenced by framing; framing is the shaping of the meaning and understanding of a group (Barkan & Snowden, 2001). An identity is then formed that the collectivity can adhere to and supply reason for their behavior. This identity promotes partisanship and solidarity among the group members and a sense of connection and homogeneity for the group (De la Roche, 2001). The identifiable inclusion and exclusion of group members may lead to value judgments, which tend to take on negative formats such as "Arabs = terrorists" (Mattaini & Strickland, 2006). Even if these value judgments are challenged as incorrect they are likely to remain and possibly be reinforced through the dispute (Mattaini & Strickland, 2006). Identifying the 'other' provides a concrete basis for the feelings of hatred that often precede genocide.

Since genocide is a collective act of a state, the ability of the state to solidify the intent to commit genocide is vitally important to the implementation of genocide. The

likelihood of successful collectivization is dependent on the power of the state. Forming a collectivity to save the state from an external threat from the 'other' is relatively simple. The elite of the power group rallies the majority to see the other as a danger to peace and stability. The collectivity then forms its own exclusive ideology where the individual is subordinate to the group (Gould, 1999). This allows the elite of the group to dictate and control the collectivity's interests and actions (Klein, 2007). When the subordinate status of the minority group becomes unbearable, violence is the likely result. While the majority of the collectivity will fall into line behind the elite leaders and join their genocidal ideology, there will be some who decide that their own interests are at odds with the collectivity (see Gould, 1999). This is a possible explanation for why there are usually some in the dominant group who do not participate in genocide--they were not successfully integrated into the collectivity. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond describe how Sudan has contributed to the collectivization of violence in Darfur. They highlight how Sudan "(1) [found] an ethnic militia with existing rivalries with the targeted group (the ethnic groups related to the rebels); (2) arm[ed] and support[ed] that militia, and g[ave] it impunity for any crimes; [and] (3) encourag[ed] and help[ed] it to attack the civilians of the targeted group. . ." (Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2009: 125).

Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's collective action theory of genocide has several connections between the above-explained individual elements of the theory. The first link is between the state led ideology and the socially constructed groups in society. In Darfur, the dehumanizing and supremacist state ideology, based on competition for scarce resources, intensified the divisions between the Arabs and Black Africans. The second link is between the socially constructed groups and the individualization of those

roles. This link represents the change from racial identification to use of racial epithets. From the use of racial epithets, the next link is to the meso-level collectivized racial intent prior to the beginning of the genocide. This link represents the aggregation and concentration of the racial epithets into collective action through the framing process of the other. The final link is between the collectivized racial intent to the genocidal state; this link represents the culmination of the collective action and anger into genocidal behavior. When individuals are encouraged by state-based racism and acquire a collective force that rises above their individual expressions, genocide is the result.

Aside from Coleman's transformative process question, Hagan and Rymond-Richmond also utilize Sampson's work on collective efficacy and Matsueda's work on collective action. Collective efficacy emphasizes that individuals are collectively organized in neighborhoods that have their own qualities (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). "Just as individuals vary in their capacity for efficacious action, so too do neighborhoods vary in their capacity to achieve common goals" (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997: 918). Sampson et al. also recognize that efficacy is a consequence of processes at the neighborhood level, it is not solely an individual process. As applies to genocide, this implies that there is a meso- or macro-level process that collectivizes people into action when there is a shared goal. This was reinforced by Matsueda's use of social efficacy to mean the ability of certain individuals to mobilize others into realizing shared goals (Matsueda, 2006). Hagan and Rymond-Richmond thus use collective efficacy as a linking mechanism to highlight how individual actions inspired others to join together in collective action. Specifically, the authors refer to two Janjaweed militia leaders whose actions spurred violence in Darfur

(Matsueda, 2009). Militia leader Musa Hilal told one reporter, “The government call to arms is carried out through tribal leaders. . . Every government comes and finds us here.” (Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2009: 135).

Hagan and Rymond-Richmond rely on collective action theory as the basis for their explanation of genocide in Darfur. Collective action theory assumes that people think before they act and expects that they will act in ways that generate benefits (Francisco, 2010). Collective action requires mobilization whereby “restive leaders summon zealots to cluster and use violence . . . to attack their targets” (Francisco, 2010: 5). However, collective action does not have to be violent; collective action can be either for a positive or negative purpose. As the size of the group increases in collective action, the ability to exert pressure and coercion increases (Udehn, 1993). For a large group to be able to function as a collectivity, a leader usually emerges to control the group, much like those who mobilize others into action in collective efficacy (Udehn, 1993). The thrust of the collective action dynamic that Hagan and Rymond-Richmond highlight is the use of racial epithets during attacks on Darfuri villages. The epithets are spoken by individuals, but represent a “collective action frame that constructs grievances as collective, dehumanizes Africans (the ‘them’ versus ‘us’), and justifies horrific attacks” (Matsueda, 2009: 498). Collective action frames contain three elements: “(a) it defines the root of the problem and its solution collectively rather than individually; (b) it defines the antagonists—‘us’ and ‘them’; and (c) it defines an injustice that can be corrected through a challenger’s action” (Matsueda, 2006: 20). Collective action framing involves groups seeing their “shared frustrations as following from a status system that is unjustly stacked against them” (Hagan & Rymond-Richmond,

2009: 119). The Janjaweed militia leaders have taken on the role of instigator in the violence to arouse Arabs to attack together in order to succeed at their ultimate goal.

Hagan and Rymond-Richmond then use quantitative analysis to support their proposition and find that use of racial epithets is highest when Janjaweed and government militias attack together. They also found that sexual violence increased when the government and militias attacked together. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009: 190) concluded that “racism operated as a collective instrument of organized terror that amplified the severity of [] genocidal victimization in Darfur.” This evidence was used to support their collectivized racial intent element of the collective action theory.

Modifications

While Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s work is exceptional and definitely a step forward in the criminology of genocide, their theory appears so narrow that it may only apply to genocide based on racial divides. The purpose of the work was to examine genocide as a study of criminology, but more specifically provide evidence of genocide in Sudan and encourage intervention and prosecution (Hoffman, 2009). This means that the theory posited by Hagan and Rymond-Richmond is too specific to the situation in Darfur. The ability to apply their theory as presented is limited; one reviewer has stated that the authors “give definitional and analytical priority to racism, although this is (in general) only one of numerous types of potentially genocidal ideology” (Shaw, 2010: 389). In the modified collective action theory of genocide (MCAT), we broaden the applicability of the theory by eliminating reference to specific racial characteristics in

Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's explanation. It is hoped that the MCAT will be able to explain genocides not only based on race (as suggested by Hagan) but also on—ethnicity, national origin, or religion (the protected groups in the UN Convention on genocide). In our revised model, any specific references in Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's theory to race have been eliminated (these changes are marked in Figure 2 with empty red boxes; for the full modified collective action theory see Figure 3).

In addition to the limited applicability of the authors' theory, there are other limitations to the collective action theory of genocide. The authors "fail[] to consult or engage the extant body of rich literature by criminologists on genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and more generally state crime. . . [T]he field of state crime [was] ignored and yet could have contributed significantly to the authors' argument and analysis" (Rothe, 2009b: 872-873). The "organizational issues of the state" was also overlooked by Hagan and Rymond-Richmond in their discussion of Darfur (Rothe, 2009b). In the MCAT, we utilize the work of state crime and organizational crime to buttress the theoretical framework—by expanding on Hagan's concept of state ideology to include the social and political pressures explained by Rothe (2009) as well as the organizational structure addressed by Braithwaite (1989)—and address its absence in Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's analysis. As has been seen, many different fields of study have analyzed genocide and there are many theories of genocide in political science, sociology, and law. A criminological theoretical framework of genocide should learn from these other fields while contributing its own unique ideas. There is great potential to extend the bounds of criminology with an integrated theory of genocide and

the modified collective action theory of genocide is but a humble attempt to expand upon the strong work of Hagan and Rymond-Richmond.

Finally, the link between collectivized racial intent and the genocidal state in Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's theory lacks a thorough discussion. Their explanation for how collectivized racial intent becomes genocide is simply stated as the "culmination of the frenzied fury" (Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2009: 166). As Rothe (2009b: 873) notes, "many relevant factors or catalysts are missing or not taken into account." To correct this oversight, there must be some triggering event that ignites the collectivized intent into genocidal action. Like most other crimes, opportunity must arise before genocide can be executed. In order to cross the line between oppression and genocide, there must be some catalyst that propels the state into the final option. "Other, and more critical and precipitat[ing] events are required in order to cross that threshold" (Dadrian, 1990: 135).

Many scholars recognize the presence of a catalyst without necessarily applying that label. Harff (2003) found that almost all genocides after 1945 occurred during or immediately following an internal war, revolution or regime collapse. Freeman (1991) found that nations destabilized by crises were more likely to experience conflict that could lead to genocide. Krain (1997) found that the opportunity to implement genocide had to present itself prior to the genocide beginning. The opportunity for genocide presents itself in the form of some catalyst that triggers the extreme act. Examples of a triggering catalyst can be war, revolution, a failing nation, or other national crisis (Kolin, 2008). Any rapid and profound change on the national level may be a sufficient catalyst to trigger genocide. The presence of the other elements acts as a primer that prepares

the state to take genocidal action. Without the catalyst though, genocide will most likely not be the result. The addition of a triggering catalyst allows for the analysis of the relevant factors for which Hagan and Rymond-Richmond did not account.

CONCLUSION

The collective action theory posited by Hagan and Rymond-Richmond is a great step forward in the criminological theorizing on genocide. As a new theory that was applied to only one instance of genocide in the original work, there is a need for a broader based test of the theory. We will examine whether Hagan's collective action theory can explain genocide across time, place, and intention behind the genocide. In order to do this, we had to broaden the scope of Hagan's theory by eliminating the references to race and opening it to include genocide based on race, but also on nationality, ethnicity, and religion. In addition, based on prior work on genocide in several different fields, there appeared a need to expand the theory by adding the element of triggering catalyst. We will include this new element in the testing of Hagan's theory to evaluate if it is a needed modification. The next chapter will detail the methodology used in testing the collective action theory of genocide.

CHAPTER SIX**METHODOLOGY**

“Actions, not words, would be the measure of our success or failure. Will there be lengthy academic or legal debates on what constitutes genocide or crimes against humanity while people die?”

-Charles Marinade
Minister of Education, Rwanda

INTRODUCTION

THE CASE STUDY METHOD IS “THE FOUNDATION ON WHICH understanding is built” (Rothe, 2009a: 86). Case studies allow for the analysis of processes over time, as well as identifying the interaction between variables in social phenomena (Yin, 2009).

Genocide is a complex social action and quantitative methods may not be able to incorporate all of the variables necessary to conduct adequate analysis (Rothe, 2009a).

The case study method is concerned with fully understanding a small number of cases that share some significant outcome (Ragin, 1999a). Case studies focus closely on developing a complete understanding of a few cases, instead of finding generalizations

across many cases. Case studies are used many times where the phenomena under analysis are too complex to be studied in any other manner (Ragin, 1999a).

In the study of genocide, there are many factors and complexities involved. It is not easy, and may not be practicable, to reduce genocide to numbers and quantitative analysis. In order to understand this complex relationship between genocide and its causes, the case study is the preferred method. While in quantitative research, variables compete with each other to explain variation in the dependent variable, the variables in case-oriented methodology do not compete with each other (Ragin, 1999a); instead, causal variables in case studies are understood to work together.

This would seem to favor the case study approach to testing the proposed modified collective action theory of genocide. As will be shown, the case-oriented approach has benefits when trying to disentangle causal complexity. In the current study, we will use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). QCA is a growing method that is likely to increase the acceptance of qualitative methods in the field.

CAUSAL COMPLEXITY

In most social science research there is more than one causal condition (Ragin, 1999b). Certain outcomes may be the result of several different, non-overlapping combinations of conditions (Ragin, 1999b). Being able to identify these several factors is important if the social sciences want to offer a fuller understanding of social phenomena. Genocide is one example where causal complexity makes research into this phenomenon very challenging. In genocide, there may be many combinations of factors that ultimately end in mass killing. Where more than one causal condition has

been found, it is important to determine whether that condition is necessary, sufficient, or both. Studying a small number of cases is very good for identifying necessary causes (Ragin, 1999a). Necessary causes are discovered by working backward from the outcome of a case and searching for common antecedent conditions (Ragin, 1999a). Necessary causes can be analyzed in a probabilistic manner recognizing that a cause is necessary 90% of the time (Mahoney, 2004). Sufficiency works forward from instances of causal conditions to see if these combinations result in the same outcome (Ragin, 1999a). To determine sufficiency, it is necessary to find all combinations of causal conditions and see if these combinations result in the same outcome (Ragin, 1999a). If all of the cases result in the same outcome, the evidence supports the claim that the necessary causes are also sufficient. If the cases differ greatly on the outcome, then the causal conditions must be re-specified or the set of cases restructured (Ragin, 1999b).

As will be seen, QCA methodology is well-suited for testing the modified collective action theory of genocide. If the theoretical elements can be shown to be necessary and sufficient causes of genocide, then it becomes plausible to recognize which countries might be at risk of genocide. Since most genocide research can only be conducted after genocide has ended, the ability to predict where genocide might occur next offers the possibility of preventing mass murder.

QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) was developed for the analysis of small and intermediate-N data sets (Ragin & Rihoux, 2004). QCA is designed to unravel the

causal complexity of specific outcomes by applying set-theoretic methods to cross-case evidence (Ragin & Rihoux, 2004). While QCA is non-statistical at its base, probabilities can be employed to explain the chance of a causal condition leading to the outcome under analysis (Ragin, 1999b). The QCA method was designed to work with the case study approach of analysis (Ragin, 1999b).

The primary analytic tool in QCA is the truth table. A truth table lists all of the “logically possible combinations of causal conditions and the outcome associated with each combination” (Ragin & Rihoux, 2004: 4). Analyzing the truth table will reveal what causal combinations result in the outcome of interest. Causal conditions are identified in the truth table with a dichotomous indication of present or absent (Ragin, 1999b). QCA methodology tends to be carried out in three steps: first, construct the truth table based on theoretical and case study information; second, analyze the truth table; and finally, take the results back to the cases and theory to evaluate the findings (Ragin & Rihoux, 2004).

Cases should be chosen using a rigorous manner. Causal conditions should be selected in a theoretically and empirically informed manner (Ragin & Rihoux, 2004). In an analysis of the modified collective action theory of genocide, cases will be chosen based on the fact of genocide having occurred with a small number of matching cases without the occurrence of genocide. This will be explained in more detail in the next chapter. Causal conditions have been laid out in the full description of the theory and based on prior theoretical and empirical information. The significant causal variables (state regime, socially constructed groups, individualization, collectivization, and triggering catalyst) and their operationalization will be presented in the next section of

this chapter. For the test of the modified collective action theory of genocide (MCAT), there are thirty-two possible combinations of these causal variables (see later in this chapter).

All thirty-two possible combinations should be considered in order to provide a thorough assessment of the theory. There are bound to be some situations where it is not possible to determine if the outcome resulted from the causal combination represented in the truth table. These are known as “remainder” cases where the outcome is unknown (Ragin & Rihoux, 2004). A solution to the remainder cases is to treat them as “don’t care” combinations (Ragin & Rihoux, 2004). When treated as “don’t care” combinations, the presence of the outcome will be assumed if it results in a simplified causal combination. For example, if $A \cdot B \cdot C \cdot D \rightarrow Y$ and $A \cdot B \cdot C \cdot d \rightarrow Y$, where capital letters represent the presence of the variable and lower case represents absence, then the causal condition can be simplified as: $A \cdot B \cdot C \cdot (D+d) \rightarrow Y$, which means that $A \cdot B \cdot C \rightarrow Y$ (Ragin & Rihoux, 2004: 7-8). This simplification assumes that the combination $A \cdot B \cdot C \cdot d$ did not have any instance of the outcome variable. We assume that Y was present in order to simplify the casual conditions that can be said to relate to the outcome.

From the truth table, a simple two-by-two table can be constructed for assessing the sufficiency of the causal conditions analyzed. The two-by-two table will tally the total number of cases that experience the causal conditions and whether the outcome variable is present, as well as the number of cases that do not experience the causal conditions and whether the outcome is present or not. “As long as there are cases in cell 2 and no cases (or virtually no cases) in cell 4, then the researcher may argue that

the causal combination is sufficient, assuming that theoretical and substantive knowledge support this interpretation” (Ragin, 1999b: 1229). The more cases present in cell 2, the stronger the claim that the causal combination is both a necessary and sufficient cause of the outcome variable.

	CAUSAL COMBINATION ABSENT	CAUSAL COMBINATION PRESENT
OUTCOME PRESENT	1. CASES EXPLAINED BY SOME OTHER CAUSAL COMBINATION	2. CASES EXPLAINED BY PRIMARY CAUSAL COMBINATION
OUTCOME ABSENT	3. NOT DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO THE ASSESSMENT OF SUFFICIENCY	4. NO CASES (OR VIRTUALLY NO CASES) HERE

(Ragin, 1999b: 1229)

QCA will provide support for the modified collective action theory of genocide by assessing cases of genocide and whether they exhibit the same causes. These cases will increase the size of the population and see how generalizable the theory might be. As dichotomous variables, they can be easily transferred to a numerical system where 0 means not present and 1 means present. While this study would not provide a large enough sample size to conduct quantitative analysis, it could be the beginning of a data set on genocide that has heretofore not existed.

There are critics of QCA, but the method recognizes its limitations and does not seek to unseat any quantitative methods. It has been said that QCA provides a plausible account of the data, but not the only plausible account that could be generated (Lieberson, 2004). Lieberson (2004) also believes that QCA over-interprets the data it produces. However, Lieberson does acknowledge that a great deal can be learned from QCA if we observe patterns within the truth table without attempting to account for

everything. Ragin and Rihoux (2004) agree that QCA cannot be used to explain everything. There will be cases that do not fit the causal combination of interest and researchers must recognize and acknowledge those cases. Much like quantitative analysis which fails to account for all variance with a single variable (or combination of variables), QCA cannot account for all variance in causal combinations.

Another critique of QCA is the manner in which it handles omitted variables. In QCA, a variable is omitted only after it has been inferred that the variable has no relationship with the outcome. This is a higher standard that most regressions would apply (Seawright, 2004). Ragin and Rihoux (2004) point out though the different foundations for QCA and regression analysis. QCA has the goal of identifying combinations of causal variables linked with a specific outcome. Regression analysis estimates the net effect of each individual variable in isolation from all other causal variables (Ragin & Rihoux, 2004). It is more important in QCA to omit variables that have no relationship to the outcome because we are seeking to understand causal combinations and not isolated variables.

Qualitative methodology focuses on the study of social phenomena, which by its very nature is limited in diversity. This means that the selection of cases is going to be limited in their outcome because QCA begins with the assumption that causation is complex and not simple (Ragin & Sonnett, 2005). In quantitative analysis, diversity is obscured by the nature of holding independent variables constant when determining the effect of the individual variables (Ragin & Sonnett, 2005). The QCA analysis here will result in many cases of remainders where there are causal combinations and an unknown outcome. What can be taken from QCA analysis is that it is a combination of

conditions that lead to the outcome of interest (Rioux, 2006). Also, it should be remembered that different combinations of conditions can produce the same outcome and depending on the context, one condition may have a different effect on the outcome (Rioux, 2006).

QCA, unlike most quantitative methods, requires that the researcher work with real-life, complex cases. The QCA researcher must compile a large amount of knowledge about the cases under analysis, which is achieved through almost complete immersion in the case. QCA researchers must get in-depth knowledge about their cases and not simply numbers recorded in a data set. In some respects, the QCA researcher “knows” his cases better than a quantitative researcher might “know” his variables. While no method is perfect for assessing causality, QCA will be useful to examine the modified collective action theory of genocide by using a larger number of cases to determine if the same causal conditions are present across time and location of the genocides.

VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION

Nation-State Regime Type

The crucial element according to previous research (Harff, 2003; Rummel, 2005) appears to be the political organization of the state—autocracy or democracy. Rummel (2005) goes as far as saying that democracy is a hedge on genocide because no democracy could create the necessary state control to execute mass slaughter. Harff’s (2003) study confirmed that no democracy had committed genocide since 1945. For QCA purposes, all variables must be dichotomous; nation-state will be categorized as

'autocracy' or 'democracy.' From qualitative data about the form of government in the state, an autocracy is present when the "representative is one man . . . [or] an assembly of only some of the multitude" (Hobbes, [1651] 2010: 85-86). Democracy is "an assembly of all that are willing [to] come together" (Hobbes, [1651] 2010: 86).

Socially Constructed Groups

Assessing the presence of socially constructed groups can be simple depending on the criterion for being a group. One way to identify a socially constructed group is to identify what unifies and solidifies the group. Most socially constructed group members share a common sense of self-interest and identity. This may be based on shared historical experience and cultural traits such as religious beliefs, language, and a common homeland (Gurr & Harff, 1994). Being able to identify what shared factors solidify a socially constructed group is essential when examining genocide. As per the United Nations definition, genocide only occurs when targeted killing is based on religion, ethnicity, nationality, or race. While there might be a valid minority group based on shared beliefs and history, if it does not fall within one of these four identified groups, then it cannot be labeled genocide. To identify a minority population, the criterion is the powerlessness of the group. Then it must be established which category the minority group belongs to under the Genocide Convention. For the QCA analysis, the dichotomous variable socially constructed groups will be labeled 'yes' if there are identifiable socially constructed groups in the state and 'no' if there are no identifiable groups.

Individualization

The process of individualization involves identifying the 'other' and labeling them as such. "In general, it is the process by which individual beings are formed and differentiated" (Jung, 1971: 757). To be individualized is to be "made for or directed or adjusted to a particular individual" (The Free Dictionary). When applied to a group, this individualization identifies the group with some description, often negative. Once these negative characteristics are applied to the group, it becomes easier for value judgments to attach to the 'other' because they are not seen as part of the community. Value judgments imply an assignation of either good or bad to a particular thing; value judgments of the 'other' tend to take very negative forms (such as Arabs = terrorists or Tutsi = cockroach)—in order to demonize the victim group while elevating the perpetrator group—and can be associated with violence. For QCA analysis, individualization will be labeled either 'high' or 'low.' Based on previous research, there seems to be a threshold where individualization crosses the line from base distrust or dislike to severe hatred of the 'other.' For example, during the Holocaust, there was a bureau of the government designed to create and disseminate propaganda against the Jews. This involved creating films and posters blaming the Jewish population for military losses in World War I and labeling them as a disease to be eliminated. This would be classified as 'high' on the QCA scale for individualization. In contrast, during the Herero genocide, there were people in Germany protesting the slaughter of the Herero people. While they were called baboons and apes, this language was not unusual for colonialization purposes in Africa at the time. This would be categorized as 'low' on the QCA scale for individualization.

Collectivization

According to the collective action and collective violence literature, collectivization involves unifying a group together in order to achieve some economic, political, or social change. Collective violence is characterized by the fact that events are committed by a collectivity rather than by individuals (Barkan & Snowden, 2001). The collectivity participates in violence because they see their acts as a way to achieve the desired social change (Barkan & Snowden, 2001). For true collectivization to occur, a diverse population must come together to share a common goal and a common way to achieve that goal, namely genocide. For QCA analysis, collectivity will be dichotomized as 'yes' or 'no'; if collectivization is present, the society will have been mobilized to act, while a lack of collectivity implies that there was no mass mobilization of the population to execute genocide. An example of a lack of collectivity is when genocide is accomplished through state action and dictates. For example, the military does not represent collectivization as described in the collective violence literature because the military did not come together with a common goal and a shared way to achieve that goal.

Triggering Catalyst

Many scientific experiments require a catalyst before the end result occurs. The simplest definition of a catalyst is "an agent that provokes or speeds significant change or action" (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). Any rapid and profound change on the national level may be a sufficient catalyst to trigger genocide. This catalyst can be either a violent or neutral act that the political structure views as an immediate change

in the equilibrium of the state. Any act that has a nation-wide effect can be a triggering catalyst to set the spark of genocide. War and violent conflict that continues to grow could act as a catalyst. While the catalyst need not be violent, violence seems to be the most obvious type of catalyst. The catalyst may only be recognizable after the genocide has begun. But tracing the violence back to the beginning of the killing will reveal what precipitated the mass murders. If a state-wide cataclysmic event has occurred it will be labeled 'yes' for QCA analysis.

CONCLUSION

The QCA analysis will be useful for testing the modified collective action theory of genocide. If the elements of regime type, socially constructed groups, individualization, collectivization, and triggering catalyst are present in episodes of genocide, then conclusions can be drawn regarding the necessity of these elements to the occurrence of genocide. Understanding the complex causes that lead to genocide will not be simple. There are likely to be several causal combinations that lead to a genocidal state. Knowing these precursor elements can have an important policy implication for identifying and ideally preventing future genocides.

CHAPTER SEVEN**CASE STUDIES**

No one can demand that you be neutral toward the crime of genocide. If there is a judge in the whole world who can be neutral toward this crime, that judge is not fit to sit in judgment.

-Gideon Hauser
Eichmann prosecutor

INTRODUCTION

IN ORDER TO TEST HAGAN'S THEORY AND THE modifications of it using qualitative comparative analysis, analysis of case studies of genocide must be performed. In the analysis of each episode of genocide the causal variables explained previously (i.e., regime type, socially constructed groups, individualization, collectivization, triggering catalyst) will be highlighted. This will result in the construction of a truth table detailing what combinations of the causal variables result in genocide. The possible combinations are listed in table 2. There are thirty-two possible combinations when

there are five causal variables (2^k where k equals the number of causal variables) (Ragin, 1999b). The genocides include the 1904-07 Herero genocide, the 1915 Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, 1971 in Bangladesh, 1972 in Burundi, 1975 in Cambodia, 1975 in East Timor, 1988 in Iraq, the 1994 Rwandan genocide, 1995 in Bosnia, and 2003-present genocide in Darfur. For comparison purposes there are matching negative cases chosen in three cases; these include 1972 in Rwanda, 1988 in Iran, 1994 in Burundi. The comparative cases are chosen based on year and being a neighboring country to the area where genocide was occurring.

“Let us die fighting rather than as a result from maltreatment.”
-Herero Chief Samuel Maharero

1904-1908 HERERO GENOCIDE

The Herero were a pastoral people who lived in the south west part of Africa-- what is today called Namibia.⁵ Unlike the other genocides analyzed in this dissertation, the Herero genocide occurred during colonization. South West Africa (as the area was then known) was seen as ripe land for colonization purposes by the Germans. By the time of the genocide, Germany owned more than twenty-five percent of the Herero land and nearly half of their cattle. To justify this exploitation, Governor Leutwein spoke of the superior culture of the whites over the native population. One German newspaper said: “the land, of course must be transferred from the hands of the natives to those of the whites, [this] is the object of colonization in the territory. The land shall be settled by

⁵ The following information comes from: Harff (2009), Madley (2004), Palmer (1998), Kiernan (2007), Drechsler (1990), Bridgman & Worley (2004), and Goldhagen (2009).

whites. So the natives must give way and either become servants of the whites or withdraw” (Madley, 2004: 182). When speaking of political ideology in South West Africa, it becomes clear that there was no native control. The Germans had promised to take care of the Hereros, but instead took their land and their cattle. Left without recourse, the Herero felt like slaves in their own country. While the government in Berlin was not present in Hereroland, they had sent Governor Leutwein to maintain order and control over the territory.

The division between the Germans and the Herero was obviously based on race, but there were also many other divisions that existed. The Herero were a nomadic herds-people with a complex social and political organization. The Hereros organized themselves by paternal and maternal lineage that was unknown to the German settlers. Hereros considered all of the land to be common property with no one person owning any particular section. Cattle were very important throughout the Herero culture. The Herero language contained over one thousand words for the colors and marking of cattle. Owning cattle bestowed wealth, prestige and political power upon the Herero. In religion, cattle played a prominent role and soured cow’s milk was a staple of the Herero traditional diet. This traditional way of life did not match with the German settlers who saw themselves as the natural superior to the Herero. In fact, those Germans who refused to mistreat the Herero were looked down upon by the European community.

With such obvious divisions between the Germans and the Herero, it is not surprising that value judgments and individualization soon followed. First and foremost, the Herero represented an obstacle for the Germans. They were an obstacle not just to occupying the land, but also to the limited resources in the arid environment. Ridding

the area of the Herero would eliminate any obstacle to further colonial expansion in South West Africa and beyond. In addition, the Germans did not see the Herero as equal human beings, but as primitive natives not worthy of the land that they occupied.

One missionary in the area at the time proclaimed that:

The average German looks down upon the natives as being about on the same level as the higher primates (baboon being their favorite term for the natives) and treats them like animals. The settler holds that the native has a right to exist only in so far as he is useful to the white man (Madley, 2004: 169).

Viewing the Herero as baboons meant that they were not human and did not have the same feelings or emotions to consider. The Germans thoroughly treated the Herero as subhuman savages. The Kaiser had said that Christian precepts did not apply to “heathens and savages,” even though he had never been to South West Africa. When analyzing the value judgments that accompanied the Herero genocide, it must be noted that these beliefs were not uncommon at the time. Most Europeans believed that all Africans were savages and less than human. This is why the individualization here is considered low, because it was not uncommon to the belief system of the day.

The extermination of the Herero populace in South West Africa was less of an official decision by the government of Germany than it was the decision of General Luthar von Trotha. General von Trotha was sent by Berlin to South West Africa to control the Herero after they had rebelled against German control. Upon his arrival he stated that “His Majesty the Emperor only said that he expected me to crush the rebellion by fair means or foul and to inform him later of the causes that had provoked the uprising” (Drechsler, 1990: 241). In order to accomplish this goal, von Trotha

ordered the elimination of the Herero people regardless of age or sex. His simple cry was that “the entire Herero people must be exterminated” (Bridgman & Worley, 2004: 44). After the war with the Herero began and the genocide was underway, von Trotha issued his “Extermination Order,” which detailed that the Herero people must leave the territory or face death. There was not to be any compassion for women or children, and if they approached German officers, the officers were to shoot above their heads to encourage them to retreat.

However, von Trotha’s policies did not go unchallenged. Governor Leutwein was so disturbed by what he saw that he asked the German Foreign Office if he (Leutwein) had any power to deal with the Herero people. When he was informed that von Trotha had sole authority when dealing with the Herero, Leutwein resigned as governor. Upon his resignation, von Trotha was appointed governor. The editor of the leading German newspaper in South West Africa said, “The Herero should not be destroyed” (Kiernan, 2007: 384-85). Back in Germany, many government agencies refused to be involved in what they believed to be an immoral act. Two Colonial Office employees brought forward evidence of misconduct by German officials in South West Africa; their report was destroyed and they lost their positions. Anti-colonial parties in the Reichstag stated their position that von Trotha’s policies were wrong and anti-German in their brutality. They attempted to halt the genocide by defunding the military and the colonization projects. When their protests became too loud to ignore, the Kaiser dissolved parliament. August Bebel, a member of the Social Democratic party, called the elimination of the Herero “not just barbaric, but bestial” (Kiernan, 2007: 387). With such strenuous objections, it is clear that Germany never achieved a state of collectivization.

Collective violence is perpetrated by the public; the Herero genocide was accomplished through the military forces of Germany and von Trotha's "Extermination Order."

The death knell for the Herero people came on January 12, 1904. On this date, the Hereros rose up against the German settlers killing more than 100 settlers and soldiers. After this attack, the German government sent in General von Trotha with military support to squash the rebellion. After cornering the Hereros, von Trotha set up an easy escape route that led straight to the Omaheke Desert. As the Herero fled into the desert, if any groups tried to escape in a different direction, German troops forced them back into the main group toward the desert. After the Herero made their way into the Omaheke Desert, von Trotha cordoned off the area by a 250 kilometer fence making it nearly impossible to escape the desert. One German study of the offensive noted that "the arid Omaheke was to complete what the German Army had begun: the extermination of the Herero nation" (Drechsler, 1990: 242). Pursuing German soldiers indiscriminately killed Herero who had fallen behind or could not make it into the desert. Once in the desert, German troops patrolled any water holes they found and drove away or killed any Herero who attempted to approach. At some point, the Germans poisoned the water holes to keep the Herero from obtaining any water. Many Herero had to decide between dying of thirst or of poisoned water. Some examples of what survivors saw include:

After the battle all men, women, and children who fell into German hands, wounded or otherwise, were mercilessly put to death . . . all those found by the wayside and in the sandveld were shot down or bayoneted to death . . . They were just trying to get away with their cattle.

The child was tossed into the air towards him and as it fell he caught it and transfixed the body with the bayonet. The child died in a few minutes and the incident was greeted with roars of laughter by the Germans, who seemed to think it was a great joke.

The manner in which the flogging was carried out was the most cruel imaginable . . . pieces of flesh would fly from the victim's body into the air (Bridgman & Worley, 2004: 25, 42, 46).

Those who survived the initial genocide were sent to concentration camps where a further forty-five percent perished. By the end of the German assault on the Hereros, only roughly 16,000 Herero survived out of an initial population of 80,000; eighty percent of the Herero population was annihilated.

*“Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?”
-Adolf Hitler, August 22, 1939*

1915 ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

The Armenian genocide can be traced back to the strong feelings of Turkish nationalism promoted by the Young Turk government prior to 1915.⁶ The Ottoman Empire was in decline and fear of loss of territory was very high. The “imminent collapse of the empire” (Lewy, 2005: 157) was a real concern to the Young Turk government. The loss of territory and population was placed at the foot of the Christian population within the Ottoman Empire. The Christian Balkans had revolted and won independence leaving the Armenians the only Christian group still within the Ottoman Empire. Fear of the Armenians revolting for their independence was something the Turkish government sought to squash before it even arose.

The military setbacks of the Turkish army during the Balkan war and the fast-approaching World War created an opportunity to scapegoat the Armenians for the losses. Enver Pasha, military commander of the Young Turks, suffered a devastating loss at the Russian border where 75,000 of his 95,000 troops died. This humiliation at the hands of Russia, the Ottomans previous foe in the Russo-Turkish war was not something that the Young Turks were willing to accept. Instead, they used the opportunity to label the Armenians within Turkey as treasonous. The Young Turks claimed that the Armenians had gone over to Russia to fight and reveal Turkish military

⁶ The following information comes from: Lewy (2005), Hovannisian (1986), Balakian (2003), Adalain (2004), Kuper (1986), Melson (1986, 2004).

plans. The entire Armenian community was deemed to be in sympathy with Russia and opposed to the Empire.

Fearing for “the decay of the Turkish race” (Balakian, 2003: 163), the dictatorial rulers of Turkey turned to fanatical nationalism as a response. Turkism changed the population of the Ottoman Empire into a fierce national identity that emphasized ethnicity over anything else. Being Turkish was deemed to be better than any other ethnicity in the region and Turkey for the Turks became a rallying cry for the new movement. Turkism demanded that loyalty to Turkey and the Turkish ethnicity be total and unwavering. Unfortunately, the Armenians did not fit into the new exclusionist ideology of the state. Instead, the Armenians became the focus of hatred and scorn.

Up until the early part of the twentieth century, the Armenians had lived within Turkey peacefully earning the moniker “the most loyal millet [community]” (Lewy, 2005: 3). There were restrictions though for non-Muslims within the Empire including not being allowed to testify in court, poll taxes, not having the right to bear arms, and dress codes. Even with these restrictions in place, the Armenians had their own culture with their own unique language, alphabet, poetry, and music. In fact, the Armenians tended to be more urban than their Turkish neighbors, dressing in more European fashion and succeeding in business and commerce. This affluence was used against them during the genocide as one reason the Turks should eliminate them because Armenians were too successful and taking money that was rightfully Turkish.

Since the Armenians were already a distinct culture within the Ottoman Empire, it was not difficult to separate them from the Turks. Being a religious minority placed the Armenians outside of the realm of the Ottoman Empire. Once they were the only

Christian minority left in the Empire, their isolation became more noticeable. The manner in which the Armenians lived also differentiated them from the Turkish people. The government proclaimed that the Armenians controlled sixty percent of the imports to Turkey, forty percent of the exports, and eighty percent of the total commerce. This was reinforced by stereotyping the Armenians as wealthy merchants who did not care for the Turkish people. This built resentment between the Turks and the relatively successful Armenians who often owned European artwork, artifacts and furniture. Armenian churches were also very decadently furnished with rare books, paintings, and jewels. In addition to their perceived opulent lifestyles, the government used any desertions from the military as a sign of treason by all Armenians. Regardless of the fact that desertion was a large problem for the Turkish military in general, the government ordered any Armenian troops to be disarmed and placed in labor battalions. This action further heightened the hatred of the Armenians and suspicion of their every move. This suspicion was not just at the government or military level but also in the local communities. During the genocide and deportations, looting of Armenian homes and churches by townspeople was widespread.

Once the dictatorial government had enabled xenophobia to rage throughout Turkey, it became easier to mobilize the populace to see the need for eradicating the Armenians. By this time the Empire had lost seventy percent of its population and eighty-five percent of its European territory. Pamphlets advocating jihad against the Christians began appearing and fanned the flames of Turkism. In response the Turkish government began to order the deportations of Armenians as a protective measure during the war. Within a couple of months, the government legalized their behavior by

passing the Temporary Law of Deportation. By legalizing its behavior, the government made acquiescence even easier--you were only following the law. In its final version, the deportation orders, which led to genocide, started at the national government level and were passed down to the Minister of Interior and on to the military and local government offices. By the end, the entire nation of Turkey was involved in the deportations and genocide of the Armenians. To encourage compliance, the government issued the following instructions: "The Armenians must be exterminated. If any Moslem protect a Christian, first, his house shall be burned, then the Christian killed before his eyes, and then his family and himself." This level of individualization is recorded as high for QCA purposes.

On April 24, 1915, the Allied forces landed at Gallipoli, Turkey. On that same day, 250 Armenian community leaders in Constantinople were arrested, deported, and killed. Thus began the Armenian genocide. By June 1915, the entire Armenian population was ordered to be deported from Turkey to modern-day Syria. These deportation orders were carried out in an "unnecessarily ruthless and cruel manner" (Lewy, 2005: 163). The movement of thousands of people over hundreds of miles without proper food or water was bound to cause the deaths of many people, especially children and the elderly. Dead bodies were left to rot in the hot sun; children with bloated bellies were lying in the open heat waiting to die. Some examples of what happened during the deportations include:

The men, numbering about eight hundred, had been tied together in groups of fourteen and marched out of town before daybreak so as not to be seen by the inhabitants; under heavy guard they were taken to a ravine several hours' marching time from Harput and then shot by the

gendarmes; those not killed in that way were dispatched with knives and bayonets (Lewy, 2005: 169).

The misery, suffering and hardships endured by these people are indescribable. Deaths are innumerable. Hundreds of children are constantly being abandoned by their parents who cannot bear to see them suffer or who have not the strength to look after them. Many are simply left by the roadside and cases of their being thrown from railroad cars are reported (Lewy, 2005: 185).

Diseases broke out at an alarming rate due to lack of appropriate sanitation.

Typhus, dysentery, and cholera were rampant leaving victims on the side of the road to exile. Others were killed on the road to Syria if they lagged behind the main group. To save ammunition, many victims were killed with bayonets or pushed over precipices.

The numerous corpses along the way revealed what had happened here. Some, from early convoys, had become skeletons; others were naked bodies whose clothing had been torn away by robbers; while still others, who had died very recently, were lying on or by the side of the road fully clothed, with faces distorted by their suffering (Lewy, 2005: 212).

Other victims were transported by rail to the Syrian desert. Many times the Armenians would have to pay for their ticket first. On the train cars, they were packed in as tight as possible and were sometimes forced to wait hours or days before moving.

Only a quarter of those deported survived long enough to reach the Syrian desert. Once there, they were forced to survive with no food or supplies. The killing did not stop though once they reached the desert. Killing units would come through the make-shift villages and kill the survivors; "children were smashed against rocks, women were torn apart with swords, men were mutilated, others thrown into flames alive"

(Adalain, 2004: 57). It was noted by one observer that the Turks in their fanaticism “seemed determined not only to exterminate the Christian population but to remove all traces of their religion and even to destroy the products of civilization” (Balakian, 2003: 243). When the killing was over, somewhere between one million and one-and-a-half million Armenians were dead. All Armenian villages in Turkey were completely destroyed and their homes empty.

“Germany will either be a world power or will not be at all.”
-Adolf Hitler

1939-1945 GERMANY

The Holocaust may be unique in its breadth and longevity as a genocide.⁷ The abbreviated synopsis of the Holocaust presented here cannot hope to explain the entire terror or explain the event in detail. The Holocaust is the most written about genocide in history and those resources should be consulted for a deeper and fuller understanding of this cataclysmic event. For purposes here it shall be enough to detail the Holocaust as it fits or fails to fit into Hagan and the MCAT of genocide presented previously.

Germany at the time of the Holocaust was one of the most scientifically and industrially advanced nations in Europe. It is difficult to imagine that a solid nation like Germany would resort to genocide at any cost. However, Adolf Hitler seized power in Germany in 1933 and did not allow for his control to be challenged or diminished. While the country may have been succeeding as a nation, it was failing as a political state. Under the complete domination of the Nazis, there was no political competition. Following the burning of the Reichstag in 1933, Hitler removed the socialists from any power position and barred them from future elections. There was no democratic growth in Germany during the years of Hitler's reign. As a nation, it was truly autocratic in development and execution.

While the extermination of the Jewish population in Germany and occupied Europe is well-known, the Holocaust also targeted Roma and other socially undesirable

⁷ The following material comes from Bauer (1990), Chalk & Jonassohn (1990), Goldhagen (2009), Kiernan (2007), Koenigsberg (2009), Marrus (1990), Niewyk (2004).

groups. This is because of the notion that Hitler propagated once he took control of the state. Prior to Hitler's rise to power, the ills of Germany were blamed on unemployment, high tariffs, and reparations following World War One. But once Hitler rose to power, he changed the message. Hitler made it known that there were the Aryans and the others. The Aryans were the only humans who deserved to live and rule Germany (and the rest of the world). All others were outside the realm of humanity. The Aryan race was superior to all other races because the Aryan was willing to sacrifice the self for the betterment of the whole according to Hitler. It was expected for the Germans to unite as a nation against those who were not of the Aryan race. At the time, less than one percent of the German population was Jewish and even fewer were Roma. But these non-Aryan races were the others not to be trusted by the true Germans.

The identification of the other in Germany was easy because the state was very eager to point out the Jews as different. The value judgments that emerged from these identifications were some of the most widespread hatred ever seen in history. There was a system of propaganda including posters, movies, and art that depicted the Jewish people as non-human. The Jews were considered an anti-race that did not have a culture of their own. They were portrayed as clinging to the culture of the nation wherein they lived and destroying that culture at the same time. Being subhuman or non-human certainly made their destruction even easier for the people of Germany since killing a human is seen as bad, but killing a non-human is much easier on the conscience.

In addition to classifying the Jews as non-human, the German propaganda machine went further and called them germs and bacteria that were killing Germany.

The Jewish people were labeled as a parasite inside the body of the Germany nation. As a bacteria or parasite, the elimination of the Jewish people was seen as one way to save the Germany state from annihilation. Related to the idea that the Jews did not have a culture of their own to live with, they were saddled with the burden of taking the German culture and destroying it. While blatantly false, propaganda began to influence the way the common German viewed and thought about the Jewish population. Saving Germany became the most important thing a “true” German could do by eliminating the disease that was the Jewish people.

During the height of the genocide, the identification of the Jews became so prominent that it was displayed on their clothes and their body. Jews were issued identity papers that clearly labeled them as Jewish for classification purposes. The concentration of Jews in the ghettos made it very distinct who the Jewish people were and where they could and could not travel to. Yellow stars were used on clothing to identify at a glance who was Jewish. Numbers were tattooed on the forearms of concentration camp inmates as a way to identify them and keep records of the mass extermination that occurred at these camps. The identification and individualization that occurred during the Holocaust is one of the worst known to mankind today. The Jews were singularly highlighted as bad and diseased through a variety of different propaganda means.

The Holocaust was too vast of an undertaking for the German police and army alone. While many of the deaths occurred at the hands of the military, many other deaths were caused by a bureaucracy of death in the German state. The forces of the German army recruited allies in each nation it invaded to kill the Jewish population of

that state. Often people volunteered to serve as guards at concentration camps. Throughout the Holocaust, there were also local mobs that killed the Jewish population of their city or town at the encouragement of the German army. One such example occurred in Jedwabne, Poland where the mayor and his administration organized the killing of the Jews in Jedwabne by bringing them to a spot for slaughter and handing out clubs and pitchforks to the villagers. This type of locally organized slaughter occurred throughout the war years and the genocide.

In order for Germany to succeed at its goal of eliminating the entire Jewish population, there needed to be a bureaucratic system established. Germany became very astute at creating and implementing this system to track down every Jewish person for extermination. Those involved in this system included people from all industries in Germany and across occupied Europe. Some industries involved included railroad administrators and crews, diplomats, lawyers, engineers, military personnel, scientists, physicians, economists, and anthropologists. Germany had succeeded at collectivizing its populace to participate in the slaughter of Jews, Roma, and others. In collective violence, the group gives itself over to the leadership by adhering to what the elites say is the right thing to do. In Germany, the powerful Nazi party achieved the collectivization of the public under their control in order to accomplish the final goal of eliminating the entire Jewish population in Europe.

From the time when Hitler took control of Germany in 1933 he had a plan to exterminate the Jewish population in Germany. He pursued these policies at the legislative level and beyond. On the night of November 9, 1938, Nazi party officials attacked thousands of Jews and sent them to concentration camps in an event now

known as Kristallnacht (“night of broken glass”). But it was not until Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 that the murder of the Jewish populace began to reach its peak. Einsatzgruppen followed the invading army and rounded up and killed thousands of Jews. During the invasion, Nazis were “blockading buildings, taking all the residents out, shooting some, beating up others, expelling the rest, and closing another block to Jewish residents” (Kiernan, 2007: 446). Soldiers from Germany, Lithuania, and the Ukraine went out on a violent rampage of killing and looting. It was now that the Jews of occupied Europe were shipped to concentration camps for extermination.

The dead were taken . . . if one fell on the street . . . he was covered. A stone was put on top, and thus he lay until. . . There was not enough time to collect the dead. . . And then people drove around with small carts. There were no funeral coaches any more, nothing. People drove around with small carts, collected the dead, loaded them up, took them to the cemetery, and buried them--women, men, children, everybody in one grave. . . And we. . . It had broken out, the first deportation that was in the year 1942. . .

The sick began jumping out the windows. So they [the Germans] ran on the roofs with machine guns and shot down at the sick. And all were shot. And we were led away to the rail terminal (Niewyk, 2004: 141, 141-42).

"I will reduce this majority into a minority."
-General Tikka Khan, military governor of East Bengal

1971 BANGLADESH GENOCIDE

The genocide in Bangladesh traces its roots back to the partition of India by Great Britain.⁸ When India was partitioned based on religion, the new state of Pakistan was established to be majority Muslim. Bengali Muslims decided to become part of Pakistan at this time. This created two separate entities of East Pakistan (today Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (today Pakistan). These two sections of Pakistan were separated by more than 1,000 miles with differences in population, culture, and language. Not long after partition, power sharing ended and a military dictatorship took control of the government. Bengalis represented the majority of Pakistan's population, but they did not receive fair representation in the government. Their language was denied official recognition for several years. The Bengalis were also being economically exploited in that they produced the majority of the product that brought in income to the state but received little benefit from the crop themselves.

The unequal economic development and language battles soon led the Bengalis to feel as though they were a colony of Pakistan. Amid these feelings emerged a cry for autonomy and democracy among the Bengali nation. In the elections of 1970, the Bengali delegation received a majority of the votes. In order to prevent the Bengalis from taking control of the government, President Yahya suspended the congress indefinitely. As a result, the government of West Pakistan felt that they had to teach the

⁸ The following information comes from Akman (2002), Beachler (2007), Chalk & Jonassohn (1990), Jahan (2004), and Kiernan (2007).

Bengalis a lesson not to contest West Pakistani rule and to rebuff their attempt at autonomy and democracy. West Pakistan sought a military conclusion to the perceived threat posed by the Bengalis.

Most of East and West Pakistan professed Islam as their religious faith. However, Bengalis were known to be both Muslim and Hindu—the two major religious groups in East Pakistan. In addition to some religious differences, the Bengalis also had a distinct language, history and identity. Their culture, art, literature, music, and dance were all distinct from West Pakistan. Since the two countries were over 1,000 miles apart, there were also differences in climate and physical appearance between the Bengalis and Pakistanis. The Pakistanis also considered the Bengalis language and culture to be more Hindu in nature than Muslim. Their “Hindu leaning” culture was seen as a threat to the dominance of the Muslims in West Pakistan. Muslims worship one God while Hindus worship multiple gods, which meant that the Hindus were looked down upon by the Muslim majority of West Pakistan. This religious difference was one of the driving forces behind the genocide.

While Bengali nationalism was rising and the call for autonomy was increasing, the Hindus became a convenient scapegoat for their actions. The Bengali nationalism movement was said to be rooted in Hindu corruption of Bengali Muslims. Ridding East Pakistan of its Hindu influence was seen as a possible way of controlling the remaining Muslim population. In addition to the anti-Hindu beliefs of West Pakistan, there was a general feeling that Bengalis were a culturally and racially inferior group. Bengalis were seen as being insufficiently martial and insufficiently Islamic. “The ideology to destroy the Bengali nation was that they were descendants of aboriginal Indian tribes. They do

not deserve to rule but only to be ruled. Therefore, they were to be crushed in such a way that they could never again demand the fruits of election victory” (Beachler, 2007: 483). West Pakistan extolled the belief that if East Pakistan were left untended, “the unity of the country was in danger” (Akmam, 2002: 548). By casting this division in terms of national unity, West Pakistan was able to easily instigate military operations. The value judgments expressed by the government were relatively neutral in passion and did not raise much ire in the West Pakistanis ranking low on the QCA truth table.

This lack of individualization and harsh value judgments may be why there was not a collectivization stage in the Bangladesh genocide. Similar to the Herero genocide, the Bangladesh genocide was committed mostly by the military in military operations. There was no grand collectivization of the populace and the population of West Pakistan did not participate greatly in the execution of the genocide. While the “Final Solution” to the Bengali problem was violent and many civilians were killed, it was mainly accomplished through military fiat. President Yahya Khan told his generals prior to the genocide, “Kill three million of them, and the rest will eat out of our hands” (Kiernan, 2007: 574). Upon General Tikka Khan’s arrival in Bangladesh, he reportedly announced his final solution to the Bengali problem claiming he would kill 4 million people in forty-eight hours.

General Khan saw his mission as a jihad, or holy war, against the Hindus and Bengali Muslims. One military official said, “We are determined to cleanse East Pakistan once and for all of the threat of secession, even if it means killing off two million people and ruling the province as a colony for 30 years” (Beachler, 2007: 476). The motive was to crush the threat of secession while at the same time cleansing the

area of Hindu influence. However, this military action did not go unchallenged. General Niazi, Pakistan's Lieutenant General, condemned the operations saying that it was a violation of the mission and reminded him of the British seizure of Jalluanwalabagh in 1919. He further complained that the operations were making the Bengalis mutinous and hostile to West Pakistan. Overall, there was no mass collectivization of the populace in this genocide. It was accomplished through the actions of the military and those in command of the military.

The genocide of Bengali Muslims and Hindus began on March 25, 1971. That night, Operation Searchlight was launched killing seventeen professors and 200 students at Dhaka University. Operation Searchlight was designed to be a massive armed strike against the capital city Dhaka. The following day, March 26, 1971, Bangladesh declared independence from Pakistan; two days later on March 28, 1971, Pakistan declared war on Bangladesh. In response to guerilla tactics of warfare, the Pakistan military began a strategy of search and destroy. These search and destroy missions involved massive killing, looting, burning and raping of areas where guerilla actions had been reported.

Though Hindus were especially targeted, the majority of the victims were Bengali Muslims--ordinary villagers and slum dwellers--who were caught unprepared during the Pakistani army's sweeping spree of wanton killing, rape, and destruction (Beachler, 2007: 477).

The army would first clear the area of Bengalis and then kill the Hindus of the region, especially those in the military, journalists, teachers and students. The common pattern was to enter the village, ask where the Hindus lived, and then kill all of the male Hindus.

The soldiers would then indiscriminately burn the villages and slaughter any remaining inhabitants.

The West Pakistani army used tanks, heavy artillery and machine guns on unarmed civilians, killed 1,600 police while sleeping in their barracks...demolished the student dormitories at Dacca [sic] University, and excavated a mass grave for the thousands of students; they've systematically eliminated the intelligentsia of the Country, wiped out entire villages. . . (Beachler, 2007: 476).

The indiscriminate killing civilians, including women and children and the poorest and weakest members of the community; the attempt to exterminate or drive out of the country a large part of the Hindu population; the arrest, torture, and killing of Awami league activists, students, professionals and businessmen and other potential leaders among the Bengalis; the raping of women; the destruction of villages and towns; and the looting of property. All this was done on a scale which is difficult to comprehend (Akmam, 2002: 549).

In the first phase of the genocide, young able-bodied men were targeted for death.

During the second phase, girls and women became the targets for genocidal rape.

After nine months of fighting, Bangladesh won its independence. The price in terms of life is incalculable. There are no solid estimates of the death toll in the Bangladesh genocide; anywhere between 1 million and 3 million people are said to have been murdered.

“They wanted to kill my clan because my clan was educated.”
-Hutu survivor

1972 BURUNDI GENOCIDE

The Burundi genocide is a classic example of discrimination and fear leading to widespread killing and ultimately genocide.⁹ Much like its neighbor to the north, Rwanda, Burundi has experienced ethnic troubles for many years. Similar to Rwanda, Burundi had been a colony of the Germans and then the Belgians. After gaining its independence in 1962, there was a monarchical system of government established with a king and several princes in line to the throne. When looking at the state of Burundi prior to the genocide, it is clear that the Hutu majority were being excluded from the power base. Within the constitutional monarchy, the true set up of the government was a Tutsi ethnocracy. Between the years of 1966 and 1993, the government was ruled by three separate military regimes. These regimes began the rise to power in 1966 when a coup d’etat occurred and the first military regime took control of the government. While the Tutsi represented a numerical minority in the Burundi population, they represented a majority in the government. Almost every political position of importance was occupied by a Tutsi. This was the trend for close to two decades before the genocide of the Hutu broke out. This unequal access to the government had repercussions on the access of the Hutus to other scarce resources. Immediately prior to the genocide, one commentator has said that Burundi was on the “brink of anarchy” (Lemarchand, 2004: 324).

⁹ The following material comes from Lemarchand (1975, 1998, 2004), Meisler (1990), and Uvin (1999).

The two main social groups in Burundi, as in Rwanda, are the Hutu and the Tutsi. In Burundi in 1972, the population was roughly eighty-five percent Hutu, fourteen percent Tutsi and one percent Twa (native dwellers). The original division between Hutu and Tutsi was based on ownership of cattle. Those who owned a large herd of cattle were called Tutsi and those who spent most of their time farming were called Hutu. Over years and through colonization, there developed a deep wedge between these two groups. The great division between Hutu and Tutsi is somewhat surprising because of what they share in common. These groups shared a social structure, political systems, language, religion, and had lived together for several decades. Even so, the groups of Hutu and Tutsi had become an almost caste-like system. And even within the Tutsi social group, there was a division between the Tutsi-Hima and the Tutsi-Banyaruguru. The Hima Tutsi were concentrated in the south and the Banyaruguru in the north. As a minority, the Tutsi still maintained control over most of the political system and held sway over the Hutu majority. When the Hutu of Rwanda took power from the Tutsis there, a sense of longing began to run through the Hutu of Burundi.

While the Hutu were the majority, they lacked power in the country, and there was little individualization occurring. The Hutu often felt as a peasant class and the Tutsi as the elite power holders. One observer noted that the Tutsi held on to power only because of the lowly status that the Hutu held in society. However, regardless of this low status, and opposite of what occurred in Rwanda, the Tutsis did not label the Hutu with names or value judgements. The most common experience that the Tutsi and the Hutu of Burundi had was a shared fear of each other. Both groups believed that the other group would somehow cause them harm. This mutual fear easily devolved into

rumors of possible attacks. These false rumors led the Hutu to attack the Tutsi in what they believed was a preemptory strike. As we will see, this uprising led directly to the genocide of the Hutu.

Even though the individualization of the Hutu was low and almost non-existent, the government of Burundi succeeded in collectivizing the Tutsi population to participate in the genocide. The official organizers were the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of the Interior, and of Justice; all three were Hima Tutsis. Their plan was to kill all of the educated Hutu people in Burundi focusing expressly on schoolchildren, university students, and civil servants. To rally the local Tutsis,

The government radio broadcasts encouraged the population to 'hunt down the python in the grass,' an order which was interpreted by Tutsi in the interior as license to exterminate all educated Hutu, down to the level of secondary, and even primary schoolchildren. Army units commandeered merchants' lorries and mission vehicles, and drove up to schools removing whole batches of children at a time. Tutsi pupils prepared lists of their Hutu classmates to make identification by officials more straightforward (Lemarchand, 2004: 326).

The involvement of the Tutsi schoolchildren included physical assaults and often Hutu students were beaten to death. In addition, soldiers and youth gangs would arrive at the schools, call the Hutu children out of the room, and the children would not be seen again. Other Tutsi participated because of personal animosity toward the Hutu or for personal material gain. While there were Tutsi who risked their own life to save Hutu neighbors, the great majority of the Tutsi population collectivized their intent to remain in power and executed the genocide as a sign of force and dominance.

The genocide of the Hutu began when the Hutu majority attempted a coup on April 29, 1972. Hutu members of the coup attempt killed several thousand Tutsi including women and children. This failed coup led to a quick and brutal backlash that began on April 30, 1972. While the counter violence may have started as a repression of violence toward the Tutsi, it devolved rapidly into full scale genocide.

There was a manner of cutting the stomach [of pregnant women]. Everything that was found in the interior was lifted out without cutting the cord. The cadaver of the mama, the cadaver of the baby, of the future, they rotted on the road. Not even burial. (Lemarchand, 2004: 333).

The girls [Tutsi] in secondary schools . . . killed the Hutu [girls]. The Tutsi girls were given bamboos. They were made to kill by pushing the bamboo from below [from the vagina] to the mouth. It is a thing against the law of God. (Lemarchand, 2004: 333).

By the end of the genocide in July, roughly a quarter of a million Hutu men, women, and children were murdered. In addition, several thousand fled into neighboring countries seeking refuge.

Rwanda in 1972¹⁰

Rwanda and Burundi share much of their culture and history in common. During part of German rule the two countries were governed as one nation--Rwanda-Urundi. During the genocide in Burundi, there was the possibility of genocide in Rwanda, which did not materialize. As a negative case example, Rwanda in 1972 represents a foil to the Burundi genocide. The neighboring countries of Rwanda and Burundi actually

¹⁰ The following material comes from Des Forges (1999), Power (2002), Rusesabagina (2002).

mirror each other in their ethnic makeup. The population of Rwanda consists of a majority of Hutu and minority Tutsi population in almost the same percentages as Burundi. However, unlike Burundi, the government of Rwanda in 1972 was governed by the Hutu majority population of the country. Much the way the Tutsi in Burundi excluded Hutu from power, the Hutu in Rwanda likewise excluded the Tutsi from power. While the same social groups existed in Rwanda, the individualization in Rwanda was much greater than in Burundi. For years, the Hutu and Tutsi of Rwanda had been viciously labeling each other as the problem. The Hutu called the Tutsi cockroaches and not worthy of holding power or jobs because of their prior dominance in such areas. The hatred and mistrust was heavily known in Rwanda as compared to Burundi.

The greatest difference between Rwanda and Burundi in 1972 was the lack of collectivization in Rwanda. While the hatred and speech was more dangerous in Rwanda, there was not a collective movement that riled the population into action. In addition, there was no triggering catalyst to spark the fire of genocide. While the Tutsi were annoyed by their exclusion from the government and jobs in Rwanda, there was no signal that the people of Rwanda had a desire to make any social change--a deliberate motive of collective violence. As there was no threat to the political structure at the time, relative peace was widespread in Rwanda as it was not in Burundi at the same time. The lack of collectivization and a triggering catalyst in Rwanda appears to signal that these elements are important to the execution of genocide on a large nation-wide scale.

“The soldiers who landed started killing everyone they could find. There were many dead bodies in the streets--all we could see were the soldiers killing, killing, killing.”

-Catholic Bishop of Dili, East Timor

1975 EAST TIMOR GENOCIDE

Much like the genocide in Bangladesh that occurred after Pakistan invaded in hopes of returning the land to Pakistani control, the genocide in East Timor was the result of an independence movement gone awry.¹¹ The island of Timor sits in the Indonesian archipelago and is divided into West Timor and East Timor. The island was divided by its colonial masters in the Netherlands and Portugal with East Timor under Portuguese control. For much of its colonial existence East Timor was relatively neglected by Portugal and most East Timorese lived traditional village lives. This existed for several decades until 1974 when the government in Portugal was overthrown and replaced with an anti-colonial power. Under the new regime, East Timor was going to become an independent nation after a period of decolonization assisted by Portugal.

In the unsettled time that was decolonization, Indonesia expressed a desire to take control of East Timor and annex the land into greater Indonesia. Many East Timorese did not approve of this offer and they formed their own government under the Fretilin party. Fretilin had widespread support throughout East Timor and was working with Portugal to establish a functioning and efficient government for an independent state. The Suharto regime in Indonesia was giving statements saying that they

¹¹ The following information comes from Chalk & Jonassohn (1990), Kiernan (2007), Saul (2001), Sidell (1981), and Silove (2000).

supported East Timor in its desire to become an independent nation. However, the regime was secretly planning its own invasion of the island in order to secure annexation with Indonesia. While the Suharto regime was notoriously undemocratic, they were also anti-Communist, which made it an ally of the United States and most major powers. While at the time of the genocide, East Timor was attempting to achieve independence and a democratic government, its status as a neglected colony and the undemocratic nature of Indonesia's government signal that the genocide occurred in an autocratic society.

Part of the reason why East Timor did not want to be annexed by Indonesia was due to their different cultures. While the geographic distance between Indonesia and East Timor is slight, the cultural differences are great. Even though East Timor is part of the archipelago of Indonesia, the East Timorese view themselves as a separate and distinct nationality. While Indonesia is predominantly Muslim, East Timor practices Catholicism and animist religions. The ethnic and culture of East Timor is also much more complex than that of Indonesia. Political traditions are different between the two peoples as are the multiple languages that are spoken on East Timor. The ethnically diverse population of East Timor cannot be subsumed or incorporated into that of Indonesia easily. Diverse religious beliefs and different languages make the East Timorese a unique and socially diverse people. These differences were overlooked by the Indonesian regime when they decided to annex the island nation.

While the primary goal of Indonesia was to annex East Timor into its dominion, the process to achieve the goal was genocidal in nature. But what can be seen is that the East Timorese experienced a low level of individualization and value judgments

from the Indonesians. The primary target of value judgments from Indonesia was Fretilin and other groups dedicated to the independence movement of East Timor. Propaganda from Indonesia was targeted at undermining the strength of Fretilin by claiming that they lacked popular support from the public. Further, they claimed that the Fretilin was a communist organization and anti-Indonesia in policy. By vilifying the political leadership in the independence movement, the motivation for genocide grew and the support for Fretilin suffered to some degree. The worst propaganda against the Fretilin was when the Indonesian government referred to them as snakes. The discussion soon devolved into clearing the grass of the snakes through whatever means were necessary. While much of the anti-Fretilin propaganda was untrue, the negative judgments against them were relatively minor and did not become as extreme as in other cases of genocide.

Much of the fighting and terror of the East Timor genocide was accomplished by the Indonesian army. After one massacre, two senior military generals were heard to say that the killing was “necessary and that no regret was warranted” (Silove, 2000: 69). Army commanders threatened to “liquidate...all the pro-independence people, parents, sons, daughters, and grandchildren” (Kiernan, 2007: 581). Military documents discovered after the genocide revealed that one communiqué ordered massacres from village to village if the pro-independence vote won. The army was clearly the primary perpetrator of the genocide in East Timor through its scorched earth policy of killing, torture, and rape of civilians in villages across the island. As the Fretilin forces fled inland, the genocide followed them and killed those inland forcing them toward the shore without food or water.

But in addition to the military forces from Indonesia, the army created its own militia force using East Timorese people opposed to independence. This minority view point was prime for recruitment into these militia forces. The arms, training, and funding for these militias came from various government sources in Indonesia. Ultimately, each of East Timor's thirteen districts had a militia unit assigned to it. These forces were used to attack pro-independence supporters. These units represent the collective nature of genocide when those seeking social change subordinate themselves to a larger group. That group then dictates what the actions of the collectivity should be in order to achieve their goal. In order for those East Timorese opposed to independence to win, they would have to eliminate the pro-independence East Timorese. While this could be seen as attacking your own populace, at this point the militias were under the control of the Indonesian forces and were aligned with Indonesia's goals.

On December 7, 1975, Indonesian forces invaded East Timor from the land and the sea. From the beginning, the Indonesian forces went on a rampage against the East Timorese people. On the first day of the invasion,

'There were 20 women--Chinese and Timorese--were taken out in front. Some of them had children who were weeping. The soldiers tore the children from the women who were then shot one by one, with the crowd being ordered to count after each execution. At 2 P.M. on the same day, 59 men, including Chinese and Timorese, were taken to the wharf and executed in the same way' (Dunn, 2004: 286).

The Indonesian troops continued on their rampage through East Timor killing, torturing, and raping the civilian population. Search and destroy missions using aerial bombardments killed the civilian population and their crops.

We knew by radio from the south zone that the Indonesians had dropped four napalm bombs there. Then they dropped two of these on us. I saw all the flames and heard people shouting and screaming...We saw a whole area about fifty meters square all burnt, no grass, nothing except ash...You couldn't see where bodies had been. There was nothing except ash and burned rocks on the whole areas, but we had heard those people screaming (Dunn, 2004: 290).

The loss of crops and forced deportments to resettlement camps led to mass starvation and disease. The resettlement camps were grossly inadequate in terms of food, water, and medical supplies. In the first months of the invasion, roughly 60,000 East Timorese were killed.

Hundreds of human beings died every day. The bodies of the victims became food for carnivorous birds (if we don't die of the war, we die of the plague), villages were completely destroyed, some tribes decimated (Dunn, 2004: 287).

There is no accurate death count of the East Timor genocide. Of the island's initial 650,000 population, 150,000 people had been killed or disappeared in the first four years of fighting. By the end of fighting nearly twenty-four years later, it is estimated that 200,000 people had died. But while the genocide raged it was feared that half of the population may face extinction, so it may never be known how many East Timorese were annihilated by Indonesia.

“All prohibited villages will be destroyed.”
-Iraqi military order

1988 KURDISH GENOCIDE IN IRAQ

In September 1980, disputes between Iran and Iraq over border lines erupted into war when Iran bombed several Iraqi border towns. Using the Iraq-Iran war as cover, the regime of Saddam Hussein created a designated campaign to eliminate the Kurdish population.¹² By this time Hussein had consolidated his power in Iraq and neutralized any threat posed by his enemies. Part of the ideology of the Ba'ath Party in Iraq was the creation of an Arab nationalist character. This ideology soon spread to cover areas of the country that were not traditionally Arab in nature. The Kurds of Iraq represented a block to full Arabization of Iraq. Living in oil rich portions of Iraq also led to the desire to either Arabize the locale or rid it of the Kurdish population. The genocide of the Kurds evolved under the strict control that Saddam Hussein wielded in his country.

With an Arab ideology in place, the Kurdish population was easy to identify and criticize. The Kurds live in an area of approximately 74,000 square miles stretching across Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Most of the area is densely mountainous and heavily forested; the majority of Kurds lived as farmers and mountain dwellers. The Kurds consider themselves indigenous to the area even though they have never had a recognized nation of their own. The mountains of Kurdistan made it geographically isolated from much of the rest of Iraq. In addition to geographic separateness, the Kurds represent a distinct ethnic group. Kurdish language, customs, and traditions are

¹² The following information comes from Human Rights Watch (1993), Kelly (2008), Knowles (1998), Leezenberg (2004), Power (2002), and Salih (1995).

all unique to the Kurdish populace. While the Kurds are spread across several different nations, they have maintained their own cultural and ethnic identity. At the time of the genocide, the Kurds comprised about twenty to twenty-five percent of the Iraqi population--the largest ethnic minority in the country.

The unique cultural and ethnic identity of the Kurds made them identifiable to the Iraqis quite easily. But to further the individualization process and identifying the 'other,' the government of Iraq required a census to be taken throughout the country. At the census, all Iraqi citizens had to declare their ethnicity; the only options were Arab or Kurd. Anyone who failed to participate in the census was subject to loss of Iraqi citizenship and was to be considered as army deserters. Many Kurds claimed that they were never informed of the census, which may be true due to the isolated location of most of the Kurds. Anyone willing to declare themselves Kurd faced the destruction of their home and deportation to the autonomous region. By the time of the census, many Kurdish towns and villages were no longer drawn on official maps.

In terms of defining the target group for annihilation, the national census of 17 October 1987, was the most important single administrative step of the Iraqi regime in the desired direction. Having created a virtual buffer strip between the government and the peshmerga-controlled zones by the village clearances, the Ba'th [sic] Party offered the inhabitants of the prohibited areas an ultimatum: either you 'return to the national ranks' - that is, abandon your home and livelihood and accept compulsory relocation in a sordid camp under the eye of the security forces; or you lose your Iraqi citizenship and be regarded as military deserter. This second option was subject to an August 1987 decree of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council, imposing the death penalty on deserters. Not choosing the 'national ranks' was, in effect, tantamount to a death sentence, to be carried out by Party organizations. Prior to the census date, proper measures were taken by security and intelligence agencies

to prevent any contact or movement between the two sides, other than on the regime's terms (Salih, 1995: 27).

In addition to the census, which clearly identified the Kurds and the 'other,' there were value judgments against them as well. Human Rights Watch (1993) relayed several instances of negative value judgments against the Kurds including a police officer who said, "Dogs have no relations to Islam," or identified all Kurds as "saboteurs, all saboteurs we attacked with chemical weapons." When the elderly mullah of Balisan went to Ba'ath Party officials at Seruchawa to plead for an improvement in conditions in the complex, he was told contemptuously, "You're not human beings." (Human Rights Watch, 1993).

While high levels of individualization and value judgments played a role in the Kurdish genocide, it was the Ba'ath Party organization that executed the genocide more so than any other police or military service. The highly efficient Ba'ath Party did not have to recruit or fire up anger at the Kurds in order to eradicate them from the area. Prior to the genocide in 1988, al-Majid, who was in charge of the Kurdish area, issued several decrees limiting the rights of the Kurdish people. On April 6, 1987, he took away the property right of all "saboteurs"; on April 10, he suspended all of the legal rights of villagers in prohibited areas (where most of the Kurdish population was located); on May 1, al-Majid ordered the execution of first degree relatives of saboteurs; on May 14, he authorized the execution of wounded civilians; and on June 3, he forbid farming and the importation of goods into the area.

In June 1987, the process of drawing irreversible boundaries - the red line between 'us' and 'them' - was legalized by issuing two sets of standing orders, which were based on a

simple axiom with a result few, if any, of the Kurds could comprehend: in the 'prohibited' rural areas, all Kurdish residents were coterminous with the peshmerga insurgents (Kurdish guerrilla), and they would be dealt with accordingly.

Through a policy of shoot-to-kill, the first of al-Majid's directives was to ban all human existence in the 'prohibited areas.' The second constitutes an unmistakable inducement to mass murder, spelled out in a chilling clear language. In clause 4, army commanders are ordered *"to carry out random bombardments, using artillery, helicopters and aircraft, at all times of the day or night, in order to **kill the largest number of persons** present in these prohibited zones."*

In clause 5, al-Majid ordered that, *"All persons captured in those villages shall be detained and interrogated by the security services and **those between the ages of 15 to 70** shall be executed after any useful information has been obtained from them, of which we should be duly notified."* (Salih, 1995: 26-7, italics and bold in original).

These military orders from the Ba'ath Party indicate the lack of collectivization during the Kurdish genocide. The genocide was accomplished using the military and army to bomb civilian populations. There was no collectivization of the average Iraqi citizen in eliminating the Kurds, though there was no protest to the actions either.

The genocidal attacks on the Kurds, known as Anfal, followed a regular pattern. The targeted area would be surrounded and then bombed from the air, including the use of chemical weapons. Once the population began to flee the bombing, ground troops would enter the area and mount a ground attack on those fleeing. People who surrendered to the ground troops were never seen again. Others who were captured during the raid would be transported to camps where the men and women would be separated and the men killed en masse. It was not unusual for men to be tied together, made to stand in a line at the tip of a pit and then shot in the back and allowed to fall

into the pit, which served as their grave. Some of the grave sites contained dozens of separate pits containing thousands of victims. Most of the Anfal attacks occurred after some military interaction with Iran during the Iraq-Iran war. The army would withdraw from the front lines of war to engage in the genocide of the Kurds. There is no accurate count of the number of victims of the Anfal campaign.

Iran in 1988

Iraq's neighbor, Iran, looked very similar to Iraq during the 1980s, but Iran did not exterminate its Kurdish population. At this time, Iran was a theocratic regime ruled by Ayatollahs. Much like Iraq, there was no room for dissent or free thought. As within Iraq, the Kurds were located in Iran. While the Kurds were present in Iran, there does not seem to be the same level of Arabization in Iran as there was in Iraq. While Saddam Hussein was obsessed with making Iraq an Arab nation, Iran was content to be an Islamic regime. This lack of Arabization desire may explain why the groups within Iran did not find their Kurdish neighbors to be a problem.

Since the Kurdish population in Iran was not seen as a problem, there is no evidence of individualization or negative value judgments against the Kurds. In fact, during the Anfal campaign near the border with Iran, many Kurds fled freely into Iran to escape the death in Iraq. There is no evidence that Iran was bothered or tried to turn away Kurdish refugees at the border. With Iran engaged in a war with its neighbor, there was no collectivization occurring within the country towards the Kurds. There is no evidence of hatred or a desire to rid Iran of the Kurds by the state, the military, or the people of Iran. While losses in the Iraq-Iran war seemed to trigger genocidal attacks on

the Kurds in Iraq, there was no such attack on Iranian Kurds following any battles. It may be that the Iranians were more successful in their campaign against Iraq and had not residual aggression to mete out. While Iran shared Iraq's autocratic political status as well as a Kurdish population within its border, there is no evidence that individualization, collectivization, or a triggering catalyst existed in Iran to prompt genocide.

“When I came out, there were no birds. There was sunshine and the stench of death.”
-Tutsi survivor

1994 RWANDAN GENOCIDE

The genocide in Rwanda that lasted 100 days in 1994 may be the most clear-cut case of genocide since the Holocaust.¹³ In just over three months from April to July, nearly one million Tutsi were massacred in Rwanda, a country the size of Vermont. The intense vitriol and hatred of the Tutsi minority dates back many years in Rwanda. As was seen in the Burundi genocide of 1971, the Hutu and the Tutsi have been at odds for many decades. Much as in the Burundi genocide, when Rwanda erupted into genocide, there was fear that Burundi would follow, yet it did not. The genocide in Rwanda only ended when the Rwandan Patriotic Front defeated the sitting government and installed themselves as the new power elite.

Rwanda began its existence as a Belgian colony. It was under this colonization that the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups became more identifiable and caste-like in nature. During Belgian rule, the Tutsi minority were given political power over the majority Hutu population. However, upon receiving independence in 1962, Belgium switched allegiance from the Tutsi to the Hutu and assisted the Hutu in their political revolution. In the end, the Hutu took political power and more than 130,000 Tutsi fled Rwanda. Ten years later, General Juvenal Habyarimana took control of the government and made Rwanda a one party state under his control. The new military regime consolidated all political power in the president’s party and forbid the involvement of

¹³ The following information comes from Des Forges (1999), Gourevitch (1998), Lemarchand (2004), Meredith (2005), Power (2002) and Rusesabagina (2006).

Tutsi in the new state government. By the time of the genocide in 1994, the political power of the Habyarimana regime was threatened by peace talks designed to increase Tutsi representation in the government. These Arusha accords would ultimately result in a power sharing government between the Hutu and the Tutsi.

With Burundi as its neighbor, it is not surprising that the ethnic groups within Rwanda are the same--the Hutu and the Tutsi. The origins of the Hutu-Tutsi division dates back many decades. Originally, the word Tutsi simply referred to a person who was rich in cattle. Hutu was originally used to refer to the mass public or ordinary people who were not wealthy. It was not until the Belgian colonial rule that these terms became distinct ethnic identities that could not be changed. There may have been some physical distinctions between the Hutu and the Tutsi originally, but intermarriage has erased most of them. Beside these physical distinctions that were faded by 1994, the Hutu and the Tutsi shared a common culture. They spoke the same language, had the same customs and clan names. They attended the same schools and churches and worked with each other in the same offices and bars. While this shared history and cultural identity would seem to argue against ethnic division, there were important differences between the Hutu and Tutsi. The most recognizable division was in the population of the Hutu and Tutsi; the Hutu represented eighty-five percent of the population while the Tutsi comprised merely fourteen percent. In addition to these vast numerical differences, the population also believed that there was a difference between the Hutu and Tutsi that could not be changed. Being Tutsi was still identified as being wealthy and superior even though they were a numerical minority.

The individualization and negative value judgments against the Tutsi was quite severe. The Tutsi were demonized and made the incarnation of evil to the Hutu masses. Much of the Hutu population believed that the Tutsi were not part of the national community. They were viewed as a threat to the security and safety of the Hutu populace. One high-ranking official in the Rwandan government told the Hutu to “know that the person whose throat you do not cut now will be the one who will cut yours” (Des Forges, 1999: 86). In addition to presenting the Tutsi as a threat to the Hutu, the Hutu leadership created what became known as “The Hutu Ten Commandments.” Among these commandments were judgments of Tutsi women as conspirators and infiltrators of the Hutu ethnicity. They also said that all Tutsi were dishonest in business dealings, that the military should have no Tutsi members, and that the Hutu should not have any mercy on the Tutsi. Other terms used to describe the Tutsi were *ibytso* and *inkotanyi*. *Ibyitso* translates as accomplice to the enemy and *inkotanyi* translates as cockroaches. Tutsi were also referred to as snakes that slithered into the Hutu society and disrupted Hutu solidarity. All of these value judgments were supported, if not supplied, by the government and the government-run media outlets.

When the genocide broke out, most of the Hutu population participated in the slaughter of the Tutsi. Within hours of the assassination of President Habyarimana, the government and militias had set curfews and roadblocks throughout the capital. The government ran the genocide through its military and the militias it recruited among the youth. These militias, known as *Interahamwe*, manned the roadblocks and killed anyone Tutsi who attempted to cross. From the beginning, the government-run radio

and television media exhorted all Hutu to get involved and murder the enemy. It was said that it was the duty of the Hutu to participate in order to save their families. The radio would read lists of Tutsi and where they could be found in order to facilitate the massacres. When some government officials throughout Rwanda refused to participate in the genocide, they were quickly removed and replaced with more sympathetic officials. While not every Hutu participated in the genocide, and some risked their lives to save Tutsi friends, the great majority of the Hutu population did participate in slaughters through the direction of the government.

The build-up to the genocide occurred over several months. From the beginning of the peace talks there was dissent among the Hutu run government. As it became clear that President Habyarimana had no choice but to acquiesce to the peace talks, he was targeted by his own regime. On April 6, 1994, on a return flight to Rwanda, his plane was shot down and Habyarimana and the president of Burundi were killed. Within hours of the plane crash the government in Rwanda set into motion its plan for collectivizing the Hutu against the Tutsi in a genocidal spree. Sporadic gunfire erupted almost immediately after the plane crash. Forty-eight hours later, the genocide spread from the capital region into the countryside. Quoting from a report by Physicians for Human Rights,

The Interahamwe used the following methods of killing: machetes, massues (clubs studded with nails), small axes, grenades, guns, fragmentation grenades, beatings to death, amputations with exsanguination, buried alive, drowned, or raped and killed later. Many victims had both their Achilles tendons cut with machetes as they ran away, to immobilize them so that they could be finished off later (Lemarchand, 2004: 403).

With such carnage throughout the country, bodies were soon being dumped in the river. So many bodies were dumped that the river became clogged and could not flow as usual. In many cases, Tutsi were lured to what was promised to be safe havens, only to be slaughtered en masse at churches, schools, and hospitals. Many times Hutu were forced to kill their own neighbors or spouses to prove loyalty to the government.

These Interahamwe brought him [my brother Theoneste] back to the house. They told us that he had to be killed in order to prove that the whole family were [sic] not agents of the FPR. ... During this time messages were coming in every hour, urging our family to kill Theoneste. The whole family was threatened with death unless we killed Theoneste. ... After these four days, about 20 Interahamwe, armed with machetes, hoes, spears, and bows and arrows, came to the house. ... Theoneste got up and spoke to me. 'I fear being killed by a machete; so please go ahead and kill me but use a small hoe.' He himself brought the hoe and handed it to me. I hit him on the head. I kept hitting him on the head but he would not die. It was agonizing. Finally I took the machete he dreaded in order to finish him off quickly. The Interahamwe were there during the whole time, supervising what they called 'work.' When Theoneste was dead they left (Lemarchand, 2004: 411).

When the genocide in Rwanda finally ended between 800,000 to one million Tutsi were dead.

Burundi in 1994

Burundi in 1994 was very similar to Rwanda at the same time including a Hutu-run government. The government in Burundi was very friendly with the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda, which is why they were sharing a plane on April 6, 1994. As explained before, the main ethnic groups in Burundi are the Hutu and the Tutsi. At the time of 1994, while there was still some animosity between the Hutu and the Tutsi, it

was not as severe or as targeted as in Rwanda. The proportion of Hutu and Tutsi are similar in Burundi as in Rwanda. However, at the time there was not the level of negative value judgments that had existed in 1971 when there was a genocide against the Hutu. Lacking this individualization, there was no need to collectivize the public against any particular group. While there was no genocide in Burundi in 1994, the country did not escape from side effects of the Rwandan genocide. Some Rwandan refugees tried to enter Burundi by crossing the river border. In an attempt to restrict the influx of refugees, many people lined the border forcing the Tutsi to return to Rwanda. The Burundi president died on April 6, 1994 when President Habyarimana's plane was shot down. While this catalyst triggered genocide in Rwanda, it did not have the same effect in Burundi. This may be because the prior build-up to genocide did not occur in the presence of individualization and collectivization.

“I would rather not know how many people I killed.”
-Drazen Erdemovic

1995 BOSNIAN GENOCIDE

The genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina began years before the execution when the former communist state of Yugoslavia collapsed.¹⁴ In 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia. The following year Bosnia and Herzegovina followed. Formally recognized as an independent nation on April 6, 1992, fighting began to retain Bosnia as part of the Serbian nation. Croatia and Slovenia had just recently fought and won their own wars of independence. However, the leadership in Serbia did not want to allow Bosnia and Herzegovina to separate peacefully because of the large population of Serbians within its borders. Within days of declaring independence, the fighting between the Yugoslav National Army and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina erupted. The conflict lasted for several years into 1995 when the Serbian military issued a directive as to what should happen in Bosnia: “by force of arms, impose the final outcome of the war on the enemy, forcing the world into recognizing the actual situation on the ground and ending the war” (Honig, 2007: 402).

Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the most ethnically diverse portions of the former Yugoslavia. By population, Bosniacs (Bosnian Muslims) represented forty-four percent, Serbs constituted thirty-one percent and Croats represented seventeen percent. This ethnic diversity made division of the land impossible as every ethnic

¹⁴ The following information comes from Brkic (2007), Carmichael (2006), Honig (2007), Kiernan (2007), Power (2002), and United Nations (1999).

group stood opposed to the country's division. The Bosniacs had lived among these other ethnic groups for many decades under the communist rule of Yugoslavia. As the nation began to separate and divide by ethnic lines, the idea of a Muslim section of the land ignited deep seeded racist notions. Early Muslim beliefs concerning food, the celebration of holidays, and clothing were the only visible differences between the Bosniacs and their neighbors. It was once said that the only difference between the Muslim and non-Muslim population was the way that the Muslims pray and what they eat. Pork was forbidden by Muslim edict yet the Christian parts of the nation bred pigs on their property. This meant that Christian areas of the state had more wooded areas than their Muslim neighbors in order to breed their pigs.

These small and some would say insignificant differences became exposed and enlarged during the war to justify a dislike of the Bosniac population. Serbian intellectuals referred to the Muslims as an inferior, non-European culture. They were deemed to be an Arab subculture more related to their "desert ancestors" than to Bosnia. A sense of Serbian power and supremacy soon developed at the state level. Bosniacs were said to be a malignant disease that threatened to infect Europe if not eliminated. Another form of individualization used against the Muslim population was to equate them with animals. Pigs became the favorite comparison seeing that Muslims did not eat pork, the offense was severe. Many Serbian soldiers were first taught how to kill by trapping a pig and cutting its throat. This became a rite of passage for many Serbian soldiers who would later use these techniques on Bosniacs during the genocide. Even following the genocide, pigs were released in Muslim holy sites in order to defile the land and prevent the return of Muslims. This 'othering' of the Muslim

population was accomplished mainly at the state level. Few individuals outside of the military were acquainted with these negative judgments and individualization of the Muslim population.

Similar to other genocides executed by the military, there was little collectivization in the Bosnian genocide. The executions were done by the Serbian military without the involvement of the general Serbian population. Prosecutors at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia stated their belief that the genocide was organized by the Serbian military headed by General Ratko Mladic. The genocide decision was made the evening of July 11 and morning of July 12 by military leaders in the Srebrenica enclave. There is evidence to show that the genocide was mainly a military operation. General Mladic issued a directive ordering the ethnic cleansing of the towns of Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorzade. Following this order, military leader Radovan Karadzic issued the following order: "By planned and well-thought-out combat operations, create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa" (Kiernan, 2007: 593-594). At the time of the issuance of this order, Srebrenica was a safe zone protected by United Nations troops. In the town were close to 40,000 Muslim men, women, and children who had fled their homes. Standing orders were to destroy the Muslim forces in Srebrenica and other safe zones should the UN troops leave the town unprotected.

On July 11, 1995, the Serbian forces broke through the UN troops at Srebrenica ending the safe zone. Deportation of the Muslim population of Srebrenica began the next day. During these deportations, the men were separated from the women and elderly. Bosniac men and boys were shot beside pits and buried in mass graves. As

some tried to flee the genocide, they were caught in the woods and slaughtered. Several of the men were taken in trucks to warehouses or factories where they were executed. Prior to executing the men they were further dehumanized by “forc[ing] them to kneel and to pray in the Muslim manner, to bow their heads” (United Nations, 1999: 80). Soldiers would then beat the men with bars and then use grenades and small arms to kill those that were still alive. On a farm near the fallen safe zone, between 1,000 and 1,200 men were lined up in one day and systematically killed. Following the massacres, UN personnel were able to see hair, blood and human tissue caked to the inside walls of the warehouses and factories. One perpetrator of the massacres has said,

I was sorry for those people simply. I had no reason to shoot at those people. They had done nothing to me (United Nations, 1999: 80).

Another witness to the aftermath reported,

I went into several...houses...after they had been destroyed, and what I noticed was that they'd actually taken time to desecrate certain things that were central to Muslim identity (Carmichael, 2006: 284).

The accounts of the survivors of the other execution sites are equally horrific. The horror for those being held in Britannic had begun a few days earlier, on July 14, when one group of men was loaded into buses and taken to a school near the Lazete Hamlet, where they were then jammed into a warehouse. Throughout the morning, the warehouse continued to be filled with men, until they were eventually taken out, given some water and told that they were to be exchanged. They were then put on trucks which took them 800 m[eters] north of the school, taken off the trucks, lined up in a field, and shot (United Nations, 1999: 81).

The above description was a common occurrence during the genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is estimated that up to 8,000 Muslim men and boys were killed during the months following the fall of Srebrenica.

“Little dogs, this land is not for you.”
-Janjaweed militia member

2003 DARFUR GENOCIDE

The genocide in Darfur, Sudan is one of the longest running genocides in history.¹⁵ John Hagan has written extensively and comprehensively on the Darfur genocide and its root causes. A major component of the genocide in Darfur is the government of Omar Al-Bashir. Sudan sits in northern Africa where there are both Arab influences from the Middle East and African influences from southern Africa. The al-Bashir government has chosen to affiliate itself with the Arab influences over the traditional African influences. This preference for Arab culture and control has led to the genocide of the traditional African tribes in western Sudan.

Darfur is located on the border of Chad in western Sudan. The area is occupied mostly by African tribes including the Fur, Massaleet, and Zaghawa. Surrounding these settlements are nomadic Arab tribes that survive by moving from place to place and using the land to subsist on. As the Arab tribes leave one portion of the land for another, the land they live is no longer arable. What soon occurred was isolation of all arable land into the Darfur region. This arable land is what drew the Arab tribes closer to the Fur and other African tribes. Prior to the al-Bashir regime and the need for arable land, the African and Arab tribes lived among each other in relative peace. However, when African tribes attacked the government in response to their perceived preference for the Arabs, genocide broke out.

¹⁵ The following information comes from Hagan & Palloni (2006), Hagan & Rymond-Richmond (2009), Kiernan (2007), Powell (2004), and Power (2004)

The individualization, collectivization, and genocidal acts occurred simultaneously in Darfur. According to Hagan and Power, the Arab tribes would arrive in the villages of Darfur, kill the men, rape the women and burn the village to the ground. These acts were carried out by the Sudanese military as well as the Janjaweed--Arab militias. When these groups would act together, the likelihood of hearing racial epithets was much higher than when these groups acted alone. Derogatory names were the most common epithets heard. While racial epithets were the most common expression of anger when the military and the Janjaweed acted together, this did not hold true when the Janjaweed acted alone. When the Janjaweed acted alone in its attacks on the Darfur villages, racial epithets were heard much less often. This would seem to indicate that while the value judgments expressed during the attacks were of a highly negative nature, they were not universally held by the Arab population. When the Arab militias acted alone in their genocidal attacks, they did not resort to the negative racial epithets signaling perhaps their desire for the land over their desire to eliminate the Black African population. However, it is clear from the state's methods and statements that the elimination of the Black African tribes was the motive for the military under al-Bashir's control.

The low level of individualization also indicates the collectivization involved in the Darfur genocide. While there was collectivization on the part of the Arab tribes to assist the state in ridding the land of Black Africans, there is evidence that the collectivization was not the Arabs primary goal. It appears that the arable land was the primary goal of the Arab tribes and the genocide was the simplest method of obtaining that land. This does not absolve the Janjaweed of any responsibility, but indicates that the level of

collectivization may vary across genocides. The collective nature of the Darfur genocide entails the involvement of the state military and the Arab militias much like the genocide in Armenia and Rwanda where militias were involved. The main difference between these levels of collectivization involves the public. In Armenia and Rwanda, the public took an active role in the genocide, while in Darfur there is no sign of mass public involvement. This may be due to the fact that there is little in the way of a public in such an arid land or it may signal some difference between the level of collectivization among Armenia, Rwanda, and Darfur.

The genocide in Darfur started after Black African tribes complained to the government in Khartoum that they were being treated unfairly. This attack on the government by the tribes signaled trouble for al-Bashir. In response to these verbal attacks, he began to send the military into the Darfur region to conduct genocidal acts against the Black Africans in hopes of moving them off of the land. The military soon joined power with the Janjaweed and together they made several raids on villages throughout Darfur pushing the Black Africans who survived into refugee camps in Chad. The state clearly began the genocide as a response to the Black African tribes seeking fair representation in the government.

Citing orders from the president of the Republic, "You are informed that directives have been issued...to change the demography of Darfur and empty it of African tribes" through burning, looting and killing "of intellectuals and youths who may join the rebels in fighting" (Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2008: 133).

These orders were carried out by both the military and the Janjaweed. Police were disarmed prior to the genocide so that they could not reasonably defend the villages against attack.

Twenty minutes before Gobe was attacked, I received a message on the radio...from Genuine saying, "All police are to stay inside the office." The government military and Janjaweed attacked the village. The military were in trucks with Daska machine guns. They remained outside the village and shot into it. The militia were on horses, camels, and on foot. Those on foot stole the animals and the rest rode through the village shooting...and destroying the homes (Hagan & Rymond-Richmond, 2007: 152-153).

While there is no accurate count of the number of people killed since the beginning of the genocide in Darfur, an accepted account puts the total near 400,000. There is currently tentative peace in the region while millions of Darfuri still live in substandard refugee camps on the border between Darfur and Chad.

CHAPTER EIGHT**ANALYSIS**

“The United Nations was founded as a reaction to the horrors of the Second World War. Even so, the international community has too often failed to stand up to mass atrocities. Let us pledge ourselves to even greater efforts to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity.”

-Kofi Annan
Former UN Secretary-General

INTRODUCTION

AS HAS BEEN EXPLAINED IN PREVIOUS CHAPTERS, GENOCIDE is a complex social action that eschews any simple explanation. Due to its complexity, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is an appropriate analytical tool. To begin, QCA considers cases holistically as a complex configuration (Miethe & Regoeczi, 2004). This complex configuration is measured best by a set of variables that can interact with each other (Drass & Miethe, 2001). The holistic approach of QCA means that each episode of

genocide can be considered independently and the causal variables leading to each unique case of genocide can be considered independent of any one single theory or explanation.

As with any methodology, QCA comes with its own set of assumptions. The first assumption is complexity (Ragin, Mayer & Drass, 1984). Events are assumed to be produced by multiple variables acting together in combination (Miethe & Regoeczi, 2004). The effect of any one variable may be different from one case to another depending on the values of the other variables involved (Drass & Miethe, 2001). QCA also assumes that social events are conjunctural and must come together in time and place to generate the particular outcome of interest. In addition, the same outcome may be produced by several different combinations of variables (Miethe & Regoeczi, 2004). Finally, QCA allows for heterogeneity in causal conditions (Miethe & Regoeczi, 2004). QCA permits the independent variables to combine in different manners and lead to the same outcome. This complexity allows for a broader analysis of the causes of genocide and how their interactions will affect the likelihood of genocide in any particular situation.

The first step in qualitative comparative analysis is to construct a truth table from the data presented previously in the case studies. The truth table is a representation of a set of variable configurations and their associated outcome (Ragin, Mayer, & Drass, 1984). With five causal variables, there are a potential sixty-four combinations of variables (see Table 2). However, only those combinations that appear at least once are represented in the truth table (Table 3). Once a truth table is constructed, QCA compares configurations looking for commonalities that permit for configurations to be combined into simpler representations (Miethe & Regoeczi, 2004). Since QCA is based

on Boolean algebra, each causal variable has been dichotomized for QCA purposes. The nation-state regime type has been dichotomized along theoretical lines as autocratic or democratic. The socially constructed groups involved in genocide have been dichotomized as present or absent as has been the variables collectivization and triggering catalyst. A yes in the truth table represents the presence of the variable and a no in the truth table represents the variable's absence. The causal variable of individualization is dichotomized as high or low; when the presence of negative value judgments of the minority group is especially high or dangerous the variable is labeled high, when the value judgments are neutral or mild in nature, the variable is labeled low. The purpose of the truth table is to highlight what combinations of causal variables will produce the outcome variable of interest, in this case genocide.

Using Boolean algebra, two configurations can be minimized if the expressions differ in one causal variable yet produce the same outcome (Ragin, 1987). This minimization will lead to the elimination of unnecessary variables. QCA considers a variable unnecessary if its presence or absence has no impact on the outcome associated with the configuration (Miethe & Regoeczi, 2004). For example, if the configuration ABc and Abc both lead to Y (where capital letters represent the presence of the variable and lower case letters represent its absence), the variable B would be considered unnecessary because outcome Y appears both when B is present and when B is absent. This means the simplified configuration becomes Ac , which means when the presence of variable A combines with the absence of variable C , the outcome Y will be present.

Configurations leading to genocide

From the truth table it can be seen that there were ten episodes of genocide present with different causal combinations. In Boolean algebra, the addition sign indicates logical OR and multiplication indicates logical AND (Ragin, 1987). The variables in the configurations will be labeled as follows: A = autocratic government, a = democratic government; S = socially constructed groups present, s = socially constructed groups absent; I = high individualization, i = low individualization; C = collectivization present, c = collectivization absent; T = triggering catalyst present, t = triggering catalyst absent. There were seven unique combinations of causal variables that led to genocide. The configurations that led to genocide were as follows:

A•S•i•c•T (Herero)

A•S•I•C•T (Armenia, Rwanda)

A•S•i•c•t (Bangladesh, Bosnia)

A•S•I•C•t (Germany)

A•S•I•C•T (Burundi, Darfur)

A•S•I•c•T (Iraq)

A•S•i•C•t (East Timor)

All seven combinations share an autocratic government. There were no examples of genocide occurring in a democratic state, much like Rummel (1995) found in his analysis. This does not mean that genocide could never occur in a democratic state just that it has not been found in the configurations that led to genocide in these situations. In addition, all seven configurations share the presence of socially constructed groups. This means that all episodes of genocide analyzed here include the presence of distinct social groups. This adds to the work on how ethnic divisions lead to genocide because the presence of socially constructed groups has been shown to be a necessary element of genocide beyond the UN definition which restricts

genocide to certain groups (Williams, 1994). While these socially constructed groups did not always appear along ethnic lines, they did appear along divisions recognized in the UN Convention on Genocide including religion (Armenia), race (Herero), ethnicity (Rwanda) and nationality (Bangladesh).

The configurations begin to diverge on the variable of individualization. There are four configurations where low individualization led to genocide (Herero, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Burundi, Darfur, and East Timor) and three configurations where high individualization led to genocide (Armenia, Rwanda, Germany, Iraq). Since this variable is not coded as present or absent, it cannot be simplified; by coding the individualization as low or high its presence is assumed based on the work of Hagan and Raymond-Richmond (2009) and other work on the negative judgments involved in genocide. Future research may wish to code this variable in a categorical way to allow for its presence or absence in configurations. As genocide occurred in the presence of both low and high individualization it may be better to code the variable as present or absent to see if individualization of the out-group is necessary for genocide to occur.

With the base configuration of A•S•i, there are three instances of genocide occurring in the presence of collectivization (Burundi, Darfur, East Timor) and three instances of genocide occurring in the absence of collectivization (Herero, Bangladesh, Bosnia). These cases were diverse in their location and time period. This may mean that the collectivization variable is unnecessary when combined with other configurations, which would undermine Hagan's reliance on collectivization in the original theory. The first and third configurations can be combined into A•S•i•T where collectivization becomes an unnecessary variable. This combination says that in an

autocratic state with socially constructed groups, low individualization and a triggering catalyst, genocide will occur regardless of the presence or absence of collectivization. This supports much of Hagan's theory and the modifications made, however, it does indicate that collectivization is not the only way for people to become involved in genocide as Hagan and Rymond-Richmond stated in their theory. The second and fourth configurations can be combined into $A \bullet S \bullet i \bullet t$ which means that an autocratic state with socially constructed groups, low individualization, and the absence of a triggering catalyst may produce genocide. This again supports elements of Hagan's collective action theory but not the collectivization variable hypothesized to be the meso-level link. This does support the modifications made to Hagan's theory because in QCA the absence of a variable does not mean it is unnecessary, but instead that its absence is necessary. As will be seen later, the above two configurations can be combined further.

The final causal variable of triggering catalyst has results similar to collectivization. There are three episodes of genocide occurring in the presence of a triggering catalyst (Herero, Burundi, Darfur [all genocides occurring in Africa]) and three genocides occurring in the absence of a triggering catalyst (Bangladesh, Bosnia, East Timor [representing Europe and Asia]). The first and second configurations can be combined into $A \bullet S \bullet i \bullet c$ where genocide will occur in an autocratic state with socially constructed groups, low individualization and the absence of collectivization. This supports Hagan's collective action theory except that the absence of collectivization is necessary, contrary to Hagan's original theory. These genocides are best exemplified by military action against the target group as in Iraq and the Herero genocide. Configurations three and four can be simplified to $A \bullet S \bullet i \bullet C$ where collectivization is

present in order to cause genocide such as the Burundi genocide, which involved more than just military action. This supports Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's collective action theory because individualization is present though at a low level. The simplified configurations of $A \bullet S \bullet i \bullet T$ and $A \bullet S \bullet i \bullet t$ above can be further simplified to $A \bullet S \bullet i$ as can the simplified configurations of $A \bullet S \bullet i \bullet c$ and $A \bullet S \bullet i \bullet C$. The most simplified equation is $A \bullet S \bullet i$ which means that both collectivization and triggering catalyst are unnecessary in an autocratic state with socially constructed groups and low individualization. This would indicate that there is some other factor at play between the micro-level individualization and the macro-level genocidal action. Perhaps the techniques of neutralization as used by Alvarez (1997, 2010) is one possible explanation for the transition between the micro- and macro-levels. This simplified equation calls into question Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's use of collectivization and the importance of the modifications made.

While the simplification of configurations when individualization is low produces one causal combination, the simplification of configurations when individualization is high is more complex. All three configurations share $A \bullet S \bullet I$ in common; as before the differences appear in the variables of collectivization and triggering catalyst. The first and second configurations can be simplified to $A \bullet S \bullet I \bullet C$ where a triggering catalyst becomes irrelevant in the presence of high individualization and collectivization fully supporting Hagan's original theory. Configurations one and three can be simplified into $A \bullet S \bullet I \bullet T$ where the variable collectivization is unnecessary in the presence of a triggering catalyst and high individualization. This configuration makes collectivization unnecessary, but the presence of a triggering catalyst necessary. Finally,

configurations two and three can be simplified into $A \bullet S \bullet I$ much like the simplified combination of $A \bullet S \bullet i$ above. However, since the prior two combinations cannot be simplified further together, it remains that there are three combinations of causal variables that might cause genocide represented as $A \bullet S \bullet I + A \bullet S \bullet I \bullet C + A \bullet S \bullet I \bullet T$. This means that these any of these three combinations will cause the outcome of genocide.

In total there are four causal variable combinations that will result in the outcome of genocide. $Genocide = A \bullet S \bullet i + A \bullet S \bullet I + A \bullet S \bullet I \bullet C + A \bullet S \bullet I \bullet T$. While $A \bullet S \bullet I$ is a subset of both $A \bullet S \bullet I \bullet C$ and $A \bullet S \bullet I \bullet T$, these combinations cannot be excluded because there may be situations where the absence of a triggering catalyst in the presence of collectivization and vice versa produce genocide beyond the parsimonious $A \bullet S \bullet I$.

Parsimony is desired in most statistical analyses, but QCA can operate with complexity and need not produce the most parsimonious solution possible. However, what these results show is that the variables of collectivization and triggering catalyst may not be required elements to produce genocide in every case. Where collectivization exists, the violent nature may erupt without a catalyst due to the nature of collective violence. As a goal oriented act, collective violence may find any reason to cross the line into genocide to accomplish its goals.

These results offer some support to Hagan and Raymond-Richmond's original collective action theory. The combination $A \bullet S \bullet I \bullet C$ fully supports their original hypothesis. The configurations $A \bullet S \bullet i$ and $A \bullet S \bullet I$ support much of their collective action theory except for the crucial meso-level step between the individual and the genocidal state. What these configurations highlight is that a triggering catalyst may not be

necessary. However, the final combination of A•S•I•T supports the modifications made to Hagan's theory while highlighting the weakness of the collectivization variable.

Configurations not leading to genocide

Of the ten episodes of genocide analyzed, there are three cases where a bordering nation with the same causal variables present did not erupt into genocide. These cases are coded as no genocide; the configurations leading to no genocide may broaden the scope of the modified collective action theory of genocide. Using the same variable descriptions as above, the configurations that did not lead to genocide were:

A•S•I•c•t (Rwanda 1972) A•S•I•c•T (Burundi 1994) A•S•i•c•t (Iran)

Configurations two and three appeared above in the configurations that lead to genocide in other situations. This may indicate the importance of time and place where these variables come together and interact prior to the occurrence of genocide.

Configuration one represents the situation in Rwanda in 1972 when Burundi was experiencing a genocide. An autocratic government with socially constructed groups and high individualization in the absence of collectivization and a triggering catalyst did not result in genocide. This supports the modified collective action theory, but not Hagan's reliance on collectivization. Years later, in 1994, the presence of both collectivization and triggering catalyst did result in genocide in Rwanda. The second configuration represents the variable combination in Burundi in 1994 when Rwanda was experiencing genocide but Burundi did not. The only absent variable is collectivization signaling that the lack of collectivized intent may have prevented the eruption of genocide in Burundi in the face of the assassination of their president supporting

Hagan's theory on the element of collectivization since its absence prevented a genocide from occurring. The third combination represents the situation in Iran in 1988 when Iraq was executing genocide against the Kurds, a minority group present in Iran at the same time. While there was low individualization of the Kurds, there was no collectivization or triggering catalyst to spur elimination by the Iranian government or people. This supports both Hagan and the MCAT because in the absence of collectivization and a triggering catalyst genocide does not occur.

Configurations one and two can be combined using Boolean minimization. Together they represent the following variable combination: $A \bullet S \bullet I \bullet c$ meaning an autocratic nation with socially constructed groups and high individualization in the absence of collectivization will not result in genocide; the triggering catalyst variable becomes unnecessary. No minimization of the third configuration is possible; when collectivization and triggering catalyst are absent in the presence of an autocratic nation with socially constructed groups and low individualization, genocide will not occur. This results in a final expression of when genocide will not occur. $\text{No genocide} = A \bullet S \bullet I \bullet c + A \bullet S \bullet i \bullet c \bullet t$. These configurations support Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's original theory and partially support the modification we made. Lacking collectivization, genocide did not occur seemingly meaning that collectivization is vital to the occurrence of genocide, though the above-discussed results raise questions as to the truth of that statement.

DISCUSSION

As a test of Hagan's collective action theory of genocide and the modifications made to it, the results of the QCA analysis are mixed. It was hypothesized that the

presence of all variables and high individualization would result in genocide. This was true for only two episodes of genocide—Armenia and Rwanda. The presence of all variables and low individualization was not predicted to cause genocide because low individualization dividing the groups was assumed to act as a barrier to the crime. However, there were two episodes of genocide where low individualization was present in combination with the presence of the other variables—Burundi and Darfur. These four cases of genocide would then appear to support Hagan's theory and the modifications made at least in the presence of all variables regardless of the level of individualization. However, with a small-N sample, the presence of four episodes of genocide supporting the hypothesis means that there are several cases that do not support the theory as expressed initially.

One way in which this might be explained is by dividing the genocides by perpetrator group. There were several cases of genocide where the primary, or only, perpetrators were the military of the state. In other cases, the public and paramilitaries or militias of non-official status were involved in the killing. When dividing the episodes by military genocide or not, there are five examples of military genocides (Herero, Bangladesh, East Timor, Iraq, and Bosnia and Herzegovina) and five examples of 'military plus' genocides where the public and militias were involved (Armenia, Holocaust, Burundi, Rwanda, and Darfur). Again, both military and 'military plus' genocides were diverse in location and time. Analyzing the combinations of causal variables along the military genocide division may shed more light on how Hagan and the MCAT explain genocide typology (see Dadrian, 1975).

The reduced configurations for military genocides are A•S•i and A•S•I•c•T. When an autocratic nation with socially constructed groups and low individualization co-exist in the absence of collectivization and a triggering catalyst, military executed genocide occurred. The lack of collectivization in these genocides is not unexpected since they are executed by the state's military power without the assistance of the general public or local militias. Though it is contrary to Hagan's theory because he posited that collectivization occurred in a genocide where both military and civilians acted together. Since the military is responsive to the head of the state, there may not need to be a triggering catalyst because the head of state will dictate when the genocide should occur. Only one case of military genocide involved high individualization—A•S•I•c•T. With high individualization, there was still a lack of collectivization but this time there was a triggering catalyst present. This may indicate that the triggering catalyst is important when value judgments and the 'othering' process is high but not when it is low. High individualization often results in very negative and widespread rhetoric against the target group. This may increase the likelihood of genocide and may also provide for the likelihood of a triggering catalyst occurring between the socially constructed groups that might be lacking when individualization is low.

Of the 'military plus' genocides, three exhibited high individualization and two expressed low individualization. The reduced equations for 'military plus' genocides are A•S•I•C•T, A•S•I•C, and A•S•i•C•T. As can be seen in A•S•I•C•T and A•S•i•C•T, these genocides exhibited all of the proposed elements of Hagan's collective action theory and the MCAT of genocide perhaps indicating that the theory works better for genocides involving the military, militias, and the public as perpetrators. The reduced configuration

A•S•I•C indicates that when there is an autocratic state with socially constructed groups, high individualization and collectivization, the triggering catalyst is irrelevant, fully supporting Hagan's collective action theory. The only genocide exhibiting all of these elements but lacking a triggering catalyst is the Holocaust. Since the Holocaust is often considered a unique situation there may be a variety of reasons why this configuration occurs just once in the truth table.

As can be seen from all of the reduced configurations leading to genocide some of the variables associated with Hagan and the MCAT of genocide appear to be necessary, though not sufficient. The presence of an autocratic nation appears to be necessary before genocide can occur; though since there were no examples of genocide in a democratic nation, it is speculative whether such an event could occur outside of an autocratic regime. It may seem obvious, but the data also shows that the presence of socially constructed groups is a necessary variable. This confirms the idea that genocide occurs between two or more identifiable groups. Finally, the variable of individualization also appears to be a necessary variable before genocide occurs. In the presence of either low or high individualization, genocide has been shown to occur. The presence of this variable however was assumed and further research should examine the presence or absence of individualization to fully confirm this finding.

As can be seen in Table 2, the occurrence of genocide is limited in diversity; this is not unusual for social phenomena (Ragin & Sonnett, 2005; Rihoux, 2006). Most social events are naturally limited in number and diversity. Quantitative research obscures the limits of diversity by their assumptions and techniques (Ragin & Sonnett, 2005). QCA, however, embraces the limitation in diversity. In QCA, it is understood

that social phenomena are limited in nature and could be caused by a variety of variables interacting with each other in a variety of ways (Rihoux, 2006). In fact, QCA is not intended to produce a single causal explanation of an event because it would be too unrealistically parsimonious (Rihoux, 2006). The cases where no episode of genocide can be found are known as remainders. In order to avoid the possibility of unrealistic configurations by using the remainder cases to simplify combinations, they are instead treated as 'don't care' combinations (Ragin & Sonnett, 2005). This permits the research to be replicated by future work (Rihoux, 2006). Replication is an essential part of the scientific model and permitting this study to be replicated will only increase the support for Hagan's theory and the modifications or where the theory falls short. Future research on the modified collective action theory of genocide may benefit from the use of fuzzy-set QCA. In fuzzy-set QCA, variables can be identified categorically instead of strictly dichotomously (Rihoux, 2006). This would permit the variable individualization to be categorized as present (high, medium, low) and absent. Since the variable individualization was present in all episodes of genocide at either high or low levels, it may be interesting to see results of treating this variable categorically. Hagan's theory plus the modifications appear to explain genocide to some degree and to explain 'military plus' genocides to an even finer degree, though it may be interesting to broaden the definition of genocide. As discussed earlier, there are several conflicting definitions of genocide used by scholars across different fields. One such example includes genocide against political groups that were excluded from this research. By adding politicides to the definition of genocide, the limited diversity of genocide cases

would be expanded. In addition, the theory may explain the occurrence of politicide to the same degree as genocide defined under the UN convention.

CONCLUSION

The modifications to Hagan's collective action theory of genocide rely on the work of state crime, organizational crime, and collective violence to explain one way in which genocide might occur. Viewing genocide as a crime and explaining its occurrence as a criminal event is a unique contribution to the field of genocide studies and to the field of criminology. While the theory proved to be imperfect, it is a step forward in the theorizing of genocide within criminology. As was discussed previously, only four episodes of genocide examined occurred in the presence of all of the variables in the MCAT of genocide. These four cases represented different parts of the world in time and place: Armenia (1915), Burundi (1972), Rwanda (1994), and Darfur (2003). Of these episodes, two occurred when individualization was high and two occurred with low individualization. This seems to indicate that individualization—highly important to Hagan's theory—may not be as important as the other variables to the outburst of genocide. Future research and testing should examine this variable in greater depth including making it categorical instead of dichotomous. Should individualization be found to be absent and genocide still occurs, then the process of 'othering' may be an irrelevant part of genocide, though present nonetheless in all cases studied here.

No cases of genocide were found here to have occurred in democratic nations or in the absence of socially constructed groups. This would indicate the necessity and importance that an autocratic nation with socially constructed groups has on the

occurrence of genocide. Should future episodes of genocide lack these elements further research and theorizing would have to be undertaken. On the other hand, the variables of collectivization and triggering catalyst do not seem to be as necessary to the occurrence of genocide. Genocide has happened in the absence of both of these variables. While the collectivization variables may be best explained by the division of genocide along the line of military execution and greater public involvement, there is no clear division to explain the presence or absence of the triggering catalyst. Military genocides appear to occur equally in the presence of a triggering catalyst (Herero, Iraq) and in the absence of a triggering catalyst (Bangladesh, East Timor, Bosnia and Herzegovina). However, 'military plus' genocides where public involvement was greater seem to occur mainly with a triggering catalyst. Only one such episode (the Holocaust) has no triggering catalyst and due to the extreme nature of the Holocaust and its uniqueness to a certain degree may explain why there was no need for a triggering catalyst.

The test of Hagan and the MCAT of genocide has shown that genocide is not a uniform social phenomenon. Much like crime itself, there is no one single explanation for why genocide has occurred. Each episode is a unique case study, though there are certain elements that these episodes share in common. It is these commonalities that future research and theorizing must examine in greater depth. Criminology has just begun to break its silence on genocide, yet there is much that this field can contribute to the study of the "crime of crimes." The work of state crime scholars, organizational crime scholars, and collective violence scholars is but one way to examine genocide. There are several existing theories in criminology that could be used to examine

genocide as a crime including the role of social bonds, the effects of institutional or global anomie on the state, and the presence of social disorganization or strain in societies that experience genocide. As a theory of genocide, the tested theory here is imperfect. There are many miles to go before we can explain the crime of genocide, but the goal should be to do our best to understand this crime before it happens and in the end save lives while honoring those who have been lost to genocide throughout time.

CHAPTER NINE**CONCLUSION**

The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.

-Article I,
UN Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

THE FIRST ARTICLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION on genocide recognizes that genocide is a crime. Unfortunately, for far too long, the field of criminology has not recognized this fact and has left the study of genocide to political science and other academic fields. By testing Hagan's collective action theory of genocide and offering modifications using state crime theory and organizational crime theory as a basis, the present study hopes to contribute to the appreciation of the importance of genocide to

our understanding of crime. Genocide is a unique crime in that it is rare and no two genocides are exactly alike. We must be open to other ideas from a myriad of scholarly fields in order to assess what is relevant to genocide and what is not relevant. This should encourage new work within the field much like Sutherland's (1944) introduction of the topic of white-collar crime and Chambliss's (1989) introduction of the topic of piracy.

The study of genocide actually has historical roots in criminology. Following World War II, famed criminologist Sheldon Glueck spent several years studying and writing about the Nazi war criminals and their proper punishment (see Glueck, 1942, 1943a, 1943b, 1944a, 1944b, 1946a, and 1946b). During the Nuremberg trial, where the leaders of Hitler's regime were tried for war crimes, Glueck was a special assistant to Justice Robert Jackson, the United States prosecutor (Hagan & Greer, 2002). Glueck's work provides a significant contribution to the development of an international response to war crimes (including genocide). After the Nuremberg trials, Glueck went on to conduct his famous study of juvenile delinquency. However, Glueck laid the foundation for current criminologists on which a new understanding of war crimes and genocide may be built.

As an interdisciplinary field, criminology should not fear the complexity of genocide, but instead thrive on the insights of the diversity of academics who have spoken on the topic. As was shown earlier, from law to political science, from psychology to sociology, there are myriad theories and theoretical frameworks available to discuss the phenomenon of genocide. Criminology is related to many of these fields and can draw from their insights. Furthermore, criminological theory has a number of

unique contributions to make. This is expressed very well by Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, “as we begin to study genocide it rapidly becomes apparent that our discipline [criminology] brings a rich array of theories and methods to this crucial task” (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, 2009b: 503). In this dissertation, we attempted to illustrate how criminological theory (particularly those related to organizational crime and state crime) provides conceptual building blocks for the analysis of genocide. Somewhat differently, the diverse critiques of Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s book (see Aviram, 2009; Hoffman, 2009; Matsueda, 2009; Rothe, 2009b; Savelsberg, 2009; Shaw 2010) highlight the many different ways that criminologists could contribute to the study of genocide. These reviewers tend to have much advice for the future of a criminology of genocide.

Contributions

We would like to review some of the contributions that this dissertation has made toward the bridging of the study of genocide and criminology. First, Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s collective action theory of genocide is a new addition to the field of criminology and genocide studies. The authors tested their theory as it applied to the situation in Darfur. In this dissertation, we tested Hagan’s theory on a broader spectrum of genocide cases. The purpose of testing Hagan’s theory on several episodes of genocide was to determine if his theory may be generalizable over a larger number of cases. The results of this analysis seem to call into question Hagan’s reliance on collectivization as the meso-level step between the individual and the commission of genocide at the state level. Several genocides occurred without collectivization of the

society; this indicates that there may be a stronger linking mechanism between the micro- and macro-level elements of Hagan's collective action theory. True collectivization as explained in the collective action and collective violence literature was present in only half of the episodes of genocide examined. Therefore, there may be another theoretical way to explain an individual's participation in genocide. Perhaps individual strain or neutralization techniques lead some people to participate in genocide, but not others. In addition, the analysis shows mixed results for the modifications we made by adding the element of triggering catalyst. While not completely without merit, there have been episodes of genocide lacking a triggering catalyst. The question then becomes what sparks the initial violence of genocide. Perhaps other theories of crime can contribute to our understanding of this transition including lack of social control or lack of self control among perpetrators. The opportunity for genocide arises somehow whether through the presence of a triggering catalyst or some other manner. Social bond and self-control theory may provide some answers to the opportunity issue when there is no legitimate control to hold back the genocidal tendencies.

Thornberry (1989) has suggested using theoretical elaboration as a strategy for theory building. Theoretical elaboration begins with a particular theory and then extends it as far as one can "to build a more and more comprehensive model by logical extension of the basic propositions" (Thornberry, 1989: 56). In this process, the theorist may incorporate compatible propositions and concepts from other theories (Akers & Sellers, 2004). This dissertation has been an attempt to elaborate upon Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's collective action theory of genocide. In the process, we have

broadened the scope of the theory by eliminating references to race and opening the categories of victims to include ethnicity, nationality, and religion as well. In addition, we have incorporated the work of state crime, organized crime, and collective violence to strengthen the original theory.

From a broad spectrum there are many things to take from theorizing on state crime when analyzing genocide. Rothe (2009a) describes three aspects that could lead to state crime when they occur. First, the state as a criminal actor may be motivated by economic pressure, political goals, or anomie (Kramer & Michalowski, 2005). As can be seen in the discussion of several genocides previously, they are motivated for a variety of reasons, which include economic and political goals. Rothe (2009a) then says that state crime can occur when the state controls information, propaganda and the military. Most of the genocides analyzed here include an element of the state controlling propaganda and the military. In several cases, the military is the sole perpetrator of the genocide. Finally, Rothe (2009a) concludes that state crime could occur when public opinion is not an effective constraint. In many episodes of genocide the public participates in the slaughter rather than fight against it. This lack of constraint can influence the state in its decision to implement and continue genocide. Further, state crime research has found that pressure to achieve one's goals may intersect with illegitimate means for success, which then provides the opportunity for the state to succeed (Kramer & Michalowski, 2005). The opportunity to commit genocide often arises from the states control of the military and propaganda.

Just as we find that state crime research is very compatible and useful for the analysis of genocide, work done on organizational crime in criminology appears to be

quite applicable to the study of genocide. Organizations are often motivated by economic pressures and an attempt to achieve their goals (Vaughan, 1982). When the legitimate opportunities to achieve these goals become blocked, illegitimate means may become available and be seen as the best way to reach the organization's desires (Braithwaite, 1989). Again, pressure and illegitimate opportunities provide the possibility of crime. The work of state crime and organizational crime provides many directions that the research of genocide can take in the future. What influences the state when they face economic and political pressure from within? Perhaps the idea of state anomie explains how the state can be a criminal actor.

The modifications to Hagan's collective action theory of genocide are an attempt to incorporate knowledge from state crime and organizational crime to the study of genocide. As Rothe (2009b) noted, Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's collective action theory would be stronger if they engaged the literature from state crime. By doing so, we hope we further reinforced the strength of the collective action theory of genocide. In addition, we broadened the collective action theory by removing all specific references to race in Hagan and Rymond-Richmond's initial expression of the theory. In this way, the MCAT is more general with greater applicability than the original theory, which is important because genocide can be executed on race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion. The ability to explain genocide should include all of these rationales. Finally, we add to the theory the triggering catalyst that ignites genocidal furor. By adding this element, we hoped to show that genocidal priming may occur, but without a triggering event, there would not be a genocide. While the QCA results were mixed on this

expectation, our study did assess the necessity of a triggering catalyst in the explanation of genocide.

Future research

Future research on the MCAT and the topic of genocide in general could benefit from using a variety of research methods. Allowing variables to be broader than only dichotomous would permit more variation in findings. This could be accomplished by using fuzzy-set QCA, which allows variables to be continuous rather than solely dichotomous. The variable of individualization could be categorized as low, medium, high, instead of just high/low as in this study. This would make it easier to classify examples into multiple categories including the presence of value judgments produced by the government, or by the media, or by the average citizen. Also, we could try to find cases where individualization actually is absent to test if the process of individualization must occur before genocide is committed. The state regime type could be broader than just autocracy and democracy to include mixed regimes styles. This would address the issue over what types of states execute genocide and is important especially with the growing number of hybrid regimes. The use of fuzzy-set QCA would also approach quantitative methodology that often finds more support than qualitative methods.

Another methodology that would work well for the topic of genocide is comparative historical analysis. Comparative-historical analysis (CHA) is best understood as a methodology oriented toward the explanation of substantively important outcomes (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003). CHA is designed to answer questions about large-scale outcomes. When cases share an outcome, they can be

systematically compared across time to understand the causes of these large-scale outcomes (Mahoney, 2004). Genocide appears to be a solid case for comparative historical analysis across time and place to see if there are common causes to genocide.

Future research should also address the mechanics of how genocide is perpetrated by the state. It may be relevant to separate the regime of the state into more specific categories including military government, theocracy, dictatorship, or monarchy. Each of these different regimes would be able to execute genocide in a different manner, either through military rule or decree. Being able to explain how the structure of the state influences the commission of genocide helps in both the understanding of genocide and the ability to predict future scenarios where genocide could erupt. The variable of collectivization in Hagan's theory of genocide appears to be irrelevant in many episodes of genocide. The field of collective violence seemed to be a strong way to explain genocide because of its focus on the achieving of a goal through the mass mobilization of people (Barkan & Snowden, 2001). However, the analysis of Hagan's theory found that several episodes of genocide were completed without collectivization or mass mobilization. That leaves the question of what mobilizes genocide. The answer may be found in other criminological theories that are used to explain crime. The techniques of neutralization have been used as a template to explain the Holocaust (Alvarez, 1997, 2010) offering a way to explain an individual's choice to participate in genocide. Perhaps the theory of anomie or social control can be used to help explicate the cause of genocide; the only way to know is for future research to address the issue of genocide as an important topic. Global anomie (see

Passas, 2000) speaks to the ability for a state to experience normlessness and isolation, which might influence the state's decision to commit large scale criminal events because of their feeling of detachment from the rest of the global community. Social control theory may be useful in explaining those cases of genocide where there was no triggering catalyst; the lack of adequate social control may be enough to cross that boundary from genocidal thoughts to genocidal action.

Limitations

The analysis of Hagan and the proposed MCAT does come with some limitations that should be recognized. The first limitation is the sample size of the population. Since genocide is a crime that occurs relatively infrequently, there are a limited number of cases that can be analyzed. A small-N population size means that we must be careful making generalizations. With a small sample size we may miss several cases that could negate our findings. Thus we must not over-generalize to situations that were not tested here. Further, QCA requires that variables be dichotomous, which imposes a limitation on the nature of our variables. Each variable had to be dichotomized when allowing for a more categorical variable may supply better variety and more depth to the analysis.

There are certainly understandable limitations to criminology when addressing genocide. It is difficult to gather information about genocide because of its rare occurrence. Also, genocides that occur in Africa or Asia or Europe may be difficult to study from the United States. This lack of data influences the issues that scholars wish to address. The more scholars who study genocide the easier it will be to study

genocide because of the ability to share information and work together. As idiosyncratic as it may seem, the best way to increase the ability to study genocide is to increase the study of genocide.

Another limitation that should be noted is our use of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Although this method definitely has distinct advantages (as pointed out in the chapter on methodology), there are limitations associated with the approach. For example, it forces the categorization of essentially qualitative variables into simple absent/present or high/low quantitative variables. The use of this method does not allow one to make full use of the rich qualitative data that often exists.

While much of this work has been theoretical in nature, I wish to conclude with a return to the victims of genocide. Over the years, the world has lost millions of human lives to the barbaric crime of genocide. It must always be remembered that genocide destroys more than just people, it can destroy a culture, a way of life. It may be politically correct to adhere to the idea of "Never Again," but we have all failed to follow through on that promise. As Martin Niemoller wrote,

In Germany they came first for the Communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics, and I didn't speak up because I was a Protestant. Then they came for me, and by that time no one was left to speak up.

We may not have the ability to save everyone from the horrors of genocide, but we should feel the obligation to do as much as we can to understand and prevent genocide.

“Whoever destroys a soul, it is considered as if he destroyed an entire world. And whoever saves a life, it is considered as if he saved an entire world.”¹⁶

¹⁶ Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 4:8 (37a).

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Table 1: The many definitions of genocide

Author	Field of Study	Definition of Genocide	Use of definition
Raphael Lemkin	Law	"[A] coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves" (Power, 2002: 43).	This definition was used prior to the UN Convention.
United Nations	Law	Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.	This definition is used for prosecution of genocide perpetrators. Currently being used by the ICTY and ICTR.
Chalk/Jonassohn	History/ sociology	"A form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrators"	This definition was used in Chalk & Jonassohn's historical study.
Israel Charny	Sociology	"Genocide in the generic sense is the mass killing of substantial numbers of human beings, when not in the course of military action against the military forces of an avowed enemy, under conditions of the essential defenselessness and helplessness of the victims"	This definition has been called too broad and is used only by Charny.
Martin Shaw	International Relations/ Politics	Genocide is "a form of violent social conflict, or war, between armed power organizations that aim to destroy civilian social groups and those groups and other actors who resist this destruction"	This definition has not been adopted by anyone at this point.

Helen Fein	Sociology	"Genocide is sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim"	This definition is prominent in sociological studies of genocide because of Fein's prominence in the field.
Leo Kuper	Sociology	Adopts UN definition but adds political groups and recognizes a nexus between war and genocide.	Used by Kuper but acknowledged as reasonable extension.

Table 2	Causal Variables					Outcome Variable
QCA possible combinations	Nation-State	Socially Constructed Groups	Individualization The 'other'	Collectivization	Triggering Catalyst	Genocide
	Democracy/Autocracy	Yes/No	High/Low	Yes/No	Yes/No	Yes/No
	Democracy	Yes	High	Yes	Yes	?
	Democracy	Yes	High	Yes	No	?
	Democracy	Yes	High	No	Yes	?
	Democracy	Yes	High	No	No	?
	Democracy	Yes	Low	Yes	Yes	?
	Democracy	Yes	Low	Yes	No	?
	Democracy	Yes	Low	No	Yes	?
	Democracy	Yes	Low	No	No	?
	Democracy	No	High	Yes	Yes	?
	Democracy	No	High	Yes	No	?
	Democracy	No	High	No	Yes	?
	Democracy	No	High	No	No	?
	Democracy	No	Low	Yes	Yes	?
	Democracy	No	Low	Yes	No	?
	Democracy	No	Low	No	Yes	?
	Democracy	No	Low	No	No	?
	Autocracy	Yes	High	Yes	Yes	Yes:2
	Autocracy	Yes	High	Yes	No	Yes
	Autocracy	Yes	High	No	Yes	Yes:1 No:1
	Autocracy	Yes	High	No	No	No
	Autocracy	Yes	Low	Yes	Yes	Yes: 2
	Autocracy	Yes	Low	Yes	No	Yes
	Autocracy	Yes	Low	No	Yes	Yes
	Autocracy	Yes	Low	No	No	Yes:2 No:1
	Autocracy	No	High	Yes	Yes	?
	Autocracy	No	High	Yes	No	?
	Autocracy	No	High	No	Yes	?
	Autocracy	No	High	No	No	?
	Autocracy	No	Low	Yes	Yes	?
	Autocracy	No	Low	Yes	No	?
	Autocracy	No	Low	No	Yes	?
	Autocracy	No	Low	No	No	?

Table 2
Possible and Actual QCA Combinations

	Causal Variables					Outcome Variable
	Nation-State Political Organization (A)	Socially Constructed Groups (S)	Individualization The 'other' (H/L)	Collectivization (C)	Triggering Catalyst (T)	Genocide (G)
	Democracy/Autocracy	Yes/No	High/Low	Yes/No	Yes/No	Yes/No
Herero (1905)	Autocracy	Yes	Low	No	Yes	Yes
Armenians (1915)	Autocracy	Yes	High	Yes	Yes	Yes
Germany (1939)	Autocracy	Yes	High	Yes	No	Yes
Bangladesh (1971)	Autocracy	Yes	Low	No	No	Yes
Burundi (1972)	Autocracy	Yes	Low	Yes	Yes	Yes
Rwanda (1972)	Autocracy	Yes	High	No	No	No
East Timor (1975)	Autocracy	Yes	Low	Yes	No	Yes
Iraq (1988)	Autocracy	Yes	High	No	Yes	Yes
Iran (1988)	Autocracy	Yes	Low	No	No	No
Rwanda (1994)	Autocracy	Yes	High	Yes	Yes	Yes
Burundi (1994)	Autocracy	Yes	High	No	Yes	No
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995)	Autocracy	Yes	Low	No	No	Yes
Darfur (2003)	Autocracy	Yes	Low	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 3 QCA Truth Table




Figure 1
Theories of Genocide Flowchart
Adapted structure from Hiebert (2008)
Layout and accompanying theorists is the
work of Pruitt (2011)




Figure 2
Collective Action Theory of Genocide




Figure 3
Modified Collective Action Theory of Genocide